دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی جهت گیری های ذی نفع و مدیریت هزینه - وایلی 2017

Abstract

We examine the effect of stakeholder orientation on firms’ cost management as proxied by selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) cost stickiness. Using a sample of 19,783 firm-years, we find that customer and employee orientation are associated with greater SG&A cost stickiness. Furthermore, the effect of customer orientation on SG&A cost stickiness is more prominent in firms where SG&A costs create high future value, growth firms, and firms with strong corporate governance. In contrast, the effect of employee orientation on SG&A cost stickiness is stronger in firms where SG&A costs create low future value, mature firms, and firms with weak corporate governance. Overall, the association between customer orientation and SG&A cost stickiness is consistent with efficiency considerations (i.e., adjustment costs). In contrast, the association between employee orientation and SG&A cost stickiness is consistent with agency motives such as empire building or “a preference for a quiet life.” In sum, we provide evidence that corporate orientation toward different stakeholders can have different efficiency implications in the context of SG&A resource adjustments and cost management.

5. Conclusion

The business community is paying greater attention to stakeholders (Hillman et al. 2009; Wang 2013). However, the implications of stakeholder orientation for internal management practices remain largely unexplored. Building upon both adjustment cost theory and agency theory, we predict that SG&A cost stickiness increases with customer and employee orientation. Using a sample of 19,783 firm-years between 1991 and 2013, we find results consistent with these predictions. Furthermore, SG&A cost stickiness increases with customer orientation for firms where SG&A costs create greater future value, firms with high growth potential, and firms with strong corporate governance. Conversely, SG&A cost stickiness increases with employee orientation for firms where SG&A costs create low future value, firms with low growth potential, and firms with weak corporate governance. In sum, adjustment cost theory better explains the effect of customer orientation on SG&A cost stickiness, whereas agency theory helps to explain the association between employee orientation and SG&A cost stickiness. We provide initial evidence that stakeholder orientation affects SG&A capacity adjustment decisions and SG&A cost stickiness. We base our predictions on adjustment cost theory and agency theory, which also helps to differentiate between efficient and excessive SG&A cost stickiness (Banker and Byzalov 2014). Our findings add to the ongoing discussions among managers and academics by showing the diverging implications of stakeholder orientation for capacity management. By examining customer and employee orientation separately, we provide some evidence that managerial commitment to customers is more consistent with corporate efficiency considerations (i.e., adjustment costs), whereas corporate orientation toward employees helps to rationalize managers’ agency incentives to delay or refrain from cutting idle resources.