- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
Small- and medium-sized firms in China have competed passively with advantaged enterprises since 2000, and the prosperity indexes have always been in the recession. This paper aims to find the optimal positioning–pricing strategies for disadvantaged small- and medium-sized firms and explore the complex influence of consumer preference uncertainty in the optimal strategies in duopoly market. In order to do so, the classic Hotelling model is modified to be a heterogeneous duopoly game model under consumer preference uncertainty. By using the backward recurrence algorithm, we first get the optimal equilibrium and then figure out the expected equilibrium solution through mathematical expectation method. The computational results show that disadvantaged enterprises could survive themselves in fierce competition as long as they choose appropriate strategies. In addition, consumer preference uncertainty plays a significant role in affecting the optimal strategy decisions of positioning and pricing in duopoly since producers can hardly obtain complete and perfect information about the market. Specifically, the increased uncertainty of consumer preference generally raises the expected equilibrium price and profit of duopoly enterprises. However, the expected equilibrium profit of the advantaged enterprise in a duopoly decreases with consumer preference uncertainty increasing under certain conditions.
The flaws of the classic Hotelling model are pointed out in this paper, and a modified Hotelling model is constructed. Compared with classic Hotelling, this modified model in this paper has two obvious differences: (1) Product position in this paper does not mean spatial localization but the level of quality. (2) This paper searches the indifference point neither through the increased amount of consumer utility nor taking account of transportation cost. The conception of “superfluous function” is introduced, and therefore the equilibrium position for disadvantaged enterprise can be easily obtained through calculating the reduction of consumer utility. Finally, equilibrium solution of positioning–pricing game is calculated.
This modified Hotelling model is closer to real market than the classic one because of the relaxed assumptions and the addition of uncertain consumer preference. In the classic model, the equilibrium locations of duopoly are both in the center of the market and the equilibrium prices are both equal to marginal costs, which means no one could make profits in that case. The modified model in this paper reasonably explains why different enterprises have different positioning– pricing strategies in reality from the view of mathematics. In addition, considering that consumer preference uncertainty is largely affecting enterprises’ competitive strategies, this proposal could be very helpful to address real problems in which it is required to improve the firms’ competitive power without complete and perfect information about consumer preference.