- مبلغ: ۸۶,۰۰۰ تومان
- مبلغ: ۹۱,۰۰۰ تومان
We investigate an experimental labor market setting in which we introduce the novel aspect that workers have the chance of investing money in a long-term project in order to increase their income. We find a strong relationship between what happens inside the labor market (worker’s performance) and what happens outside the labor market (long-term investment). Contrary to the theoretical predictions with selfish preferences, we find that the mere presence of long-term projects acts as an effort-enforcement device; this effect seems to be driven by an increase in long-term employment relationships. In the other direction, long-term labor relationships seem to provide a safer environment for undertaking successful long-term projects. This article also considers three different types of experimental labor contracts. We find that performance-based dismissal barriers, whereby firms are required to retain workers if they have satisfied the effort level required by firms, lead to more long-term employment relationships and higher overall productivity. As theory predicts, the presence of renewable dismissal barriers makes it likely that workers will provide the desired effort level. Firms appear to correctly anticipate this, leading to greater social efficiency.
We study how some crucial decisions that people must make outside of the labor market affect performance and productivity in the labor market and vice versa, i.e., how labor market conditions affect workers’ willingness to get involved in long-term projects. Having a strong degree of stability in employment has been one of the historical main aspirations of the working population. Trade unions have pursued employment protection (dismissal barriers) as a mechanism to help achieve this stability. There are two polar cases. In environments such as the private sector in the U.S., dismissal is typically on an at-will basis, so that insecurity about future employment is likely to deter such investment. At the other extreme, non-performance-based and permanent dismissal barriers (present to some degree in many European labor markets) provide little or no incentive for workers to perform at a high level. This may have a very adverse effect on worker productivity and firm profitability. In this article, we examine how labor market decisions are affected by incorporating the opportunity for workers to invest in long-term projects. Contrary to the theoretical predictions with selfish preferences, we find that the mere presence of long-term projects acts as an effortenforcement device. This result seem to be driven by an increase in long-term relationships. Workers perceived additional incentives to enhance their performance when they had the option of investing in a long-term project. We also study the importance of connecting job security to performance by introducing dismissal barriers that are based on recent performance and comparing it with non performance-based dismissal barriers.