دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی حقوق و دستمزد کارکنان بخش حسابرسی و کیفیت حسابرسی - اشپرینگر 2018

Abstract

This study examines the relation between audit personnel salaries and officelevel audit quality. We measure audit personnel salaries at the associate, senior, and manager ranks for Big 4 audit offices from 2004 to 2013, using unique individualauditor-level data obtained from the U.S. Department of Labor. We find that offices that pay lower salaries have a higher percentage of clients that experience restatements. In related analyses, we also find lower levels of audit quality when audit employees are paid less, relative to other lines of service in accounting firms. Finally, we document positive and significant associations between salary and fees, suggesting that audit offices pass some of the cost of higher labor onto their clients. Overall, our findings provide important initial evidence on the role of audit salary and its relation to audit quality and audit fees.

Conclusion

This study provides important insights regarding the role of salary in the auditing industry. Specifically, we conduct three types of analyses to explore the factors that relate to variation in audit personnel salaries, whether audit salaries relate to audit quality, and the extent to which audit firms can pass on audit salaries to their clients. We conduct these analyses using data collected from H-1B visa applications to create proxies for salary across associates, seniors, and managers employed by Big 4 audit offices in the United States from 2004 to 2013. First, we provide descriptive evidence regarding the factors related to audit personnel salary. We show that individuals who work for firms with greater local audit market share receive lower salaries. We also find that salaries tend to be higher for offices with more diverse clients and for offices in locations where the cost of living is higher. Second, we demonstrate that salary is positively related to audit quality. We find that higher levels of salary are associated with reduced restatement frequency, after controlling for factors related to restatements as well as the trade-offs that audit personnel appear to make when accepting a given level of wage. Finally, we show that audit offices do not bear all of the costs of increased costs of labor, as they appear to be able to pass some of the costs to their clients. We document positive and significant associations between salary and office level fees.