دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی دستمزد و فساد بخش دولتی: مطالعه تجربی - الزویر 2018

Abstract

An important public-policy question is whether public-sector wages can be used to deter corruption. We study the relation between public-sector wages and corruption in China. Our measure of corruption is the value of bribes obtained by government officials as reported in court proceedings. The data cover the period 1985 to 2014. We hypothesize that the public-sector wage is a reference point for bribe payers and bribe takers in determining the value of bribes, and that external wage opportunities for comparison with public-sector wages, as proposed by the fair-wage hypothesis, are not required to determine the relation between public-sector wages and corruption. Our empirical estimates confirm our hypothesis. We find no consistent support for the fair-wage hypothesis but a systematic U-shaped relation between the public-sector wage and corruption measured as the value of bribes. We conclude that ‘carrots’ of higher public-sector wages reduce corruption when the public-sector wage is low, but, when the public-sector wage is high, ‘sticks’ rather than carrots seem to be required to deter corruption.

6. Conclusions

Using our measure of corruption from the China Corruption Database as the values of bribes received by government officials, we have found no consistent evidence for the fair-wage hypothesis, which requires comparison of the public-sector wage with an external wage reference. We find evidence that the relation between the absolute value of the public-sector wage and our measure of corruption as the value of individual government officials’ bribes is U-shaped. Increasing public-sector wages, ceteris paribus, reduces corruption when provincial public-sector wages and income levels are low. The corruption-deterrent effect of a higher public-sector wage diminishes and eventually comes to an end as provincial per capita income grows. Carrots and sticks can be used in fighting corruption. A bribe is attractive to underpaid civil servants, especially when they are struggling for subsistence. In this case, a few more carrots (increases in the public-sector wage) will work. When income grows to higher levels, sticks seem to be required as carrots alone do not satisfy insatiable people.