دانلود رایگان مقاله تاثیر تعارض آژانس بین مدیران و عملکرد صاحبان خانواده در شرکت خانوادگی

Abstract

This study analyses the effects of agency conflict between “active family owners” (who participate in firm management) and “passive family owners” (who do not do so) on the performance in unlisted Spanish family firms wholly owned by family members. We employ agency theory to argue that ownership concentration by active family owners and governance mechanisms (direct control by passive family owners, existence of board of directors, and family governance mechanisms) improve the firm performance and that this effect intensifies in later-generation firms. Our findings show that family managers’ ownership and family governance mechanisms have a positive influence on the performance in second- and later-generation firms. The results also show a positive effect of direct control by passive family owners over active family owners in second- and later-generation firms. However, the existence of a board of directors is not related to family firms’ performance.

5. Conclusions

In the present study, we focused on the conflicts of interests between active family owners and passive family owners in different generational stages. Our findings that family managers’ ownership concentration and the presence of family governance mechanisms positively influence the firm performance in family firms wholly owned by the family are evidences of this agency conflict. Thus, our findings complement the previous studies on the differences among family firms and their consequences on the performance (Arosa et al., 2010a; Basco, 2013; De Massis et al., 2013; Sciascia et al., 2014) by exploring a different agency conflict. It might be argued that our findings suggest that a high level of ownership by family managers may reduce their willingness to behave as stewards of the family because this may harm the firm performance and therefore their personal economic interests. For instance, family managers with high levels of ownership may be less altruistic toward other family members. However, this argument is less supported by our finding that governance mechanisms, particularly family-specific governance mechanisms, are positively related to the firm performance in second- and latergeneration family firms. We found that ownership concentration by family managers impairs the performance in first-generation family firms but improves it in second- and later-generation family firms. This finding may suggest that an entrenched founder may be reluctant to leave, that in second-generation family firms family managers focus on current rents and those of their own nuclear family unit, and that despite the growth of the family tree in third and later generations, this general condition still persists: there are loosely affiliated family units with separate objectives. Overall, these results are consistent with the finding of studies that the generational stage moderates the relationship between family involvement and firm performance (Arosa et al., 2010a, 2010b; Bammens et al., 2008; Sciascia et al., 2014).