دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی فرار از مالیات در برزیل - امرالد 2018

INTRODUCTION

Surveys usually draw a line between legal under-reporting of tax obligations, known as tax avoidance, and illegal undervaluation, or tax evasion. In the field of economics, however, it is impossible to distinguish between the two (Lipatov, 2005). In this situation, it makes sense to split these understatements into simple and sophisticated, rather than into evasion and avoidance. Simple tax evasion means not using either specialized accounting or financial specialists. Fiscal responsibility of substatements that require special knowledge will be called sophisticated tax evasion [sophisticated tax evasion: Lipatov (2005)]. It is noteworthy that there is no measurement of any type of tax evasion available. Schneider (2006), for example, used informal sector as a proxy to tax evasion. Sophisticated evasion prevents such attempts, because arrangements that are more complex are being considered. Therefore, we observed large cases of inspection and audit in proportion of tax revenue from taxpayers in total tax revenue. In the US, as noted by Slemrod (2004), the latter US fell from 6.4 percent of GDP in 1951 to less than 1.5 percent of GDP in recent years. Indirect evidence for the maintenance of sophisticated evasion is provided by the fact that the largest taxpayers in the US have paid less tax in the last three years, even when they increased yields, as shown by Browning (2004). To solve this problem, many countries have made tax reforms and introduced revenue mobilization (Bekoe et al., 2015). However, academic papers in this area are scarce. Tax evasion with specialists has increased in all sectors, because they need to submit their reports to audits by tax authorities regularly (every three years in most countries).

CONCLUSION

As games between the tax authorities, taxpayers, and the performance of a specialist characterize a reality that involves scandals perpetrated by large corporations and people with large fortunes, we analyzed the sophisticated evasion. Thus, it was possible to identify two types of equilibrium in a perfect subset: i) the agent does not withhold taxes, and ii) the agent evades taxes and both tax authorities do not supervise. For the equilibrium in mixed strategies, the results were the same: either not evade or withhold in the absence of full supervision. The main results of the study show that, in a high dropout situation, penalizing taxpayers either with high fines or deprivations of liberty may not be very effective. The analysis also shows that audit and inspection costs play an important role in driving the equilibrium system. This enables us to suggest the following policy: when there is a situation with tax evasion, as in the case of Brazil, investing in tax inspectors becomes a more effective tool to combat non-compliance with tax obligations than does the intensity of the penalties imposed on evaders. The analysis has several limitations, and we propose, as a first attempt, to simulate games in sequential actions of taxpayers and tax authorities in Brazil. In this sense, the study can be extended in many ways. First, it could consider a performance of specialist and the amount of tax evasion. Specialists can also hinder fraud detection and rearrange the accounts of taxpayers so that the final amount evaded is greater. Second, the study could consider the career plans of public servants who work in the fight against tax evasion in Brazil in the simulations and check whether this changes the equilibrium. Finally, to analyze the robustness of the equilibrium, it would be interesting to consider the dynamics of evasion in a repetitive game context.