VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
This paper quantitatively analyzes the role played by IDs of SOEs and those IDs’ influence on enterprises, based on the statistics of listed companies between 2009 and 2013. Contrary to the prediction of existing theories in the literature, a greater number of IDs on the board of listed SOEs does not help improve corporate performance. After analyzing IDs’ professional backgrounds, we found that more than 85% of IDs are directly or indirectly from “the party-state system”, which means either that they are easily identified (to some extent) as “dummy independent directors” or they can create shortcuts for power-to-money deals and their own private benefit. Moreover, SOEs’ performance is predicted to be better when IDs’ professional backgrounds or more diverse and when IDs either dissent or express themselves in “different voices”. Some recommendations can be made based on the above analysis. First, it is suggested that employing IDs with diverse backgrounds instead of those from “the party-state system” background can help enhance IDs’ professionalism and diversity. Furthermore, IDs should be motivated to cultivate independence and should be guided and encouraged to fulfill their responsibilities and express their actual thinking and suggestions. One of the main directions of China’s future economic development is mixed ownership. The foundation of promoting mixed ownership is the authorization of private capital in the SOE system: the construction of boards and IDs are the core elements in that process. With the extension and implementation of the mixed-ownership economic reform, IDs with a background in “the party-state system” are likely to be an historical phenomenon.