5. Conclusion
This paper examines whether high reporting quality is contagious in a similar manner as aggressive reporting is within the corporate network. I find that sharing a director with a high reporting quality firm does not impact a firm's future reporting. This is consistent with the notion that positive practices are not as contagious as negative ones, and points to an asymmetry with which reporting practices spread through the corporate network. However, high reporting quality does spread within the network but only when the firm is also interlocked with a central firm. Thus, the status of the central firms allows them to endorse high reporting, which enables such reporting to spread. The results further document that firms with ex-ante conditions for poor reporting are the most receptive the high reporting quality coming from the central firms. This indicates that susceptible to poor reporting practices stand to benefit most from such from this signal. Altogether, the results highlight that high reporting quality can be contagious, but through central firms. Thus, these central firms are in a position to initiate positive reporting contagion through their network.