6. Conclusion
Competitive regulations have always been troublesome for firms (Utton, 2011). Managers do not like policy makers to interfere in their business conduct; they prefer not to put control of innovation in the hands of government. Antitrust authorities always aim to reduce the market power of firms by making the market structure more oligopolistic or fragmented and hence promoting competition (Ghosal & Gallo, 2001). Similarly, policy makers sometimes charge managers with anticompetitive practices like cartel formation when companies actually may not be involved in this activity (Reeves & Stucke, 2011). Policy makers, in general, influence business practices in many ways. Firms do not want them to implement policies that further block their routes of competitive advantages. Broadly, firms that compete dynamically are rarely questioned by competitive authorities. Thus, the behavioral approach of competition helps firms to demonstrate their true competitive intent and relay positive signals to regulatory authorities regarding healthy competition. A firm cannot control the industry. However, by focusing on intensity, heterogeneity, and speed of its competitive moves, it can at least ensure that regulatory authorities do not unnecessarily scrutinize a competitively aggressive firm, and even if they do, that the firm is able to prove itself innocent despite having high market power or profit margin. Therefore, by reflecting the competitive intent–—and by assertive competitive dynamics–—a firm can keep regulatory authorities at bay.
