دانلود رایگان مقاله تهدید اجتماعی و تنوع فرهنگی در قدرت هنجارهای اجتماعی: پایه تکاملی

abstract

The strengths of social norms vary considerably across cultures, yet little research has shown whether such differences have an evolutionary basis. Integrating research in cross-cultural psychology with evolutionary game theory, we show that groups that face a high degree of threat develop stronger norms for organizing social interaction, with a higher degree of norm–adherence and higher punishment for deviant behavior. Conversely, groups that have little threat can afford to have weaker norms with less punishment for deviance. Our results apply to two kinds of norms: norms of cooperation, in which individuals must choose whether to cooperate (thereby benefitting everyone) or enrich themselves at the expense of others; and norms of coordination, in which there are several equally good ways for individuals to coordinate their actions, but individuals need to agree on which way to coordinate. This is the first work to show that different degrees of norm strength are evolutionarily adaptive to societal threat. Evolutionary game theoretic models of cultural adaptation may prove fruitful for exploring the causes of many other cultural differences that may be adaptive to particular ecological and historical contexts.

Discussion

Strength of social norms and associated norm-enforcement differ widely around the globe. The models and experiments presented in this paper demonstrate that high levels of threat create evolutionary pressures toward stronger norms for organizing social action, whereas low levels of threat allow for cultural populations with weaker norms. Cultural groups facing chronic high levels of threat evolve higher norm-adherence and higher levels of norm-enforcement than cultures exposed to relatively low levels of threat, both in cooperation as well as coordination games, and these results are mediated by the property of diminishing marginal returns in fitness of payoffs. Our models also show that temporary increases in threat cause norm strength to increase until the threat subsides, at which point behavioral norms begin returning to their previous level. This is analogous, for example, to situations where a society that has had relatively low levels of threat is faced with a temporary threat on its own soil (e.g., the 9/11 in the U.S.). Thus these results support correlational research that show that exposure to threat is an important driving factor in the evolution and maintenance of cultural differences in norm-strength and punishment of deviation (Gelfand et al., 2011; Harrington & Gelfand, 2014).