دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی افشای اختیاری کنترل داخلی و گواهی حسابرس: شواهدی از چین - اشپرینگر 2017

Abstract

We examine what determines a firm’s decision to disclose a self-assessment report on its internal control (IC) system and to further attain an auditor’s attestation on the report, using a sample of firms from the Shanghai Stock Exchange during the period 2006–2010. We hypothesize and find supporting evidence that the likelihood of having voluntary disclosure of IC self-assessment with an auditor’s attestation is positively related to future equity refinancing, mutual-fund shareholding, and whether the firm is controlled by the government, especially the central government. Our study also takes the identification problem into consideration, as our sample includes firms with IC weaknesses/deficiencies. Our study not only makes an incremental contribution to the literature, but also has practical implications, especially for regulators and investors in China.

Conclusion

Using a unique data set from the SSE during the period 2006–2010, we examine the determinants and/or incentives for a firm’s voluntary IC-disclosure decision, as well as its decision additionally to have an auditor’s attestation on the IC report. We hypothesize and find supporting evidence that a firm with the government, especially the central government, as its largest shareholder, with more mutual fund shareholding, and with an equity refinancing plan in the near future, is more likely to disclose an IC self-assessment report and to attain an auditor’s attestation on the report. Our study contributes incrementally to the literature in several ways. Firstly, we study not only the determinants of voluntary disclosure of IC information, but also the determinants of voluntarily having an auditor’s attestation on the IC report. The decision to have an auditor’s attestation on an IC report is important, especially in developing countries, as it can further enhance the credibility of the report. Secondly, our finding that an IC report with an auditor’s attestation can facilitate seasoned-equity issuing is also new in the literature.

Our study shows that credible and voluntary disclosure of IC self-assessment has some signaling effect in the market. Thirdly, our sample includes firms with IC weaknesses. This allows us to address the identification problem that previous studies have not addressed. Our finding is that mutual-fund investors have a positive impact on the credible disclosure of IC reports even when the firm has shown IC weakness. This is an affirmation that mutual funds can play a role in enhancing effective corporate governance. It is also an affirmation of the efforts on the part of the CSRC to develop a mutual-fund industry in China.