دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی مکانیسم های حاکمیت شرکتی و محافظه کاری حسابداری: شواهدی از مصر - امرالد 2017

Abstract

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of corporate governance (CG) mechanisms (board size, board independence, separation of chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) roles and external auditor type) on accounting conservatism in Egypt. Design/methodology/approach – Archival data relating to CG and accounting conservatism are collected and analysed using multivariate regression techniques. Findings – The findings indicate that board independence is positively associated with accounting conservatism. By contrast, board size and auditor type are negatively associated with accounting conservatism, while separating the chairperson and CEO roles has no significant relationship with accounting conservatism. Originality/value – To the best of the author’s knowledge, this is one of the first empirical attempts at providing evidence on the relationship between CG and accounting conservatism in Egypt.

9. Summary and conclusion

The effect of CG on the level of accounting conservatism has been investigated in a number of studies (Beekes et al., 2004; Ahmed and Duellman, 2007; Chi et al., 2009; Ahmed and Henry, 2012; Elshandidy and Hassanein, 2014; Caskey and Laux, 2016; Kukah et al., 2016), but the results are inconclusive. In our study, four main hypotheses were examined.

First, a negative association was found between board size and accounting conservatism in Egyptian firms. These results support Chi et al. (2009), who reported that a large board size reduces the level of accounting conservatism. This implies that in cases of small board size (weak governance mechanism as in Egypt), companies tend to be conservative in their reporting to compensate for the weak governance structure.

H2 proposed a positive association between board independence and the extent of conservative accounting. This result is consistent with the recommendation of the Egyptian CG code that the majority of directors should be outside directors. They also agree with the findings of Beekes et al. (2004), Ahmed and Duellman (2007), Ahmed and Henry (2012) and Kukah et al. (2016). These findings imply that board independence as a CG mechanism plays a powerful role in enhancing the level of accounting conservatism in most countries.