دانلود رایگان مقاله انگلیسی حاکمیت شرکتی: مقدمه ویرایشگر - الزویر 2018

Corporate Governance: Editor’s Introduction

This special issue includes seven papers presented at the 26th NBER-TCER-CEPR Conference on “Corporate Governance” organized jointly by the Tokyo Center for Economic Research (TCER), the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), and the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR). After having a preliminary meeting at the Development Bank of Japan (DBJ) on December 8-9, 2016, the conference was held at Kojima Hall in the University of Tokyo on June 22, 2017. The papers have gone through the regular refereeing process of the journal and have been revised on the basis of comments and discussion at the conference, as well as comments from anonymous referees.

Economic research on corporate governance used to focus on the potential conflict of interest between the managers of corporations and the shareholders. Recent research expanded the set of entities that could be adversely affected by corporate actions (or inactions). For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) defined corporate governance as “the ways in which the suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment.” Suppliers of finance includes not only shareholders but also banks and other creditors of corporations. The notion of corporate governance was broadened even more by Tirole (2001), who defined it as “design of institutions that induce or force management to internalize the welfare of stakeholders.” This stakeholder view (as opposed to the shareholder-centric view) is now standard in the modern discourse on corporate governance.