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The effects of political ideology and message framing on counterfeiting: The mediating role of emotions

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ABSTRACT

Prior research has mostly examined the antecedents and impacts of purchasing counterfeits. However, there is little understanding of how marketers can mitigate this potential issue. The current research examines how gain versus loss message framing in an anti-counterfeit ad can be effective in persuading consumers with different political ideology (conservative vs. liberal). Results from two experiments show gain frames are more persuasive for liberals, whereas loss frames are more persuasive for conservatives in promoting an anti-counterfeit ad. Importantly, these effects are explained by different emotional reactions associated with message framing. Specifically, fear mediates the effects among conservatives, while hope mediates the effects among liberals. Findings from the current research joins four important research areas, including (1) anti-counterfeit, (2) political ideology, (3) message framing, and (4) discrete emotions, by theorizing that emotion reactions associated with message framing influence the effectiveness of an anti-counterfeit ad among consumers with different political ideology.

1. Introduction

The global luxury market has been increasing rapidly over the past decade. While recent research (Bain & Company, 2017) estimates the value of the global luxury market at almost \$1.5 trillion, such growth and size means the market is open to forces that may try to share the spoils. One such threat is that of counterfeit luxury goods. This is particularly the case in recent times, given the costs to produce counterfeits are constantly being lowered (Hennigs, Wiedmann, Behrens, & Klarmann, 2013). Because of this, market information (International Chamber of Commerce, 2017) suggests that by 2022 counterfeiting and piracy will lead to \$4.2 trillion in losses from the global economy, jeopardizing over 5 million legitimate jobs. Given the high stakes, research is required that provides better understanding of the factors that influence counterfeiting in order to mitigate risk and develop interventions that affect supply and demand of counterfeit luxury goods.

Although the counterfeiting industry is fueled by different factors, such as technological innovation and globalization, the primary driver for the production of counterfeits is consumer demand (Chaudhry, Cordellb, & Zimmermann, 2005). Because of this, there has been an increase in research examining the historical and social understanding of counterfeiting, the antecedents that drive counterfeit purchases, as

well as the impacts of counterfeits in different industries (Boon, 2010; Commuri, 2009; Wilcox, Kim, & Sen, 2009). Despite that, there appears to be limited research investigating potential interventions – such as advertising or marketing communications – that might be useful tools to reduce consumer demand for counterfeits. What is more, there appears to be little, if any, research examining how an individual's view of the world (conservative/liberal) might influence their attitudes and behaviors in relation to counterfeit goods.

The current research extends the literature, and addresses this gap by examining the role of political ideology (conservatives vs. liberals) and message framing (gain vs. loss) in the purchase of counterfeit goods. Using existing literature on political identity as a reference point, it is suggested conservative viewpoints are associated with fear of threat and loss (Jost, Stern, Rule, & Sterling, 2017; Oxley et al., 2008). By contrast, those with a liberal outlook are motivated by change and progress for the future (Duhachek, Tormala, & Han, 2014; Jost, Nosek, & Gosling, 2008). Based on this evidence, the current research predicts that conservatives should be more susceptible to loss frames (a threat to stability), while liberals should be more attracted to gain frames (an opportunity for change). Further, the interactive effects between political ideology and message framing will be mediated by emotions. Specifically, hope (vs. fear) – which is associated with gain (vs. loss)

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frames – is more effective to persuade liberals (vs. conservatives).

This research offers a number of important theoretical and managerial implications. First, this paper brings together four important research areas including (1) anti-counterfeit, (2) political ideology, (3) message framing, and (4) discrete emotions to provide further understanding around the consumption of counterfeit products. The findings demonstrate the important interactive effect of political ideology and message framing in advertisements that are focused on reducing consumer intent to purchase counterfeit luxury products. Specifically, the findings provide managers with the ability to influence the underlying mechanisms driving conservatives (vs. liberals), in that conservatives are more likely to be influenced by fear appeals, while liberals are more likely to be influenced by appeals focusing on hope. Consequently, the study provides significant implications for marketers regarding the development of a targeted approach to promote an anti-counterfeit campaign.

2. Theoretical background

2.1. Political ideology

There is a growing interest among psychologists and consumer researchers on studies of political ideology. In this regard, previous research (Jost, 2017a, 2017b) has investigated the relationship between political ideology and individual differences in personality, cognitive processing, and personal values. For instance, prior research examining the correlation between political ideology and the “Big Five” model of personality shows liberals have higher levels of openness, whereas conservatives are higher on conscientiousness (Jost, 2017b). These findings have been further verified by a large meta-analysis (Sibley, Osborne, & Duckitt, 2012) involving > 70,000 participants in 73 studies conducted in North America and Western Europe. Such effects have been shown to be consistent across different samples, including university students, internet users, and nationally representative sample (Carney, Jost, Gosling, & Potter, 2008; Nosek & Hansen, 2008).

Along with these findings, there is an enduring “rigidity-of-the-right” school of thought, in which conservatives are thought to be close-minded and intolerant of ambiguity (Malka & Soto, 2015). Importantly, such effects are related to cognitive processing and personal values. A meta-analysis by Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003) across 88 studies and > 22,000 participants also supports this position. In fact, conservatives score higher than liberals on such measures as intolerance of ambiguity, need for cognitive closure, dogmatism as well as need for order and structure (Jost, 2017b).

Together, the broad body of research provides renewed understanding of behavioral outcomes of political ideology (conservatives vs. liberals). Because of this, recent studies have started to investigate how political ideology can influence consumer judgment and decision making in a marketing context. For example, given that conservatives (vs. liberals) are motivated to promote stability (vs. change) (Jost et al., 2008), Duhachek et al. (2014) found that conservatives (vs. liberals) show higher preferences for automobile ads which promote stability (vs. change). Similarly, research by Kidwell, Farmer, and Hardesty (2013), in the context of recycling behavior, found liberals are more swayed by recycling messages that appeal to individuality (vs. a sense of duty).

In addition, there is evidence political ideology can influence consumption patterns and behaviors. For instance, it has been shown conservatives are more likely to choose national brands and less likely to purchase newly launched products (Khan, Misra, & Singh, 2013). Conservatism is also positively associated to variety-seeking because of social normative concerns (Fernandes & Mandel, 2014). Lastly, conservatives are less likely to exhibit complaining and disputing behaviors, as compared to liberals (Jung, Garbarino, Briley, & Wynhausen,

2017). In general, these findings are grounded in the notion that conservatives and liberals are driven by different motivations. Specifically, conservatives prefer stability and order (Duhachek et al., 2014), dislike ambiguity (Jost, 2017b), and are driven by fear of threat or loss (Jost et al., 2017; Oxley et al., 2008). By contrast, liberals are motivated by change and progress (Duhachek et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2008), tolerate uncertainty (Jost, 2017b), and prefer individuality (Kidwell et al., 2013).

2.2. Message framing

Message framing is based on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and describes how the same information can lead to differential choice when it is presented by accentuating its valence – positive versus negative (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). Originally, message framing was treated as a homogenous phenomenon based on prospect theory. However, Levin et al. (1998) argued there are three basic ‘types’ of message framing—risky choice, attribute, and goal framing – and each leads to framing effects via different underlying processes.

Among those, goal framing focuses on how we can enhance the evaluation of some behaviors (Levin et al., 1998; McCormick & Seta, 2016). Given the context of this research is focused on encouraging consumers to *not* purchase counterfeits, we therefore focus our attention on goal framing, wherein the object of the framing is the consequences of a behavior – whether that behavior may lead to potential benefits (gain frames) or costs (loss frames) (Levin et al., 1998). Thus, while both frames should increase the evaluation of a behavior (i.e., not purchasing counterfeits), the nature of gain (vs loss) frames suggests their influence may be different depending on the audience.

Most studies examining goal framing typically investigate its effectiveness in the context of health messages (McCormick & Seta, 2016; Meyers-Levy & Maheswaran, 2004; Rothman & Salovey, 1997). However, it is less clear whether different message framing is also effective to promote anti-counterfeit ads. The current research extends the extant literature by examining the condition under which gain frames are more effective than loss frames in promoting anti-counterfeit ads. Specifically, this research investigates the interactive effect between political ideology and message framing.

We propose that political ideology influences the effectiveness of gain versus loss message framing. In the context of loss frames, such messages highlight the negative consequences of not engaging in a behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Consequently, thinking about these negative consequences makes individuals more risk-averse, so their behaviors occur in order to avoid experiencing such negative consequences (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; White, MacDonnell, & Dahl, 2011). This is compatible with conservatives who desire stability and safety (Duhachek et al., 2014) and thus, they are more likely to be risk-averse. Because of this, it is argued conservatives will be more persuaded by an anti-counterfeit ad with loss frames.

On the other hand, gain frames highlight the positive effects of engaging in a given behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This should be more persuasive for liberals because they tend to focus on change and progress (Duhachek et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2008) and, because of this, are more likely to focus on what they can gain. As a result, it is proposed anti-counterfeit advertisements with gain frames will be more persuasive for liberals. Formally, we propose that there will be a significant interaction between message framing and political ideology on the effectiveness of an anti-counterfeit ad, such that:

H1. Liberals will be more willing to comply with an anti-counterfeit ad through gain frames than loss frames; in contrast, conservatives will be more willing to comply with an anti-counterfeit ad through loss frames than gain frames.




Fig. 1. Conceptual model.

2.3. The mediating role of emotions

Following the preceding section, we propose the underlying mechanism of such decision-making is the different, discrete emotional responses elicited by the message frames. This is consistent with prior research suggesting counterfeits might evoke emotional responses (Penz & Stöttinger, 2012; Zampetakis, 2014). Further, research on communications has demonstrated distinct emotional responses might arise depending on the framing (Kim & Cameron, 2011; Kühne & Schemer, 2015). Hence, we expect the effectiveness of gain versus loss frames in encouraging consumers to not purchase counterfeits will be influenced by the emotional responses of that particular framing.

Specifically, we argue the relevance of two discrete emotions – fear and hope – in this regard. Prior research on emotion has established that both fear and hope are emotions associated with uncertainty (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Winterich & Haws, 2011). That is, hope arises for future, uncertain positive outcomes (Smith & Ellsworth, 1985; Winterich & Haws, 2011), whereas fear occurs in the presence of potential danger and loss (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). In other words, gain frames should be associated with the emotion of hope, while loss frames are associated with the emotion of fear (Bilandzic, Kalch, & Soentgen, 2017; Dillard & Nabi, 2006; Lopes, 1987; Salovey, Schneider, & Apanovitch, 2002).

In summary, we argue that individuals might feel *hopeful* for potential benefits they can gain (Dillard & Nabi, 2006; Lopes, 1987; Salovey et al., 2002). As discussed, liberals focus on hope for the future (Duhachek et al., 2014; Jost et al., 2008) and thus, among liberals, a gain-framed message which promotes hope should be more persuasive. In contrast, individuals might feel *fearful* for potential losses (Bilandzic et al., 2017; Dillard & Nabi, 2006; Lopes, 1987). Because conservatives are more susceptible to fear of a threat (Jost et al., 2017; Oxley et al., 2008), a loss-framed message which evokes fear should be more persuasive among conservatives. Hence, we propose that hope and fear will mediate the predicted effects. As a result, the following hypothesis is proposed:

H2. Among liberals, hope will mediate the effects of gain frames on willingness to comply with an anti-counterfeit ad. Among conservatives, fear will mediate the effects of loss frames on willingness to comply with an anti-counterfeit ad.

A conceptual model is included (Fig. 1) outlining variables and relationships.

3. Methodology

3.1. Study 1

To test Hypothesis 1, an experiment was conducted with the expectation results would provide evidence an anti-counterfeit ad with

gain frames would be more persuasive among liberals, whereas conservatives will show favorable evaluations of an anti-counterfeit ad with loss frames.

3.1.1. Methods

One hundred and twenty-one participants (63% male, $M_{age} = 37.55$, $SD = 11.85$) were recruited using an online research panel. This study employed a 2 (framing: gain, loss; between-subjects) \times 1 (political ideology; continuous variable) mixed-design. In this study, participants were randomly assigned to a ‘gain’ or ‘loss’ framing condition. In each condition, participants were asked to evaluate an anti-counterfeit ad. The ads used identical images with different messages (see Appendix 1 for all stimuli). The messages were developed using information from the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC, 2018) and prior research (Dahlgren, 2011). For the focal dependent variable (willingness to comply with an anti-counterfeit ad), participants were asked two questions: (1) “After viewing the ad, how willing are you to not purchase counterfeit products?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very much); and (2) “After viewing the ad, how convinced are you that you should not purchase counterfeit products?” (1 = not at all, 7 = very convinced). These items were collapsed to form an index of willingness to comply ($\alpha = 0.79$).

In line with prior research (Wilcox et al., 2009), participants were also asked about their moral beliefs regarding people who purchase counterfeits as a statistical control. A 3-item semantic differential scale (“I feel that people who purchase counterfeit products are:” 1 = immoral, 7 = moral; 1 = unethical, 7 = ethical; 1 = insincere, 7 = sincere; $\alpha = 0.94$) was used to minimize the likelihood of socially desirable responses because of a potentially sensitive issue. Political ideology was measured using a 3-item scale developed by Kaikati, Torelli, Winterich, and Rodas (2017). Specifically, these items were, “Indicate the political label with which you most identify: 1 = extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative,”; “I think of myself as a: 1 = strong democrat, 7 = strong republican,”; “Politically, I would describe myself as: 1 = extremely liberal, 7 = extremely conservative.” All three items were collapsed ($\alpha = 0.96$) to create an index of political ideology where higher (vs. lower) scores indicate conservatives (vs. liberals).

3.1.2. Results and discussion

In line with prior research (Wang, Zhu, & Shiv, 2011), moderated regression was used to test predictions. As such, ‘willingness to comply’ was used as the primary dependent variable, with political ideology, message framing (0 = loss; 1 = gain), and their interaction as independent variables.¹ Table 1 presents the regression results for this

¹ As an additional analysis, we included moral beliefs as a statistical control in this and the subsequent studies. The effects were non-significant (p 's > .09); thus, we removed this variable from the analysis.

Table 1
Summary of regression results.

Study 1: DV = Willingness to comply				
Parameters	B	SE	t Value	p Value
Intercept	7.26	0.67	10.90	< .001
Framing	-2.76	0.76	-3.65	< .001
Political ideology	-0.39	0.12	-3.13	.002
Framing × political ideology	0.67	0.17	3.81	< .001
Moral beliefs	-0.20	0.12	-1.69	.094
Study 2: DV = Willingness to comply				
Parameters	B	SE	t Value	p Value
Intercept	6.95	0.50	13.84	< .001
Framing	-2.91	0.67	-4.33	< .001
Political ideology	-0.44	0.11	-4.08	< .001
Framing × political ideology	0.76	0.15	5.00	< .001
Moral beliefs	-0.06	0.10	-0.61	.541
Study 2: DV = Helping choice				
Parameters	B	SE	Wald chi-square	p Value
Intercept	-0.87	0.64	1.87	.171
Framing	-1.42	0.48	8.83	.003
Political ideology	0.16	0.11	2.06	.151
Framing × political ideology	0.42	1.12	13.38	< .001
Moral beliefs	0.18	0.14	1.61	.204

and the subsequent study. As expected, results revealed a significant interaction between political ideology and message framing ($B = 0.67$, $SE = 0.17$, $t(116) = 3.81$, $p < .001$). Simple slope analysis showed that gain frames were more effective among liberal participants ($B = -0.39$, $SE = 0.12$, $t(116) = -3.13$, $p < .01$). In contrast, loss frames were more effective among conservative participants ($B = 0.27$, $SE = 0.12$, $t(116) = 2.25$, $p < .05$).

From a different perspective, the spotlight analysis at one standard deviation above (5.83) and below (1.91) the mean of political ideology scores showed significant differences between endorsement conditions. Specifically, liberals showed a higher willingness to comply after evaluating an ad with gain frames ($M = 5.89$) as compared to loss frames ($M = 4.40$, $t(116) = 3.08$, $p < .01$). However, conservatives showed a higher willingness to comply after evaluating an ad with loss frames ($M = 5.47$) as compared to gain frames ($M = 4.36$, $t(116) = 2.32$, $p < .05$). To complement these results, we also used the Johnson–Neyman technique (Spiller, Fitzsimons, Lynch Jr, & McClelland, 2013) to identify the range(s) of political ideology for which the simple effect of the treatment (message framing) was significant. The analysis showed there was a significant positive effect of message framing for any conservative participants with political ideology scores < 2.99 ($B_{JN} = 0.74$, $SE = 0.38$, $p = .05$). In contrast, there was a significant negative effect of message framing for any liberal participants with political ideology scores > 5.47 ($B_{JN} = -0.88$, $SE = 0.44$, $p = .05$). These findings provided evidence for Hypothesis 1 (see Fig. 2).

3.2. Study 2

Study 2 sought to extend the findings of Study 1 in two important ways. First, it tested the underlying mechanism of the predicted effects (H2). Second, Study 2 also included an additional behavioral measure to increase confidence in the findings. Specifically, at the end of the survey, participants were asked whether they were willing to help a non-profit organization (without compensation) by completing an




Fig. 2. Study 1 results.

additional task related to anti-counterfeit ads. Because of this, participation in the additional task demonstrates the effectiveness of the anti-counterfeit ads.

3.2.1. Methods

One hundred and twenty-three participants (67% male, $M_{age} = 36.52$, $SD = 8.97$) were recruited through an online research portal for financial compensation. The study employed a 2 (framing: gain, loss; between-subjects) × 1 (political ideology; continuous variable) mixed-design. This study used similar materials and procedure to that of Study 1 with two exceptions.

First, after evaluating the anti-counterfeit ad, participants were asked questions regarding their emotional responses to the ad. Three items were used to measure hope: “The ad makes me feel ... about the benefits of not purchasing counterfeit products.” (‘hopeful’, ‘optimistic’ and ‘assured’) on 9-point scales (1 = not at all, 9 = extremely) (Winterich & Haws, 2011; $\alpha = 0.98$). To measure fear, respondents were asked, “The ad makes me feel ... about the consequences of purchasing counterfeit products” (‘fearful’, ‘anxious’ and ‘nervous’) on 9-point scales (1 = not at all, 9 = extremely) (Lerner & Keltner, 2001; $\alpha = 0.97$) about not purchasing counterfeits. In addition, they were also asked their general affect on a 2-item semantic differential scale (“The emotion I am feeling right now is ...”; 1 = negative, 9 = positive; 1 = unpleasant, 9 = pleasant) ($\alpha = 0.96$). Second, after completing demographic variables, participants were asked whether they would be willing to help the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC) by completing an additional task (around 10 min) without compensation (1 = yes, 0 = no; see Appendix 2 for the description of the question). For statistical control, respondents were asked whether they had heard about IACC and whether they have previously engaged in pro-bono tasks.

3.2.2. Results

3.2.2a. Effectiveness of anti-counterfeit ads. Similar to Study 1, the three political ideology items ($\alpha = 0.94$) were collapsed to create political ideology scores, and the two dependent variable items ($\alpha = 0.72$) to create a measure of willingness to comply with an anti-counterfeit ad. Regression was run on the data with willingness to comply as the dependent variable and political ideology, message framing (0 = loss; 1 = gain), and their interaction as independent variables (see Table 1). Results revealed a significant interaction between political ideology and message framing ($B = 0.76$, $SE = 0.15$, $t(118) = 5.00$, $p < .001$).²

² As an additional analysis, we included control variables in the model such as whether participants had heard about IACC before and whether they have previously engaged in pro-bono tasks. The effects were non-significant (p 's $> .07$). Hence, to maintain consistency with Study 1, we removed these from the analysis.




Fig. 3. Study 2 results.

Simple slope analysis showed that gain frames were more effective among liberal participants ($B = -0.44$, $SE = 0.11$, $t(118) = -4.08$, $p < .001$). In contrast, loss frames were more effective among conservative participants ($B = 0.33$, $SE = 0.11$, $t(118) = 3.05$, $p < .01$).

Furthermore, the spotlight analysis at 1 standard deviation above (5.95) and below (2.09) the mean of political ideology scores showed significant differences between endorsement conditions. Specifically, liberals showed a higher willingness to comply after evaluating an ad with gain frames ($M = 5.86$) as compared to loss frames ($M = 4.54$, $t(118) = 3.22$, $p < .01$). However, conservatives showed a higher willingness to comply after evaluating an ad with loss frames ($M = 5.80$) as compared to gain frames ($M = 4.18$, $t(118) = 3.86$, $p < .001$). Following Study 1, again we used the Johnson–Neyman technique to identify the range(s) of political ideology for which the simple effect of the treatment (message framing) was significant. The analysis showed there was a significant positive effect of message framing for any conservative participants with political ideology scores < 2.94 ($B_{JN} = 0.65$, $SE = 0.33$, $p = .05$). In contrast, there was a significant negative effect of message framing for any liberal participants with political ideology scores > 4.54 ($B_{JN} = -0.59$, $SE = 0.28$, $p = .05$). These findings replicated the findings of Study 1 and provided support for Hypothesis 1 (see Fig. 3).

Logistic regression was then run on the model with political ideology, message framing (0 = loss; 1 = gain), and their interaction as independent variables and helping behavior (1 = yes, 0 = no) as the dependent variable (see Table 1). Consistent with predictions, results revealed a significant interaction between political ideology and message framing ($B = 0.42$, $Wald = 13.38$, $p < .001$). Follow-up tests at one standard deviation above (5.95) and below (2.09) the mean of political ideology scores indicated liberals were more likely to help with the task after evaluating an ad with gain frames (63%) as compared to loss frames (39%; $B = 1.07$, $SE = 0.56$, $p = .05$). However, conservatives were more likely to help with the task after evaluating an ad with loss frames (82%) as compared to gain frames (42%; $B = 1.96$, $SE = 0.62$, $p < .01$). These findings provided further support for Hypothesis 1 (see Fig. 4).

3.2.2b. Underlying process. Hypothesis 2 argued the interaction between political ideology and message framing would be mediated by fear and hope. To test this prediction, the authors examined the differences on the levels of fear and hope among participants across gain and loss framing conditions. As expected, it was found hope was




Fig. 4. Percentage participants helped by political ideology and message framing.

higher among participants who evaluated gain frames ($M = 6.54$) than loss frames ($M = 4.46$, $t(121) = 4.86$, $p < .001$). In contrast, fear was higher among participants who evaluated loss frames ($M = 6.05$) than gain frames ($M = 3.97$, $t(121) = 4.58$, $p < .001$).

To test Hypothesis 2, moderated mediation analysis was conducted using PROCESS Model 15 (Hayes, 2017) with 5000 resamples. Specifically, the analysis examined the indirect effects of gain versus loss frames on the willingness to comply with an anti-counterfeit ad via hope and fear, and moderated by political ideology. Results revealed a significant indirect effect via hope in the low ($B = 0.5086$, $SE = 0.2457$, 95% CI [0.1484, 1.1181]) and moderate ($B = 0.3267$, $SE = 0.1812$, 95% CI [0.0466, 0.7523]) levels of political ideology (liberal), but not in the high level (95% CI [-0.2364, 0.7388]) of political ideology (conservative).

On the other hand, results demonstrated a significant indirect effect via fear in the moderate ($B = -0.3276$, $SE = 0.1558$, 95% CI [-0.6993, -0.0702]) and high ($B = -0.7363$, $SE = 0.2764$, 95% CI [-1.3603, -0.2711]) levels of political ideology (conservative), but not in the low level (95% CI [-0.2259, 0.4886]) of political ideology (liberal).

In addition, a similar moderated mediation analysis was run with helping choice as the dependent variable. That is, the analysis examined the indirect effects of gain versus loss frames on the helping choice with an anti-counterfeit ad via hope and fear, and moderated by political ideology. Results showed a significant indirect effect via hope in the low level ($B = 1.3491$, $SE = 0.5222$, 95% CI [0.6163, 2.3990]) of political ideology (liberal). Conversely, there was a significant indirect effect via fear in the high level ($B = -0.9374$, $SE = 0.5033$, 95% CI [-2.0096, -0.2477]) of political ideology (conservative). These findings provided strong support for Hypothesis 2.

4. General discussion

The present research investigates the interactive effects of political ideology and message framing in leveraging the effectiveness of an anti-counterfeit ad. Study 1 provides initial evidence for Hypothesis 1 and finds liberals are more persuaded by advertisements with gain (as opposed to loss) frames. By contrast, advertisements with loss frames are more persuasive among conservatives. Study 2 replicates and extends the findings of Study 1 using a behavioral measure. Specifically, not only was participants' willingness to comply with the anti-counterfeit ad measured, but participants were also asked if they were willing to help with a task related to anti-counterfeiting. By doing this, the

research was able to establish the underlying process driving the predicted effects. As such, findings demonstrate that fear and hope differentially mediate the effects among conservatives and liberals, respectively.

4.1. Theoretical contributions

The current research makes two overarching theoretical contributions. First, it joins four important research areas, including (1) anti-counterfeit, (2) political ideology, (3) message framing, and (4) discrete emotions. This is significant because there is increased interest in the concept of political ideology among consumer researchers (Jost, 2017a, 2017b). In particular, Jost (2017b) has pointed out the potential relevance of political ideology in advertising and framing. For instance, liberals are more likely to be “swayed” by messages promoting change, whereas conservatives prefer those promoting stability (Duhachek et al., 2014). As such, the present research adds to the understanding of this area by investigating the interactive effect of political ideology and message framing in promoting an anti-counterfeit mindset.

Second, this research establishes the underlying mechanism of predicted effects. Specifically, because gain (vs. loss) frames induce the emotions of hope (vs. fear), they make the message more effective among liberals (vs. conservatives). In other words, conservatives are more likely to be driven by fear, while liberals are more likely to be influenced by hope. These findings contribute to the current literature on political ideology by identifying the affective component driving the effects. This is important because little research has investigated the affective (as compared to the cognitive) components of how political ideology can influence judgment and decision making, including traits, processing styles, and personal values (Duhachek et al., 2014; Jost, 2017b; Jost et al., 2003; Jung et al., 2017).

4.2. Managerial implications

This research developed and tested a conceptual model that demonstrates anti-counterfeit advertisements have differing effects depending on the framing of the message (hope/fear) and the political ideology (liberal/conservative) of the viewer. These findings have a number of significant managerial implications.

In line with previous research (Jung et al., 2017), this paper provides further evidence that election data affords managers an objective means to develop tailored campaigns for different geographical regions. This form of ‘geo-political’ segmentation and targeting is a valuable technique for marketers, as effective and reliable location-based predictors of consumers' behavior have previously been difficult to obtain.

As such, managers can utilize election data as a proxy for consumers' political ideologies, which also creates further opportunities for future research. In the case of the United States, as an example, this would mean managers could use fear based appeals in conservative (red) states, while hope based appeals could be employed in liberal (blue) states. Given media can be bought in the US at either a national or regional level, this form of geo-segmentation would be particularly beneficial in allocating marketing expenditure for mass communication campaigns using broadcast and print media. At the same time, information about an individual's political ideology can be sourced through social media platforms and digital properties. By sourcing detailed information about users' political and social interests, managers are able to define and target core audiences, using highly personalized mass communications. Together, these approaches allow managers to segment and target consumers at both the group and individual level, based on their political ideology.

Once the necessary segments have been identified, the findings from this paper provide evidence of the most effective advertising appeals to employ. Previous research (Kidwell et al., 2013) has shown congruency between advertising appeals and political ideologies can have a positive influence on a consumer's acquisition, consumption and disposition behaviors. The current paper has extended this and demonstrates managers can use the congruency between advertising appeals and a consumer's political ideology to inhibit acquisition and consumption, specifically relating to the purchase of counterfeit luxury products. Thus, using the United States as an example once again, managers would be able to employ loss frames in blue (liberal) states and gain frames in red (conservative) states to ensure the most effective message is being communicated to the target audience.

4.3. Future research and conclusion

There are several avenues for future research. First, the present research uses an experimental approach in testing predictions. Future research can examine the predictions using country-level information of political ideology and secondary data from government agencies to obtain large volumes of actual behavioral data. For instance, Jung et al. (2017) conducted a study using this approach to examine complaining and dispute behaviors. Also, because political ideology is argued to possess different constructs and dimensions (Feldman & Johnston, 2014), it would thus be of interest to explore the complexity of political ideology at a more granular level. In conclusion, the current research provides evidence how political ideology and message framing can influence consumer decision making and, as such, offers exciting future research avenues in this area.

Appendix 1. Ad stimuli (gain and loss)

DO NOT PURCHASE COUNTERFEITS!

Think of the benefits of not purchasing counterfeits...

- We save victims of child labor, drug trafficking, and organized crime.
- We save our city \$1 Billion from loss tax dollars.
- We help ourselves from deadly fake medicine, and other deadly fakes like auto parts and airline components.



SAY **NO** TO COUNTERFEITS

DO NOT PURCHASE COUNTERFEITS!

Think of the costs of purchasing counterfeits...

- We support child labor, drug trafficking, and organized crime.
- We cost our city \$1 Billion from loss tax dollars.
- We help produce deadly fake medicine, and other deadly fakes like auto parts and airline components.



SAY **NO** TO COUNTERFEITS

Appendix 2. Study 2 dependent variable

Before you continue with the next part of the survey, would you please take a few minutes to read the following request from the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition (IACC)?

The International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition Inc., (IACC) is a Washington, D.C.-based non-profit organization devoted solely to combating product counterfeiting and piracy. Formed in 1979, we are the longest-standing organization of our kind.

What began with a handful of companies seeking intellectual property protection has grown to a membership base of over 250 in the past three decades. The IACC is a member-driven organization that is comprised of a cross-section of business and industry - from automotive, apparel, luxury goods and pharmaceuticals, to food, software and entertainment.

As a not-for-profit organization with limited resources from government funding, IACC relies not only on financial donations from the public but also, pro-bono work from professionals who donate their time and expertise in various areas (e.g., legal, finance, business planning, marketing) to help the organization achieve its strategic objectives.

We would like to ask you whether you would like to give your time and expertise to evaluate their past advertising campaigns. It will take you at most 10 min to complete the task. If you are interested, we will give you more specific details after the survey and you can work on it at that point. Please keep in mind that this is not part of the survey and there is no compensation for this task but your help will be very much appreciated by IACC.

Would you be willing to help the International AntiCounterfeiting Coalition with the task?

- o YES
- o NO

Appendix 3. Means and standard deviations of constructs

Constructs	Study 1		Study 2	
	Means	Standard deviations	Means	Standard deviations
Political ideology (moderator)	3.87	1.96	4.02	1.93
Willingness to comply (DV)	5.02	1.97	5.26	1.70
Moral beliefs (control variable)	3.20	1.47	3.05	1.48
Hope (mediator)	-	-	5.51	2.58
Fear (mediator)	-	-	5.00	2.73

Appendix 4. Full mediation results

Antecedent	Consequent											
	Hope (M1)				Fear (M2)				Willingness to comply (Y)			
	Coeff	SE	t	p	Coeff	SE	t	p	Coeff	SE	t	p
Message framing (X)	2.079	0.428	4.859	< .001	-2.087	0.456	-4.578	< .001	1.238	0.760	1.628	.106
Hope (M1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.339	0.128	2.651	.009
Fear (M2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.251	0.132	-1.899	.060
Political ideology (V)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.193	0.276	-0.699	.486
M1 × V	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.045	0.031	-1.457	.148
M2 × V	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.101	0.031	3.234	.002
X × V	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.298	0.196	-1.516	.132
Constant	4.459	0.304	14.68	< .001	6.055	0.324	18.706	< .001	4.088	1.152	3.556	< .001
Model summary	R ² = 0.163 F(1,121) = 23.60, p < .001				R ² = 0.148 F(1,121) = 20.95, p < .001				R ² = 0.360 F(7,115) = 9.24, p < .001			

Antecedent	Consequent											
	Hope (M1)				Fear (M2)				Helping Choice (Y)			
	Coeff	SE	t	p	Coeff	SE	t	p	Coeff	SE	z	p
Message framing (X)	2.079	0.428	4.859	< .001	-2.087	0.456	-4.578	< .001	-0.669	1.652	-0.405	.686
Hope (M1)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1.062	0.320	3.314	< .001
Fear (M2)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1.034	0.316	-3.274	.001
Political ideology (V)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.078	0.584	0.134	.894
M1 × V	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.198	0.074	-2.689	.007
M2 × V	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.249	0.071	3.497	< .001
X × V	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.111	0.402	0.277	.782
Constant	4.459	0.304	14.68	< .001	6.055	0.324	18.706	< .001	-1.467	2.548	-0.576	.565
Model summary	R ² = 0.163 F(1,121) = 23.60, p < .001				R ² = 0.148 F(1,121) = 20.95, p < .001				Model LL = 54.18 p < .001			

Note: The two mediators (hope and fear) are operating in parallel. Denoting them as M1 and M2 does not imply a sequence, but rather allows for shorthand in the interactions.

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