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Multiculturalism and Social Integration in Europe

STEVEN DIJKSTRA, KARIN GEUIJEN, AND ARIE DE RUIJTER

ABSTRACT. In an era of increasing cultural diversity within nation-states and the deterritorialization of cultures and peoples, the notion of a national citizenship signifying a single, homogenized culture shared by all citizens has become obsolete. A possible alternative is presented in which an uncoupling of nationality and culture would lead to open and equal communication between citizens and the development of transmigrants' identities as members of a transnational and multicultural global society who may have ties with two or more nation-states.

Key words: Cultural diversity • Multiculturalism • Postnational citizenship
• Refugee policies • Social integration

Introduction

In calling for the formal equality of all cultures within the purview of the state and its educational system, multiculturalism represents a demand for the dissociation (decentering) of the political community and its common social institutions from identification with any one cultural tradition (Turner, 1993: 425).

The link between multiculturalism and social integration figures high on the agenda of public administrators and researchers. This is not surprising, as present-day societies and nation-states face rising cultural complexity and diversity. This trend coincides with growing pressure on social exclusion, which in turn affects social integration.¹

We do not restrict multiculturalism to its demographic-descriptive usage (the existence of ethnically diverse segments in the population of a society or state) or to its programmatic-political usage (which refers to specific types of programmes and policy initiatives designed to respond to ethnic diversity). Rather, we focus on multiculturalism's ideological-normative meaning of "a slogan and model for

political action . . . emphasising that acknowledging the existence of ethnic diversity and ensuring the rights of individuals to retain their culture should go hand in hand with enjoying full access to, participation in and adherence to constitutional principles and commonly shared values prevailing in the society” (Inglis 1996: 16).

We define social integration here as the functional and effective link between a system’s different agents or components. Integration or cohesion is not to be taken as being positive only. In various ways it is a double-edged sword. Internal solidarity stimulates both cooperation and social control and possibly even subordination to group norms. At the same time strong internal solidarity leads to animosity toward the external, resulting in xenophobia or worse in extreme cases. The spectrum ranges from feelings of identification (in which the distinction from the other is eliminated) via tolerance to indifference, ostracism and violence. No wonder that the integration issue associated with this “diabolic dynamism of homogenization and heterogenization” (Schuyt, 1997) is both classical and current and possibly even urgent. A nearly palpable fear exists among politicians—and among others as well—that society is disintegrating.²

The definitions of social integration and multiculturalism that are applied imply that the issue of citizenship plays an important role. Our core question therefore concerns the way citizenship should be described in the situation mentioned above.

First, we will outline the problem by describing the dual process of globalization–localization and the related change in our concept of culture. Next, we will discuss its consequences for the notion of citizenship and nation-state, both with respect to the area of law and to that of cultural identity. Then we will illustrate this with a case in which the national state figures as an argument in refugee policy. Finally, we will advocate learning to deal with diversity as a core competency of postmodern citizenship.

A Dual Process—Globalization and Localization

Every society is built up of a multitude of social links between agents that differ from one another. Each of these links has its own history, its own routines, its own domain and thus its own specific attributes. At the same time the links have a functional connection. They are interwoven and mutually dependent.

Dependency based on difference does not, however, automatically lead to a bond; coordination mechanisms are indispensable for establishing a bond. A plethora of these mechanisms and instruments exists at every level of organization and management. State mechanisms include education, public administration, law and care arrangements. The nation-state has in fact appropriated an increasing amount of culture; with its very own way of classifying and interpreting reality, culture is decisive in creating unity.

The emergence of the system of nation-states coincided with efforts to reduce cultural diversity.³ During the nineteenth century newly formed national states tried through nationalistic programmes to homogenize their entire territory culturally and linguistically, as well as economically and socially (Gellner, 1983; Brubaker, 1992). The state and the political community came to be equated increasingly with “the national culture.” Although theories about what constitutes a nation differed between countries, the common view was that each nation possessed a single specific culture. This opinion was also attributable to the

growing means for joint communication. People read the same newspapers and books in the same language. In the twentieth century, radio and television became available as well. All these facilities enabled depiction of the contemporaneous existence of fellow-nationals, thereby giving rise to so-called “imagined communities”⁴ (Anderson, 1991). Culture was thus cast in a national context and turned into a political tool. “National consciousness in this sense consists of an overriding identification of the individual with a culture that is protected by the state” (Curtin, 1997: 14). Culture is not the only thing thus captured in national contexts; the same applies to the individual: “With the French Revolution, the nation-state emerged as the form of political organization and nationality as the condition of membership in a polity. The Revolution codified individual rights and freedoms as attributes of national citizenship, thus linking the individual and the nation-state” (Soysal, 1994: 17).

The nation-state therefore becomes both a territorial organization and a membership organization (Brubaker, 1992). Citizens are members of the nation and acquire equal rights through this membership. Anyone who wishes to have equal rights within a certain state must therefore also be equal to all others in that state: citizens must have the same identity. The ideal of equality is thus linked to possession of a cultural—and in this case national—identity. The price of equality through national citizenship is that not everyone can take part in it. Each link implies separation, as classical thinkers such as Marx, Simmel, and Weber have already taught us. Living together—at whatever level and in whatever way—must be viewed as a series of processes in which a distinction is constantly made, consciously or subconsciously, between within and without, between we and they, between the self and the other. This filtering and classification underlies every assignment of meaning, communication, and action.

The social effects of this ranking are significant. Drawing boundaries and setting standards always entails the creation, legalization, regulation and institutionalization of difference and inequality. Differences in age, gender, race, social class, religion, culture and ethnicity are in fact construed and emphasized as reciprocal relationships and dependencies grow. The process is exactly what the dual process of globalization and localization shows.

Globalization means that the “world becomes smaller each and every day. We see it turning into a global village” (McLuhan, 1964: 93). People and places throughout the world have become linked to each other. We see growth in mutual relations of dependence and a condensation of interactions between an ever-growing number of agents. In this context multinationals become transnational “global” organizations. People from practically all societies are confronted with aspects of other societies and cultures through tourism, the media and consumer goods. New styles of consumption (clothing, utilities, food), as well as standardized time, money, and expert systems, are introduced everywhere. Capital, human beings, ideas, and images travel at high speed through revolutionary improvements in communications technology and transport. Apart from this continuing acceleration, long-distance migration is also characterized by greater distribution: increasingly, countries and regions become involved in networks that span the globe. Political, ideological, religious or cultural trends that originally appeared to be connected with a specific region, culture or period are being echoed in large parts of the world. “The most obvious reasons for this change were the growing capital-intensity of manufacture; the accelerating momentum of technologies; the emergence of a growing body of universal users; and the

spreading of neoprotectionist pressures” (Brenner, 1996: 19). This globalization concerns not only processes; the world as a whole is adopting systemic properties in which characteristics of each particular entity must be understood within the framework of the world as a whole (see, for example, Friedman, 1995; Robertson, 1992). “In short, a worldwide web of interdependencies has been spun, and not just on the Internet” (De Ruijter, 1997).

Globalization has subjected the traditional functions of family, community, church and nation-state to pressure. The advance of globalization leads many people to revert to what they see as their own ethnic identity; they invoke traditions and a history which they sometimes manipulate to promote individual and group interests. In other words, increasing globalization fosters favorable conditions for all sorts of particularization, localization and even fragmentation (see, for example, Featherstone, 1990; Friedman, 1995; Giddens, 1990; Hannerz, 1992; Latour, 1994; Robertson, 1992, 1995).

As a result of the interaction between local and global elements and mechanisms, new multiple and varying identities emerge. These identities are no longer confined to a specific area—they are deterritorialized (Malkki, 1992). Paradoxically, this rapid increase in the mobility of human beings themselves and the mobility of meanings and meaningful forms through the media also gives rise to the conditions for (and parallels all sorts of) localization. “The paradox of the current world conjuncture is the increased production of cultural and political boundaries at the very same time when the world has become tightly bound together in a single economic system with instantaneous communication between different sectors of the globe” (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc, 1994: 29). This free movement of cultural forms and images contrasts increasingly with the growth of cultural boundaries. Apparently, a transnational system’s emergence implies the rebirth of nationalism, regionalism, and ethnicity (Anderson, 1992). As a result, cultural differentiation within national societies is rising.

Here, we encounter localization, which is the other extreme. Apparently, globalization and localization constitute and feed each other. In this era of time-space compression, distant localities are linked in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa (Giddens, 1994: 64). A state of “in-betweenness” results. As the “global and the local are two faces of the same movement” (Hall, 1991), the culturally homogenizing tendencies of globalization paradoxically imply continued or even reinforced cultural heterogeneity.

Closely related to this paradox is the precarious balance between “global flows” and “cultural closure.” “There is much empirical evidence to support the fact that people’s awareness of being involved in open-ended global flows seems to trigger a search for fixed orientation point and action frames, as well as determined efforts to affirm old and construct new boundaries” (Geschiere and Meyer, 1998: 602). This “glocalisation” (Robertson, 1995) or “hybridisation” (Latour, 1994) or “creolisation” (Hannerz, 1992) is a response via a permanent patchwork of cultural material that happens to be available (see, for example, Robertson, 1992, Beck, 1992). “The process of hybridization may create such multiple identities as Mexican schoolgirls dressed in Greek togas dancing in the style of Isadora Duncan, a London boy of Asian origin playing for a local Bengali cricket team and at the same time supporting the Arsenal football club, Thai boxing by Moroccan girls in Amsterdam and Native Americans celebrating Mardi Gras in the United States” (Hermans and Kempen, 1998: 1113).

From National to Transnational Culture

Clearly, this “glocalisation” phenomenon deeply affects our ideas about multicultural society. Most of the impact has concerned the context of the nation-state thus far. The policy has always been focused on stimulating adjustment to the culture of the dominant majority. The desirability of a stable and harmonious national multicultural society is the underlying motive. Territory, culture and identity converge in the nation-state concept. The political community coincides with the cultural community. In this view, each person naturally belongs to a certain place and possesses a national identity. Almost everyone takes the central elements in this idea for granted (see Malkki, 1992; Stolcke, 1993; and Clifford, 1994). A map of the world thus depicts areas with clear boundaries without any overlap. Territory, culture and people are connected through natural links. The concepts of *ethnos* and ethnicity assume this intrinsic link.

The three elements of territory, people, and culture combine to form “the country.” The ground is sometimes even literally linked to the people, such as when someone takes along a handful of earth from his country when forced to leave it or kisses the ground upon setting foot again on national soil. People therefore belong to a single culture only. It is for this reason that words such as “autochthonous” and, in relation to certain cultures, “native” and “indigenous” are used. It expresses the relationship between being born somewhere and the territory. They also convey a *we–they* distinction: “we” belong here, “they” do not. Migrants may *be* here, but they do not come *from* here. The natural place of people and cultures is often described in images derived from nature. Roots are an especially popular metaphor: people and cultures are rooted in the soil, just like trees; a nation is like a great family tree that is rooted in the ground; you can belong to only one tree and thus to only one culture. In this view people should continue to live in the place where they were born and raised, where their people and their culture reside. Displacements only cause problems for those involved. Should they be loyal to the nation and the state they have left or to the one where they have arrived? Significantly, this view of human beings, culture, people, and territory, which holds that people do not merely live somewhere but also belong there, asserts that the description of the “natural” order also establishes a standard, namely a moral justification of the existing situation (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992).

Assuming that today’s national, regional and village boundaries enclose cultures and regulate cultural exchange, however, would be a mistake. Production and distribution of mass culture are controlled largely by transnational companies not bound to specific locations. People construct their identities partly in this transnational mass culture. “Our” culture is increasingly permeated by aspects from other cultures. As a result of the rapid technological changes of recent years, such as the Internet, fax, mobile telephones, and extensive and inexpensive air travel, today’s migrants are better able to maintain links with their home countries, for example through temporary remigration. Migration leads to transnationalism, “the processes by which immigrants forge and sustain multistranded social relations that link together their societies of origin and settlement” (Basch, Schiller, and Blanc, 1994: 7). They establish economic, social, organizational, religious, political, and personal relationships that transcend geographic, cultural and political boundaries. We see that transmigrants act, take decisions and develop identities while embedded in networks of relationships that

bind them simultaneously with two or more nation-states. They develop new spheres of experiences and new kinds of social relations. In their daily lives they link nation-states to each other, and their lives take place within these links. Migrants maintain contact not only with those left behind in their country of origin but also with other migrants who have ended up in other countries. Their social network is not limited to a single host country but often covers several countries, at times even several continents. This situation enables new forms of transnational existence, or in other words “long distance nationalism”⁵ (Anderson, 1992). Transnational communities arise, consisting of people who feel emotionally and culturally connected, who ignore—or at least try to ignore—the national boundaries that separate them. The traditional image of emigrants who start a new life in a new country, leaving their past far behind, is thus no longer current.

In the world that is emerging people may still live and shape their lives in a specific national state but are no longer exclusively associated with and dedicated to a specific national group culture of a certain national state. People of our time who are committed to multiple cultures shape and elaborate their lives either across the boundaries of national states or within a small part of those states. “Much of the traffic in culture . . . is transnational rather than international. It ignores, subverts, and devalues rather than celebrates national boundaries” (Hannerz, 1989: 69).

The world, divided into separate national states, is yielding to a transnational and multicultural global society, sometimes slowly but more often with abrupt jolts. This new society is still organized, however, according to the principle of separate national states. Members of transnational communities cannot escape from the power of the nation-state as they try to create and maintain a collective identity. In a sense the ideal of the “deterritorialized nation-state” is a new nationalism. Transmigrants are not restrained by national boundaries, but the world is nonetheless still divided politically into nation-states with unequal power. For the time being, the nation-state system continues to exert an enduring influence in a world that is becoming ever more transnational.

Perspectives on Multiculturalism

On the one hand, people establish transnational networks and form interesting blends of different cultural sources. The concept of culture is acquiring a different scope as a result. On the other hand, sometimes simultaneously and within that same process, people revert to their “own” culture and confirm their “own” ethnicity. This tendency of globalization, which goes hand in hand with localization, has even more dimensions in the migrant situation than for those who continue to live in one place. In a multicultural society we find a transformation of culture rather than a loss of one’s “own” culture, traditions, and identity or a strict adjustment to “other” cultural identities. The outcome is a decline of national cultures that were formerly considered relatively homogeneous.

As a consequence, we see a transformation of the nation-state involving the evaporation of the triad of territory, culture, and identity. The nation-state is losing its “naturalness.” Although the nation-state is still viewed as “a key socio-psychological source of social cohesion” (Vertovec, 1997), its role as the casing for social and cultural associations renders it subject to erosion. The “national order of things”—that has been viewed in the modern West as the natural order of things—has to be problematized (see, for example, Gellner, 1983; Malkki, 1992).

“There is a transfer of formal state powers to continental ‘power blocks’ with, at the same time, a steady increase in regulations and effects on regional and local levels. In a period of ‘open borders,’ of advanced specialisation and division of labour and of continually increasing physical and socio-cultural mobility, society is becoming more pulled apart than ever has been the case” (Salet, 1996: 7).

The new situation is sometimes referred to as “a new great transformation,” especially from the perspective of the West. Analogous to the nineteenth century, when industrialization, urbanization, the formation of the core family, the formation of the national state and its associated public domain were the expressions of fundamental changes in social relations among people, a similar transformation is alleged to be taking place right now. This is illustrated by the interrelated transition to a restructured and open family, to a globalized postindustrial network society driven by new technology, to the new urban duality, to the new distribution of political power in which the national state relinquishes sovereignty to local units, NGOs, and supranational associations, as well as to the coexistence and blending of different cultures. This “great transformation” subjects existing citizenship practices and traditions to pressure everywhere and gives rise to a tremendous need for new forms and repertoires.

That need depends in part on the question of whether the present-day hybridization or multiculturalization is temporary or permanent. Three perspectives fight for priority here, convergence, divergence, and bricolage. Each of these perspectives involves different views of our future (see Nederveen Pieterse, 1996, on which we base our description).

The first perspective is that of cultural convergence or growing sameness. This perspective represents the classical vision of modernization as a steamroller that denies and eliminates the cultural differences in its way. Adherents of this “McDonaldization” thesis believe that growing global interdependence and interconnectedness will lead to increasing cultural standardization and uniformity. The “almighty transnational corporations” will erase the differences through rationalization in the Weberian sense—through formal rationality laid down by rules and regulations. Combining efficiency, calculability, predictability, and controllability, McDonaldization simultaneously represents the dual themes of modernization and cultural imperialism.

The second perspective highlights the aspect ignored in the homogenization thesis—the differences. Both a harmony and a conflict variant are identifiable within this perspective. Supporters of both variants emphasize the sociocultural or ethnic differences between various groups in their empirical studies, such as their lasting and immutable nature, implying or articulating the problems that will occur if these differences are denied or suppressed, and differing only in their evaluation and interpretation of these differences. In the harmony variant, stamping out cultural variety is seen as a “form of disenchantment with the world”: alienation and displacement become apparent (Nederveen Pieterse, 1996: 1389). In the harmony variant, it is stressed that the presence of cultural differences and cultural collectivities should not merely be tolerated but should be acknowledged as permanent and valuable, and actively protected and promoted in law and public policy (Taylor, 1992). In the conflict variant, difference is seen as generating rivalry and conflict. The assumed decay of social integration within the state is mentioned as an adverse effect of multiculturalization. This means that the common national orientation is disappearing, due to the diminishing joint commitment of all to a single nation-state and its culture.

Multiculturalism can be an excuse for marginalization, exclusion and oppression. All too often, it can be the occasion for violent conflict and even campaigns of genocide and civil war. During the last decade most conflicts around the world have been intrastate in nature, being linked to ethnic, religious or cultural differences. People of different cultural backgrounds have difficulty understanding each other; variety can evoke forces that either compel integration or thwart it. After all, people do not easily form relationships with persons and groups that differ from them. Processes of individualization lead many people to retreat and to care only for themselves—the calculating citizen.

In theory, difference is disruptive. A well-known proponent of this rivalry and conflict view is Samuel Huntington, who argues that “a crucial . . . aspect of what global politics is likely to be in the coming years . . . will be the clash of civilisations” (Huntington, 1993: 38). This variant understandably borders on racism, nationalism, religious or ethnic fundamentalism, and the associated apartheid philosophy, as well as ethnic cleansing. The difference between the two variants should not be exaggerated, however, at least not with respect to everyday practice. Although multiculturalism as a form of state-sanctioned cultural pluralism is “based on an ideology which holds that cultural diversity is tolerated, valued and accommodated in society, within a set of overarching principles based on the values normally associated with a liberal democracy—eg, the civic unity and equality of all people within the state, and individual rights” (McAllister, 1997: 2), we know that the practice of multiculturalism effectively reinforces domination by one specific ethnic group. Diversity is domesticated, shaped, and harnessed to the yoke of the dominant sociocultural order and economy.

The third perspective, which we embrace, stresses that the current bricolage of cultures is structural. This bricolage thesis, also known as glocalization or creolization, emphasizes the idea that the global powers are—and will always be—quite vulnerable to small-scale and local resistances. Hybridization acknowledges that “communities are always in flux, divided, contested; people are perpetually escaping them as well as mobilizing to enforce them” (Kalb, 1997: 5). Hybridization refers to a worldview “which is not frozen by global images and metaphors, but which refers to the multi-localized (in the geographical and institutional sense) resistances, to the vulnerabilities and tensions, in short to the contradictions, of the ongoing struggle about living and working conditions” (Maier, 1996). This formulation reminds us of the inherent tension between an imagined ideal world and the actual practices of the existing social order. Briefly, the dilemma we face in dealing with multiculturalism is as follows: “Multiculturalism conveys the idea of ‘many cultures,’ distinct from each other, implying boundaries rather than continuities; logically followed by separateness and distinctiveness. This contrasts with the conscious mixing of language, race and culture in much of contemporary societies. This implies that the boundaries between groups must not be formalised and institutionalised” (McAllister, 1997: 20).

But that evokes penetrating questions. For instance, will formal multiculturalism with its institutionalized boundaries lead to a categorization, polarization or compartmentalization of people with greater ethnic stereotyping and mobilization along ethnic lines? Is a formal recognition of cultural difference required to facilitate reconciliation, redistribution of resources, and the elimination of disadvantage? We do not know. We do know, however, that we face pressing questions. How can we accommodate the complexities and meet the challenges of pluralism? How will we balance the affirmation of particular

identities and the requirements of an increasingly interdependent world in which we must all coexist and cooperate? Pluralism is an issue for all of us that needs to be addressed at personal, social, cultural, and political levels. The personal level reflects who we are and how we define ourselves; the social level concerns how we interact with each other; the cultural level inevitably involves our beliefs, ideas, and understandings; and the political level relates to the accommodation of pluralism, which in turn involves the distribution of power and access to resources. All these levels converge in the concept of "citizenship."

Citizenship

As we have seen, national citizenship has been one of the most influential expressions of citizenship until our time. According to its present meaning, citizenship is primarily the binding element of a national community. This particular interpretation of citizenship will be discussed here. As it originated in a world of separate and divided nation-states, we may rightly ask whether national citizenship retains the same function in a world where those states have become multicultural societies, and where the bonds that link people and groups transcend national boundaries. Since this link prevents national citizenship from accommodating cultural diversity, the right to be different is also at stake. So, we do not reject citizenship as an institution, we do reject the citizenship's current linkage of law with culture.

National Citizenship: Inequality and Equality

National citizenship draws boundaries between states. It is thus one of the most powerful exclusion instruments of our time. State boundaries exclude unwelcome individuals. The resulting reservation of certain privileges and rights to a select few leads to unequal opportunities and thus inequality in the world.⁶ As Brubaker (1992: x) argues: "In global perspective, citizenship is a powerful instrument of social closure, shielding the prosperous states from the migrant poor."

National citizenship also draws boundaries within states, namely between citizens and foreigners. "Every state claims to be the state of, and for, a particular bounded citizenry, usually conceived of as a nation" (ibid.). By linking citizenship rights to a specific national-cultural identity, the institution of national citizenship leads to a situation in which not every resident of a state has access to full citizenship and its corresponding rights.⁷

Although refugees and migrants have been accepted voluntarily by the country where they have settled and live and work there, these "denizens" (Hammar, 1990) all too often do not have the same rights as "real" autochthonous residents because of their deviating cultural identities.⁸

In many cases the practice of withholding certain rights from legal residents of a state has ceased. This is because the nation-state lies in the middle of a transnational field of influence, where a struggle is taking place for individual human rights instead of rights that are based on the nation. According to Soysal (1994), the group that receives citizenship rights is being increasingly expanded to include non-citizens or individuals who are not full-fledged citizens. The state is thus slowly accepting responsibility for all those who reside within its territory.

The question then arises as to why formal citizenship is nonetheless not granted. Social rights are extended to non-citizens much more easily than political

rights. One probable factor is that, through the state, political aspects are quite closely tied to the existence of the nation. The ever-powerful influence of the link between political community and national culture surfaces here—granting political rights to non-nationals endangers the nation itself.

Accordingly, not every legal inhabitant possesses full citizenship and the corresponding political voting rights. Residents who are allowed to vote thus take decisions that affect the future of legal residents without full-fledged citizenship.⁹

National Citizenship and Cultural Diversity

In present-day liberal and multicultural societies, attempts to achieve two apparently opposing ideals are commonplace. First, in a multicultural society each group and individual is ideally entitled to equal treatment as a citizen. Simultaneously—and this is the second ideal—everyone has the right to be different. This “being different” is viewed by some migrants, policymakers, politicians and scientists in an essentialist way (see, for example, the divergence perspective in our Introduction above and in Hall [1996]). We, however, see this condition as the right to be different and unique, but also and above all to be allowed to become a different person and to evolve continuously. In this sense, several liberal authors have noted the importance of a personal cultural identity to the ability to live a good life (see Kymlicka, 1995; Young, 1990). Acknowledgment of personal cultural identity is an especially important condition for a good life, regardless of whether such identity is experienced individually or as a group (Taylor, 1994).

National citizenship, however, turns the national majority culture into the standard that migrants must meet to attain equal rights. As a result, migrants who also wish to retain their own cultural identity cannot achieve full citizenship. The national citizenship principle thus leaves little room for diversity within state boundaries. Bauman (1988) maintains that migrants face demands that are impossible to satisfy. They are given the prospect of equality and recognition, on the condition that they change their cultural orientation. Expected to become liberals in a liberal society, migrants are thus put into the position of someone who must prove himself innocent. In this way migrants will always remain aliens. Bauman therefore recommends that rather than expecting the aliens to become as we are, we should realize that we too are aliens.

Moreover, differences are especially imputed between groups. Discussions about culture thus degenerate into discussions between cultural groups that are viewed as being quite different from each other, whereas in reality the people who make up those groups are often in complete disagreement with each other. Different individuals are thus reduced to being seen as a single group with a single viewpoint. National citizenship thus turns the cultural-ethical discussion into a debate between closed groups instead of among free individuals.

Postnational Citizenship: An Alternative?

The application of national citizenship in its traditional meaning thus leads, both in individual multicultural states and in the multicultural world as a whole, to inequality before the law and to denial of the diversity in individual identities. In a multicultural society both results can lead to a decline in social integration. First, an equal citizenship position is a precondition for being willing and able to

communicate with "others." Second, a person communicates with the other only when the other accepts his identity. National citizenship therefore results in the opposite of what it is intended to achieve: instead of social integration, it generates conditions that complicate social integration. A different view of the relationship between justice, culture, and identity appears necessary to satisfy the multicultural needs of our time.

Postnational citizenship is often mentioned as an alternative (see, for example, Geoghegan, 1994; Donald, 1996). In the postnational view, anyone who resides legally for a certain period of time within the territory of a state or settles there legally is granted equal rights. Possessing such rights and having the related duties does not necessitate a certain cultural identity. Nor does such a person need to belong to a certain territory; being there is all that matters. This separation of rights and culture can lead to equality before the law and greater acceptance of different identities.

A principal difference from national citizenship is that, in the postnational definition of citizenship, the interest and survival of the state are not the first priority. Instead, the interests and means for survival of every person situated within the territory of the state are looked after, regardless of individual identity. Nor are predefined categories of aliens excluded. In a state that applies a postnational citizenship principle, everyone is in a certain sense a stranger to everyone else. Contrary to the situation with national citizenship, however, people are then in any case not defined as certain types of aliens.

Postnational citizenship, however, leads to other problems. A multicultural state with a postnational citizenship will face the issue of admittance: who shall be accepted as new members, and who makes the decisions? The transition from national to postnational citizenship displaces the problem in some respects. Denationalizing state citizenship does not eliminate the state's boundaries. Within the state everyone may have equal rights, but group formation, which involves exclusion of "others," is once again inevitable. Even an ideally organized multicultural society has state boundaries.

Still, postnational citizenship aims to accomplish more than merely shift the problems. First, it ensures greater acceptance and equality for all citizens within a state. Second, it provides reasons for granting or excluding people from postnational citizenship. The application of national citizenship leads the "other" to obtain a specific identity, even an anti-identity, since this is compared to the identity of the group that accepts but also excludes. If one individual is accepted because of who he or she is, another one will be excluded for the same reason. The idea of postnational citizenship supports an entirely different principle. Acceptance or exclusion is based not on identity, whereby the "other" is mainly reduced to the status of alien. Instead, postnational justice entails that the other is especially a fellow world citizen, "one of us." From this perspective, none of us is a stranger, or we are all strangers, which amounts to the same thing.

Continuing Power of the Nation-State

But how does the possibility of a postnational citizenship relate to the current power and functions of nation-states? Does it lead directly to the end of the national state? Important trends indicate that the nation-state is losing power. The impact of globalization is causing its sovereignty to give way—a partially "forced" process. Individual states have, for example, little influence over supranational

effects that are inherent to developments in the fields of environment, economy and finance. In part, the nation-state chooses to share its sovereignty more or less "voluntarily," such as in the area of rules and agreements within the European Union and in military issues. This voluntary character is limited, however, in the sense that it constitutes an attempt to absorb the effects of globalization. In addition, within the scope of these developments new, often transnational, agents arise next to or in place of the national states, and new principles are developed to define who belongs to these various agents and who does not.

A number of authors argue in fact that nation-states are coming under great pressure. Eriksen (1997) even foresees their rapid downfall. In his opinion, the accelerating increase of diversity in personal experience, combined with the dislodgement of such experience from the symbolism of the nation, has resulted in the shared national identity now standing on its last legs.

Also in the area of law, agents other than the nation-state are starting to play a greater role. Treaties on human rights and other issues have great consequences for the possibility of bringing national states into line or intervening in each other's affairs. There is a growing sense that states should be unable to do everything to their citizens that they would like to, and that the international community has a responsibility to address human rights issues, even when states call them "internal affairs." In actual practice, human rights that are not bound to states are becoming ever more important, in addition to the civil rights that are bound to the state. Individuals can increasingly indict their states through legal courts or international commissions for violations of human rights. In that way they too become subjects under international law. In addition, it has gradually become more customary for states that are treaty partners to report periodically about their progress in a given human rights area. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are often then granted the opportunity to issue supplementary reports. Also, special observers are appointed by organizations such as the United Nations to investigate suspicions of human rights violations in specific states. Such investigations are not only directed at human rights violations of individuals but also of minority groups. State sovereignty is highly affected by these developments. States are also dependent on international organizations such as the United Nations bodies. This applies not only to states that have voluntarily joined such treaties, as was generally the case in the past, but increasingly also to states that have not signed these. This is more and more being interpreted as common law (Flinterman, 1996).

These developments are affecting a core function of the national states, that of the judicial system. International organizations, such as the United Nations, the European Union and the Council of Europe; transnational NGOs, such as Amnesty International; and also transnational industrial organizations, are playing an increasing role in this area, in addition to national states, whose role remains important. The sovereignty of national states, which lies at the basis of admittance policy, is also being affected.

But the power or powerlessness of the nation-state has a paradoxical twist that arises from the conflict between two principles that will not budge—that of national sovereignty and that of universal human rights. The transnational collection of universal human rights we have just described is becoming continuously more imperative and sometimes forces nation-states to expand the arsenal of rights that is granted to non-nationals (Soysal, 1994). It is remarkable then that these universal human rights, on which a potential postnational

citizenship might be based, are continuing to be implemented for the time being through the nation-state. Transnational organizations such as the United Nations are still calling upon the nation-state and thereby in fact give it legitimacy. The more or less forced granting of these human rights thus undermines the sovereignty of the nation-state, while it is simultaneously reproduced thereby. In the end, only the nation-states themselves are authorized to introduce legislation to improve the legal position of groups of people within their territory. Even in a time when international law is experiencing a shift from the right of self-determination of nations to a more individual human rights approach, the sovereignty of nation-states continues to hold a central position. A truly postnational citizenship thus still belongs to the future. To use the words of Brubaker (1992: 189): "The heralds of the budding postnational era are too hasty in relegating the nation-state to the dumping ground."

Below we address the consequences of globalization and localization for refugees. Literature on globalization tends to cover the well-educated, cosmopolitan crowd employed in transnational firms and only temporarily residing abroad. These individuals have no claim to citizenship. Instead, we will discuss a different category—refugees in a transnational world.

Refugees in a Transnational World

Simultaneous globalization and localization leads both to the deterritorialization of culture (causing the image that is used by the nation-state, in which territory, people and culture converge) and to the creation of new cultural identities with the attendant exclusion mechanisms. The result is a growing global diversity and the existence of groups of people who form identities that cut across the boundaries of existing nation-states. In order to concretize these developments, we will now focus specifically on the approach by the European nation-states toward migrants and in particular refugees.

Refugees and migrants, legal or otherwise, have increasingly become a transnational "risk" that the state is unable to control. As a result of globalization, more people are able to move over great distances, for example to Europe. The end of the cold war has resulted in the former world powers no longer being able to control conflicts, which can become uncontrollable without directly affecting areas that lie at greater distances. However, the refugees who are victimized by these conflicts do come to these more distant areas, whereupon attempts are made to close the borders. To what extent is the superseded image of the triad of territory, people, and culture used as an argument to exclude people? The declining sovereignty of nation-states plays an important role in this context. How does Europe deal with its search for a *new* sense of community? What are the consequences for refugees of the immigration policy of the European states, and how do their diverse cultural identities express themselves in a transnational context?

The National State as an Argument in Refugee Policy

The exclusion of people through state boundaries works to a certain extent. But it only works with many more laws, rules and public officials and at a higher cost. Public policy within Europe reacts with involution—an accumulation of policy measures that have only brief effects and an ever-continuing refinement of

refugee categories. Formally, the West European states belong to what is sometimes called Fort Europe: a territory that is screened off from foreigners through various treaties, such as those of Schengen, Dublin, Maastricht, and Amsterdam, as well as through electronic and other control mechanisms. In practice, however, many immigrants reach Europe without permission, with or without the help of facilitators. Some of them “disappear” within the state, so that the control of the state over who may be considered an inhabitant is in fact undermined. It becomes impossible to deport others from Europe; according to the rules, they are not entitled to a residence permit, but for technical reasons they cannot be deported, sometimes for so-called “policy” reasons—it is unjustified for humanitarian reasons. With them an additional category of inhabitant comes into being—not (partly) citizen, but also not illegal.

Of course, states have never been fully sovereign. They have always delegated certain parts of their sovereignty to the local, regional or international level. Only within the ideology of nationalism were nation-states coherent and stable; outside of it they have always been fragmented. Because of the developments mentioned above national states can no longer properly justify the basis on which they legitimize entry; the explicit arguments and implicit assumptions are losing their effectiveness. In an explicit way, state sovereignty was legitimized in admittance issues for the protection of both the state under a rule of law and the welfare state—the political and economic entities. By implication this choice was legitimized in the light of the protection of nations as cultural units. The legitimizations for admittance and exclusion are thus an expression of the concept of the state as a political, economic and cultural community.

The European Union—Shifting the Problem?

The depiction of a state as a nation-state in the way prescribed by the ideology of nationalism is under attack due to the shifting of its functions, as these have been transferred in part to the European Union. The European states can no longer be seen as a community that can itself determine who are citizens (“we”) and who are not (“they”). This does not, however, herald the beginning of a new “we,” of the new nation-state of Western Europe. The European Union does invest in the establishment of new common traditions (“invented traditions”) in order to become a community (“imagined community”), but this has not yet led to a European nation. Creating a nation does not operate upon command. Despite all the information and propaganda, despite EU symbols including a flag, an anthem, a passport, a currency, the European dimension in education through the Erasmus programme, the activities of citizenship such as the right of petition and voting rights for the European Parliament, despite the introduction of a legal European citizenship through the European Union treaties of Maastricht and Amsterdam, despite all this the ideology of European “nationalism” has not yet caught on.

The European Union does, however, behave like a nation-state in legitimizing the exclusion of migrants. Within the EU there is free movement of persons, goods, services and capital, but the European Union shuts itself off from outsiders as if it were a nation-state. That points to common external borders just like those of a nation—intensification of checks at the external borders and a common visa policy within the context of the “external borders convention.”¹⁰

The European Union legitimizes this on the basis of the unquestioned concept

of citizens versus non-citizens, a paradoxical situation, and contributes toward the erosion of the old nation-states while establishing at the same time those same ideals. The European Union previously called the European Economic Community, was created to "solve" certain problems of the nation-state, particularly economic issues. As time passed, its functions have expanded to social issues such as immigration and asylum policy, but the same arguments are being introduced as in the nation-states. The European Union, a result of developments that undermine nation-states, also contributes to a state-formation process while it attempts to deal with the consequences of the earlier developments, an attempt unlikely to succeed.

The European Union was not founded to handle social problems such as the refugee issue, but over the years this issue has become salient within the EU. A shift in functions has thus taken place as the EU has become one of the agents in global dynamic processes and relationships where it has had an unmistakable but unpredictable effect: the outcome of actions by a new agent is always uncertain. In this case the problems are becoming differently defined, possibly even aggravated.

Until now, the European Union has been using the same ideology as the national states, and the same types of problems persists if the EU uses the same arguments as the nation-states with regard to admittance, refugees may be defined even more as the "other," or as a problem of "us versus them." The internal problems of the European Union, those between the different national states and between national states and EU bodies, also affect its approach. The EU is in fact not on its own in this process. National states put their interests first, which can for example result in "burden shifting" rather than "burden sharing" in the case of large numbers of refugees, such as those from Bosnia and Kosovo; many member states quickly set up visa requirements for citizens of the former Yugoslavia. When most refugees who came to the European Union settled in Germany, the other member states felt no need for further action. Possibly for internal political reasons, the national states tend to demonstrate their sovereign powers and to cooperate in particular in the technical support of a restrictive refugee policy which undermines the EU's approach to these global developments.

This mainly technical cooperation in maintaining a restrictive immigration and asylum policy reinforces the perceived need to protect the nation from outsiders, creating a negative spiral which causes the refugees to be regarded as the problem, whereas the problem is that people have been made in to refugees. This is hardly on the public agenda.

It appears that the European Union and its member states contribute little to the solution of the problems of refugees. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Mrs Ogata, has pointed out on various occasions that states outside Europe are starting to adopt this attitude; some African countries argue that they, while being the poorest in the world, bear the main burden of the refugees, and that if Europe refuses to accept its share of the burden, they too will refuse to take it up any longer. This can have dramatic consequences for refugees, as they will then no longer be accepted anywhere and will in fact be confined to the area where they are persecuted or made victims of war and other disasters.

Globalization diminishes the traditional functions of the nation-state, and the legitimacy of the exclusion of foreigners. But while certain boundaries are fading away in practice, the ideal of the national state is simultaneously being put forward strongly in the debate about admission policy. In the admission and exclusion of foreigners, the nation-state definitely still has a powerful effect.

Cultural Identities in Refugee Policy

Although asylum policy always emphasizes that economic motives are irrelevant in the protection of refugees, the restrictive policy in the determination of who is a “real” refugee still appears to point toward economic considerations having a certain impact. In addition to these factors, cultural considerations also play a role, for example in the policy regarding the return of refugees. In this view, people by nature belong to a certain culture that is rooted in a certain territory, relocation is an anomaly. In the receiving country, refugees are said to be in a strange world, while they felt at home in their own community; if people must flee, it is therefore best to have them stay as close as possible to their original place, or, if that is impossible, at least return to their own place as soon as it is safe again. There they can pick up their old way of life, so that the situation becomes normalized.

The place where the refugees used to live is wrongly idealized in this view, and the asylum country as an option for refugees is depicted negatively. It cannot, however, be taken for granted that refugees feel at home in their country of origin: they fled because the situation had become hostile and threatening. Situations of ethnic conflict and gross violations of human rights cause people to feel no longer at home. For the rest, one may rightly question whether asylum countries are in fact such a totally strange world in this age of world-wide communication.

In the immigration and asylum policy, this cultural image means that people are pinned down to the area where they belong, even if it is a place of poverty and impotence. Immigration control is a way of maintaining the “natural” order, since migration supposedly blurs the distinction between culturally separate areas. Such ideas legitimize the protection of the economic interests of the rich countries (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992).

An ethnic identity is, however, not an essence that people bear within themselves. It is a social construction within a certain historical context. Groups and boundaries are shaped through social and political processes. For refugees these are processes in their country of origin, processes in the country to which they have fled, and processes on a global scale, all at the same time. They experience the tension that exists between the pain of their forced physical separation from their homes, where they would have stayed in safe circumstances, and the often just as difficult experience of shaping their lives in a different country. All this happens in a world that is undergoing great change through the impact of globalization, to which those very refugees and other migrants are also contributing. These are no longer totally separated worlds. Refugees live a transnational existence, and many factors influence the way in which they shape their existence: it makes a great difference, for example, when someone who used to live in the countryside first comes to a city. The reasons for fleeing play an important role. Another influential factor is whether the country of origin has an emigration tradition. The refugees from the former Yugoslavia could, for example, fall back to some extent on the knowledge of fellow countrymen who had preceded them to Western Europe. Lastly, the image that people have of the asylum country, or of Western Europe in general, is an important factor.

In Western policy too little attention is paid to globalization as it relates to identities in a transnational context in the asylum country, and in relation to the country of origin. Below we pursue each of these items.

Cultural Identities in a Transnational Context

Western European governments tend to ignore the fact that the continuing globalization causes identities to change. The bond to a geographical location lessens; identities become deterritorialized (Malkki, 1992). Many migrants live a transnational existence. The world is changing due to these processes, not only for those who move but also for those who stay. In addition, refugees and migrants stay in touch not only with the “stay-behinds” in their former place of residence, but also with other refugees and migrants from their former city or region who have ended up in other countries. The dispersion is not confined to a single host country, but often covers many countries, sometimes even continents, all interconnected through these transnational communities.

Cultural differences have until now generally been mapped—and this applies to asylum policy also—along the lines of geographical linkage. That is one of the reasons why such importance is attached to the reception of refugees “in their own region.” But, as an Iranian refugee expressed it in the context of the debate about whether refugees should be taken up in their own region: “To me, the region is the big cities in the Western countries. I feel much more strongly attached to these cities than to the rural areas in the countries around Iran.” The geographical linkage of identities must therefore be put into perspective; it has become less “natural.” This type of situation may enable forms of solidarity and identity that are not based on geographical proximity (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992: 19).

Integration? Identity Formation in the Asylum Countries

The second factor that West European governments need to consider in their asylum policy is that identities of refugees are also shaped within the context of the host country, which change over time. There are two approaches: on the one hand, there is the receiving society with its many differences, and, on the other there are the refugees with all of their own mutual differences. These two sides obviously impact on each other constantly. Further, the processes of identity formation are not univocal in this context and do not proceed along straight lines. Instead, they are dissimilar, heterogeneous, and unpredictable. And government policy does not take these differences among people into account.

In the Netherlands as an asylum country, for example, the debate deals mainly with admission and with the purely legal aspects of refugee policy, while far less attention is paid to what happens after admission. An important aspect in the identity formation of refugees in asylum countries, for example, is the persisting image of refugees as pitiable victims, groups in need of humanitarian aid. This is in sharp contrast to the exiles of the past, who were strictly individual, almost romantic heroes. The image of exiles, linked to political revolt and to cultural life, is aesthetized and elitist. The exiles were seen as able to maintain a certain freedom and power; the recent refugee who often belongs to a much larger group is not considered to possess or desire freedom and power.

Of course, it is true that refugees have often suffered hardships and have thus had traumatic experiences. At times, however, this aspect is overemphasized so that it seems as if refugees are unable to contribute in any way to their new society. This denial of value is found not only among the Dutch, but refugees themselves sometimes utilize this victims’ image in order to get certain things from the government. This victims’ role is justified in only a limited way. Many refugees are

in fact quite active people who have overcome great difficulties in order to reach their goal, safety. They try to shape their new situation creatively but if they are pushed into the role of victims their dignity is lost.

The identity of refugees and migrants in the context of the host country is undermined by their weak position on the job market, where it is extremely difficult for them to find suitable work. If they find work at all, they are often underemployed, which further damages their sense of self-esteem. As a result, they are neither accepted nor valued as contributing fellow-members of Dutch society. As the number of refugees grows, so grows the image of a burden too heavy for society to bear.

Widespread admission of large numbers of refugees also contributes significantly to their identity formation. Whereas until recently, taking in refugees was the main issue, the emphasis now is on the return of people admitted in the past. Receiving only temporary protection makes them feel unwelcome, especially in the eyes of the autochthonous population and government. However, some refugees, who formerly did not consider integration in an asylum country, after years spent in a marginal position come to long for greater participation. A Bosnian dentist, for example, said in a television documentary programme that, during her first two years in the Netherlands, she only thought of returning to Bosnia. In the meanwhile, however, her children have learned Dutch and gone to school here. As the war continued and her children became more integrated, this situation became unbearable. A sudden change in Bosnia, such as that offered by the Dayton Agreements, could reverse this, so that return becomes a viable option again, but that introduces new uncertainties.

In addition to these problematic aspects, which can affect the process of identity formation in the context of the host country, positive creative forces also can be addressed. The idea of a temporary stay leads to quite different views of citizenship and participation in Dutch society from the idea of living in the Netherlands for a longer period or even permanently. Someone who thinks that he or she will be able to stay in the Netherlands only temporarily may prefer to learn English, which in most countries is much more useful than Dutch. Often this aspect changes as time passes. It is logical for a person to increase his focus on the local environment as the time spent in the Netherlands becomes longer.

But even then the ties that migrants and refugees maintain with people in their countries of origin or other host countries are regarded with suspicion by government representatives. It is believed that such contacts counteract integration. Multiple allegiances are abhorrent in the eyes of policymakers, even though recent research in Rotterdam has shown, however, that refugees and migrants are quite able to focus on two or more places simultaneously (Dijkstra and van Eekelen, 1999). Ties to a particular country do not necessarily preclude embedment in a different and new society.

The plight of migrants who are forced to leave their country and only slowly adjust and assimilate in their new environment applies far less than it did in the past. People find new and creative ways to construct their lives, often combining cultural sources. Interesting blends can develop in this way. In the old centre of Lyons, for example, a Turkish "McDoner" sits next to authentic Cambodian and Moroccan restaurants.

The problematic experiences of refugees in the host country can also lead to positive new links that emphasize the unique characteristics, especially when related to colonial or neo-colonial history. In France, Algerians, Tunisians and

Moroccans nowadays develop a common Maghreb awareness, in which Raï music is an important factor (Clifford, 1994).

Back to the Future? Returning to the Country of Origin

A third factor which needs more attention in the attitudes of the West-European governments is that there is no question of refugees returning to the same situation in their country of origin as that which existed previously, like a trip back in time. The lives of the refugees involved did not stop during their residence elsewhere, and this may well have been a period of several years. They have had many experiences, and gone through many changes; in some cases their period of refuge was easier than their lives before it. They do not automatically expect to go back to find things as they used to be. Some refugees have lived in cities, followed training courses, found work, and are not keen to go back to a country where they would have scarcely any economic possibilities, even if this were the place from which they originally came. The country from which they fled has also changed; often conflicts have been going on for years. Houses, land, and other possessions have been taken over by other people. Going back does not mean a return to the old situation, but to a new situation in which they must build up a new life through creativity, perseverance and will power. Some people are unwilling or unable to take this step. They have developed a new transnational way of life which they wish to continue in the asylum country.

The return means different things for different people: amongst them there are differences not only in their gender, age and duration of stay in the host country, but also in the degree of involvement they have retained with their country of origin. As already stated, globalization for refugees means, amongst other things, that they can keep greater contact with their country of origin through the people who did not flee for many reasons. Social and political networks can be maintained or even set up transnationally. The fact that refugees can, far more than used to be the case, stay involved with developments in their country of origin means that the conflicts from which they fled continue to play an important role in their asylum countries too. For example, many Bosnian refugees in asylum countries redefine their identity partly on the basis of the developments in the conflict in Bosnia. Some Muslims put a lot of emphasis on their identity as Muslims, a sort of ethnicity. They call themselves *Bosnjak*, a reference to the descendants of the Bosnjani, a Bosnian society in the Middle Ages. In this way, an ethnic Muslim identity is constructed which provides a connection with descent and territory. In Sweden, for example, the refugees did not use specific Serbo-Croatian words used in parts of Bosnia associated with groups posing the greatest threat or denoting their place of origin. Thus a family from Mostar would avoid using Croatian words and a family from Banja Luka would avoid using Serbian words (see Eastmond, 1998).

The refugees do not, therefore, consist of homogeneous groups, but have large mutual differences and often contradictory interests. The transnational manner in which culture, identity and idealisation of the homeland are elaborated varies.

In addition there are, of course, differences between what people say in public that they consider to be important and the things about which they express their doubts in private. In public, few deny that return is the ultimate objective, one of the reasons being that they will then not be accused of double betrayal: you not only fled, but you are not going back to help with the reconstruction either.

Meanwhile, many refugees put their eggs in more than one basket: they help in the asylum seekers' centre through which they can make contact with those who work there, and thus build up a network. At the same time they request recognition of their diplomas and apply for a passport from the Bosnian embassy. Other important differences between people are their prospects given the economic situation in their host country, and their opportunities in the land of origin. Some people have found work or are following training courses; others feel marginalized, nor do they have any prospect of providing for themselves in the land of origin. All these differences between refugees affect the vision of their return.

People ultimately denied admission (or no longer accepted) in a host country may decide not to return to a place that they no longer see as home, or where they do not feel safe, but migrate to another country. Some Iranians, for example, having trained in Sweden but being unable to find work there and unwilling to return to Iran, are prepared to migrate to the United States or Canada (Graham and Khosravi, 1998).

If people do return to their country of origin, how those who have stayed behind view the situation plays an important role. The latter may think that refugees returning from Western Europe have had it easier than those who remained or those who fled to a neighbouring country. People can brand them as "traitors, cowards, people who have run away." Sometimes other people have moved into a house that was left years ago, and the land is worked by someone else. The relationship between losers and winners is also important in a (past) conflict. Is the family that has returned seen as belonging to the winners or the losers? This is important with regard to any reprisals, the loss of land, house, and other possessions. In Bosnia certain people can no longer return to their place of origin because of the division according to ethnically-defined areas. Building bridges between those who have stayed and those who are returning is enormously important in the process.

Focusing on Refugees: From Fixed Core to Self-constructed Identity

Refugees not only find themselves in another place but also in a globalizing world. They have been able to flee a long distance because of globalization; because of it they can lead a transnational life better than would have been possible in the past. The cultural context plays an important role in the asylum country, but also in the country of origin. Refugees experience hybrid transnational cultural identities in which traditional and new elements are united.

The formal grounds for any refugee policy, which take insufficient account of these changes and the related large diversity amongst refugees, are therefore based on points of departure which are becoming increasingly obsolete. The aims for so-called durable solutions are a return to the country of origin or integration in a host country. The problems associated with both are insufficiently recognised in the policy. In a globalizing world it has become impossible to talk about integration as though refugees simply switch from one culture to another, needing an initial period of mourning for their loss and then becoming steadily better adjusted in the course of time. Similarly, it is not realistic to think about return to a home in which refugees can just reintegrate as though time had stood still.

Government policy which takes insufficient account of the factors described above will not be effective, at least if it really wants to accomplish what it claims,

that is, quality of integration and quality of return. This is a problem for the government itself, and for the refugees, as also for the country to which they return.

Further refinement of the existing rules, which has been done repeatedly in recent years, is not really what is necessary. This leads to involution and the treatment of the symptoms in the short term and on a very limited scale. Another perspective is necessary in forming refugee policy, in which the views of refugees, with their changing cultural identities, become central. Where refugees now seem primarily to be objects of the policy, they should become more the subject, with the prospect of a worthwhile existence in which dignity and self-sufficiency are central concepts.

Conclusion: A Plea for Postnational Citizenship

National citizenship does not meet the requirements of a solution for the social integration problem in the multicultural communities for two reasons. First, it cannot achieve its objective, bringing about social integration by means of a divided culture, because it is based on an obsolete, static picture of culture. In the current world in which cultural meanings rapidly transcend borders in which people can simply travel to another area and maintain simultaneous (transnational) contacts, cultural homogeneity is an illusion, while the creation of new cultural identities is a fact. The theory of national citizenship does not fit in with the practical diversity and multiple connections of a multicultural society.

Second, national citizenship hinders any possible alternative approach to the social integration question. The cultivation of a common, national feeling presents the changed (and repeatedly changing), globalizing world with contrary results. Legal inequality and denial of the individual's identity, the consequences of national citizenship, are of course not a fruitful ground for social integration. The policy which arises from the opinion that a plural society can only function adequately if there is a consensus about fundamental values and orientations between different groups in the society therefore overshoots its mark. The plurality in normative orientations and the increasing international and transnational orientation in the fields of economy and the law, as well as identity, cannot be reversed. "Problems which are the result of the increasing diversity cannot be solved by modelling the behaviour of citizens. The state cannot impose a behaviour which is in accordance with the system (observance of rules, willingness to sacrifice oneself, political participation) in the name of citizenship. After all, this appeal is paradoxical: it tells free citizens how they should behave. However, citizenship implies the autonomy of citizens, the freedom to judge for oneself" (Van Gunsteren, 1992: 4).

We believe that rather than looking for an impossible cultural conformity, attempts should be made to unite the differences and different groups in the multicultural societies in another way than on the basis of culture. Social integration between different groups can be organized in a social manner, without this having to lead to cultural integration: perhaps cohesion leans more on social equality than on cultural integration. Having common ideas and values is not a functional condition for the society nor for communication between different groups and individuals. The question must then be, not how cultural homogeneity can be achieved but how the growing diversity can be united in such a way that enough social integration is maintained. What new cultural competencies do

citizens need in order to live together in such a “differentiated society”? And what role can the state and other (trans)national actors play here? In any case, the presence of diversity means that the current view of citizenship, with its homogenizing objective, must be brought up for discussion. We need another attitude towards citizenship. And the objective of the discussion about this new citizenship “should not be to realize a unity in society (shared standards and values, common goals, brotherhood) but to organize plurality” (van Gunsteren, 1998).

Citizens and Cultural Diversity: Learning to Communicate

Citizens in these multicultural societies connected by transnational contact will have to learn to deal with cultural diversity in a judicious manner. After all, in a plural society the citizen will inevitably have to associate with people who have different ways of thinking and acting. There is an urgent need to constantly communicate with others, foreigners, both with regard to capacity and intention. In a certain sense, for this to be the case, it is necessary that citizens also consider themselves to be foreigners and realise that there is no longer a benchmark which a cultural identity must meet.

The important question is, of course, how the citizen is to acquire the necessities for such communication. The differences in the society may finally lead to friction in the mutual contacts: people may be irritated by others, which results in imminent threats. It is difficult to lay down the competence to deal with diversity in formal rules. It has to do with the ability to deal with uncertainty, with unknown situations, with limited means, with one’s own shortcomings. The citizen does not find his freedom in blindly observing rules nor in a self-evident orientation toward the general interest, nor in the ability to do everything he wants to do, but in the ability to act judiciously under different specific conditions (van Gunsteren, 1992).

The State and Diversity: Public Debate about Postnational Citizens

We feel that an important condition for the realization of the above-mentioned open and equal communication between citizens is the uncoupling of law and culture in the form of the postnational citizenship as described above. This uncoupling leads to equality under the law and the recognition of different identities. These are, of course, natural objectives in themselves, but they are equally important conditions for learning to deal with differences in a multicultural society. Free and desired communication can ultimately only take place from equal power and legal situations. Besides these, equal citizenship rights are an instrument with which further social integration can be achieved. Citizenship is, after all, the main door to other entrances to the society.

As regards the characteristics a citizen needs to be able to live with “others” and if possible to get to know them, it is in any case necessary that the diversity of identities be recognized and valued within and by the state. This valuing of diversity takes place under the law via national citizenship and via the concept of the group. There is such a thing as a homogeneous groups metaphor, which repeatedly goes under different names: the nation, the Dutch culture, the French nationality. By this group thought, it is difficult to value difference without seeing other groups of individuals as totally different and excluded from specific rights.

Postnational citizenship is, on the other hand, willing to accept cross-boundary links, precisely because of the aspect of deterritorialized culture which is enclosed within it. It makes membership of various groups possible, which in our opinion is essential for life in a “differentiated society.” Finally, someone can only learn to accept and (if he chooses) value differences if he begins to be open to the open ends in his own identity. A postnational citizenship could be the cement of a multicultural society, in which the presence of diversity is actually recognized.

We must, therefore, let go of the idea of “commonality.” It must be replaced by a search for the capacity of differences to be united. Culture can then be described as a means, an instrument with which diversity can be organized, both in interests and standpoints. In such a vision, culture is not a system of fixed codes, but an implicit contract with respect for diversity.

It is not necessary to organize plurality around a common basis, because society would otherwise fall apart as cultural groups with calculating individuals fighting each other. People or groups with different values and backgrounds may work together very well in everyday practice by gradually developing the necessary instruments to do so. People may design and observe rules for associating with one another, without it being necessary to base them on a like-mindedness with respect to standards and values, in other words a shared “civil religion.”

This does not imply that a certain degree of commonality cannot be conducive to the organization of plurality. If commonality is actually present people may try to leave it intact. However making it a standard and a goal and trying to create it where it is lacking is in conflict with the principle of citizenship, that is, autonomy. In a plural society (and world) it is appropriate that we find ways to deal with differences, that is to say, to deal with the absence of self-evident commonality. Appealing for commonality when it is not present is to present the problem as the answer to the problem. We should not remove differences, which is impossible and unnecessary, but regulate and thus recognize and appreciate them. Only compatibility is required, not a commonality of cultures and lifestyles. This compatibility is not present from the very start, but should develop from practice. Here the government, but perhaps not only the government, has a vital function. It should cultivate compatibility. It can do this by stimulating and organizing public debate—in which many segments participate—on views, definitions and procedures with respect to the public domain. It should also teach the citizen to recognize differences between standards and systems of values and deal with them. The problem of the task of (post)modern open society is to develop the ability of citizens to deal with changing environments. A consequence of this may be that the other will not be denied (or excluded or ostracized), but treated and respected like any other person (van Gunsteren, 1992, 1998).

The Participating Citizen

It is only partly possible to do justice to these citizenship lessons in formal curricula; daily practice is the best experience. People will have to be able to participate in the practice of citizenship in a modern multicultural society. This means that the government will have to draw a clear line with respect to attempts to segregate or ostracize groups of citizens. In other words, it means stimulating contacts between groups with different identities, without asking these groups to develop a common system of basic conditions.

Nevertheless it means guaranteeing and regulating access to and use of the

competencies for participation necessary in our society. These competencies are not distributed equally over the various segments of society; certain groups find themselves in a basic situation of deprivation, lacking equal opportunities for development and having a low degree of participation. Different authors point out the danger of the possible formation of a permanent ethnic lower class (de Swaan, 1992; Wilson, 1991). In our opinion low participation is not connected to the culture of those groups.

An important characteristic of a lower class is the limited social participation and integration (Roelandt, 1994). The main cause can easily be identified. Participation in modern industrial society is realized through an economic dimension. Integrating while retaining one's own cultural identity is therefore perfectly possible, because in our type of society it is not culture but economics which is the determining factor. Work is the key to participation and integration in society and education is the key to work. According to van Amersfoort (1986) and Wilson (1991), successful participation in education is therefore of decisive significance for (young) migrants for upward social mobility and career development. It is here that there is a bottleneck.

The greatest problem for the participation and/or emancipation of ethnic minorities lies not in their culture but in their level of education. Other decisive factors include discrimination by employers and co-workers. There is still no true management of diversity, which should be based first of all on the added value arising from a knowledge of several languages and cultures for an organization in a transnational world. Lack of networks is another obstacle to finding work. This is especially true for refugees, whose network of family and friends to help them find work or start a business is smaller than that of other migrants.

In addition to generating income, work organizes the individual's whole life and provides a system of concrete expectations and objectives (Bourdieu, 1965). The government, possibly in cooperation with NGOs, must therefore utilize training and work as a means of participation for all citizens. Other areas of importance include promoting appreciation for diversity within and outside organizations and alternatives to the lack of networks.

Transnational Cooperation

Not only can states and citizens contribute to the changing citizenship and deal with growing diversity, the question is whether the state is the only proper and authorized institution to give form and content to the existing diversity. After all, not only do we live in multicultural societies, but also in a multicultural world linked by transnational connections. The recognition of multiculturalism has not yet led directly to the recognition of boundary-crossing linkages. Often national governments allow membership of and focus on only one political community. It would seem that people prefer to live in a multicultural state rather than recognize the existing multicultural world. For the time being it is still difficult to think outside the grid of the national state. The important question is ultimately, on which level, within what limits, do people want to organize social integration in a multicultural world.

In Europe, for example, a complex interaction takes place between the institutions of the EU and the institutions of separate nation-states. On top of this, there are other factors such as intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, (transnational) non-governmental organizations, private companies, regions, and

the like, which all have a role in questions concerning immigration, exclusion, asylum and the making of differences. Levels and centres of policy and sovereignty overlap. States do not disappear, but the sovereignty of states is affected. Individuals are at the same time members of various communities which are not mutually exclusive.

There is therefore a large diversity between, but also within, the actors. They all have their own subinterests without having a common umbrella interest. There is, however, a need to coordinate and combine these subinterests because otherwise complex questions which transcend the separate actors, such as the problem of refugees and the multiple connections of migrants, will not be considered.

It is precisely because of globalization that these different levels are not separate but dependent on one another. There are consequently problems in the terrain of harmonization in policy and jurisdiction, particularly with the many translevel matters. It is highly problematic if no institutions are able to coordinate and regulate the increasingly more complicated, intensive, and comprehensive dependency relationships across borders. The question is whether the United Nations institutions can function as arbiters given the fragmentation of actors, with a plurality of ways of life, objectives, values, and definitions of reality.

The existing conceptualizations of identities and citizenship are, as yet, expressed as institutions which are based on a "we/they" distinction. With globalization, there is a need to enrich these. The new conceptualizations and practices concerning identities and citizenship require new institutions, which may be found in the recognition of a diversity of actors, at different levels with partially overlapping sovereignty. A postnational citizenship strikes us as being an important condition for dealing adequately with difference and equality in a multicultural world.

We see a world in which all sorts of individuals and groups of people with self-created identities, more or less different from each other, more or less living in fixed abodes, practising more or less transnational contacts, trying to live together. If this equality of law and freedom of identity does not exist in the current world of difference and if the nation-states (and also Europe) obstinately continue to place "foreigners" in groups with big signs saying "not welcome here" in front of them both within and outside of their borders, we should worry about a future without cohesion.

Notes

1. During the recent period of globalization the West has exhibited a general tendency toward growing inequality and increasing poverty and exclusion. The trend toward less inequality came to a halt in the United States in the 1970s and in Europe in the 1980s. Inequality in terms of income and capital is on the rise. Some analysts predict a far-reaching polarization of income levels, leading to a dichotomy within societies. Others expect a fragmentation of the class structure, either instead of, or as well as, the above. What appears to be taking place is the formation, at least in part, of a social underclass. "Besidesx, we see a gradual transformation from the 'state as centre of power' which assumes responsibility for the welfare of its citizens to the 'state as border,' in which above all the criteria of membership of the society occupy a central place and in which an erosion of collective responsibility is going on" (Detrez and Blommaert, 1994).
2. Understandably, therefore, this theme links several projects within the comprehensive longitudinal multidisciplinary programme "The Dutch Multicultural and Pluriform

Society,” which is linked in turn to the international MOST research programme. In this programme, which is financed by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO) and several universities and runs from 1997 to 2005, various Dutch research groups work together. In addition to a more synthetic and theoretical-conceptual part, five comprehensive clusters can be distinguished, namely (1) the construction of identity, (2) the formation of networks, (3) law enforcement and the development of norms, (4) economic self-sufficiency and informalization, and (5) multicultural healthcare. These themes are closely linked to the issue of citizenship. An important component of the programme concerns the theoretical underpinning of empirical research and making the results of scientific research suitable for application. The nature and functioning of pluralism in a theoretical sense are elaborated in these primarily conceptual and synthetic studies.

3. This homogenizing activity within states brought about increasing differences among states.
4. Paradoxically, however, the latest developments of these media lead to a fragmentation of communality. The ever-increasing supply of television channels, for example, results in fellow-countrymen watching ever fewer of the *same* programmes. Without shared experiences, an imagined community is impossible. Instead everyone seems to be forming their own community. While television was originally a gateway to the *entire* world, it is now used to shut oneself off from certain parts of that world. The television button appears to be changing from a gateway into a barrier. The window to the world is increasingly degenerating into a means to reduce the world. This development can also be found in relation to the Internet.
5. This can also backfire, as Anderson (1992) indicates. The myriad means of communication have allowed various forms of crossborder nationalism to emerge. People in different countries maintain networks through which violent actions can be planned and implemented. Such forms of long-distance nationalism exist among certain refugees as well. The violent attacks by various Kurdish groups in Western Europe are a case in point.
6. Another relevant question is whether such privileges are perhaps acquired. While fostering inequality among people within the same state (or world) may be unjust, forcing a group to make resources that it has acquired over time accessible to members outside that group may be at least as unfair.
7. This statement does not refer to people who according to the law reside illegally in a particular state. Proponents and opponents engage in heated debates about the rights of these so-called illegal aliens, such as to health care and education, but this article does not address that discussion. It deals instead with the different statuses for people who have been accepted voluntarily by a given state.
8. Walzer (1983) argues that a community is entitled to deny access to individuals but that it must treat them as full and equal citizens once it has admitted them. He views the practice of granting different citizenship statuses to people living within one and the same country as unfair. Glastra and Shedler (1996) mention the consequences of the new naturalization programme in the Netherlands. Its essence is an integration paradigm, in which newcomers are required to attend courses in the Dutch language and sociocultural and job orientation, all in exchange for work at rates below the minimum wage. According to the authors, the rights of a certain population group are thus restricted, and people are forced to engage in certain activities to be allowed to become citizens. “In this context, citizenship is regarded not as a legal status but as a goal that the residents of a certain territory, in this case newcomers, can achieve only once they have met their obligations. Until then—much like young people—they lack full citizenship rights” (ibid.: 178).
9. Not all residents automatically have the same rights and obligations in Europe today. This also has to do with the linkage of nationality to legal rights, even though a supranationality is involved in this case. In principle, Europeans may have certain rights and obligations in every other member state. Membership in the European

Union is defined as being a citizen of one of the member countries, a simple fact that excludes at least 14 million legal residents from European citizenship. This shows how difficult it still is to consider citizenship in a postnational context.

10. The majority of the rules in this area are, however, intergovernmental rather than set by the European Community. The Treaty of Amsterdam sets a period of five years within which further thought must be given to the possibilities of transferring immigration and asylum policy from the third pillar (intergovernmental) to the first pillar (community): first harmonize, then set community rules for immigration and asylum policy. Harmonization is presently under way.

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