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Negotiation

Jeanne Brett *, Leigh Thompson

Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, United States

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ABSTRACT

Negotiation has been an important area of research within organizational behavior and management science for the past 50 years. In this review, we adapt Brett's model of culture and negotiation (Brett, 2000) and use it as an organizing guide to examine the factors that research has shown to affect 3 key measures, namely: negotiators' interests and priorities, strategies and social interactions, and outcomes. Specifically, the model focuses on psychological factors including cognitions and biases, personality, motivation, emotions and inclination to trust; and social-environmental factors including reputation and relationship, gender, power and status, and culture. We conclude with a discussion of how future directions might address some of the limitations of current research.

1. Introduction

Negotiation has been an important field of study within organizational behavior and management science since the publication of Walton and McKersie's (1965) book, *A behavioral theory of labor relations,* which provided in-depth descriptions of two different strategic approaches to negotiation in behavioral terms. Walton and McKersie (1965), themselves, were influenced by the newly emerging field of game theory (Luce & Raiffa, 1957). The game theory perspective can be seen in the pervasive focus on understanding deviations from rational negotiation outcomes. It was largely Pruitt (1981) and his students during the 1970s who brought the social psychological perspective and its rigorous experimental methods to negotiation research.

In this review, we adapt Brett's model of culture and negotiation as an organizing guide for our examination of the literature (Brett, 2000). According to the model, negotiators' interests and priorities affect the potential value of their joint gains. Negotiators' strategies affect the nature of the interaction between the parties. How well the negotiated outcome captures the potential value of the negotiators' joint gains depends on the nature of their interaction. Although Brett's model was developed to examine inter-cultural negotiations, it also can be used to organize and examine the research on negotiation more broadly. Much of this research addresses factors that negotiators bring to negotiation and that affect their interests and priorities and or use of negotiation strategy, thereby affecting the nature of the interaction at the negotiation table. Specifically, we focus on psychological factors including: cognitions and biases, personality, motivation, emotions, inclination to trust; and on social-environmental factors including: reputation and relationship, gender, power and status, culture. We begin by reviewing the research on negotiation strategy. We then turn to the research on psychological and social-environmental factors that influence negotiators' interests and priorities and use of strategy.

We pay special attention to the research that launched each area and then examine how the area has advanced. This is not a comprehensive, but a selective review. We focus on two-party negotiations in which people communicate and voluntarily choose to reach terms, what Nash (1950) referred to as cooperative negotiations. We do not review research on social and prisoner's dilemmas, trust, ultimatum, or dictator games. However, we largely focus on empirical research that uses scoreable simulations in experimental designs. We conclude with a discussion of how future directions might address some of the limitations of current research.

2. A model of negotiation

Our adapted version of Brett's (2000) model of how culture affects negotiation is in Fig. 1. The key concepts in her model are negotiators' interests and priorities that together determine the outcome potential, and negotiators' strategies that affect the negotiation process by which negotiators either capture the outcome potential or leave potential value on the table. Interests are the motives, concerns, underlying negotiators' positions (Fisher & Ury, 1981). Priorities reflect what is more and less important to

* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: jmbrett@kellogg.northwestern.edu (J. Brett), leighthompson@kellogg.northwestern.edu (L. Thompson).

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

Fig. 1. A model of negotiated outcomes. Source: *Adapted from* Brett (2000).

negotiators (Lax & Sebenius, 1986). Negotiation strategy is the goal-directed behaviors that people use to try to reach agreement (Weingart, Thompson, Bazerman, & Carroll, 1990). Much of the negotiation research over the past 50 years can be seen through the lens of factors that affect negotiation outcomes through their effects on negotiators' interests and priorities and strategies. We review research on negotiators' cognitions and biases; their social motivations and emotions; trust; personality; gender; reputation, power and status; and culture.

We begin our review with the research on negotiation strategy and then turn to the psychological and sociological factors that affect negotiators' strategies as well their interests and priorities at the negotiation table.

3. Negotiation strategy

Walton and McKersie (1965) described two different negotiation strategies: distributive strategy, which refers to the behaviors negotiators use when they are focused on claiming as much value as possible for themselves; and integrative strategy, which refers to behaviors negotiators use when they are focused on creating value and claiming value. Weingart et al. (1990) operationalized these two different strategies by coding transcripts of negotiations. They had three major findings. (1) Distributive (claiming) strategy consists primarily of attempts to influence the counterpart to make concessions by using threats and emotional appeals, and single issue offers. (2) Integrative (creating) strategy consists primarily of sharing information about interests and priorities and then fashioning tradeoffs (logrolling) to generate high joint gains. Subsequent research revealed that many negotiators generate high joint gains by consolidating information about interests and priorities that they gain during the first half of the negotiation into multi-issue offers that incorporate trade-offs in the second half of the negotiation (Adair & Brett, 2005; Liu & Wilson, 2011; Olekalns & Smith, 2000). (3) Negotiators primarily using distributive strategy claim more value than those who engage in less distributive strategy, but typically fail to identify tradeoffs that would have created value. Negotiators primarily using integrative strategy create more value than negotiators primarily using distributive strategy. A recent meta-analysis of 18 studies of negotiation strategy confirms these findings (Kong, Dirks, & Ferrin, 2014).

3.1. Distributive strategy

Scholars have described three different distributive strategies: take-it-or-leave-it, objective or fair standards, and first offers and bargaining. Harnett and Cummings (1980) documented the take-it-or-leave-it distributive strategy, also called Boulwarism. They found that in Europe, the U.S., and East Asia, negotiators faced with opening offers framed as take-it-or-leave-it typically rejected such offers even when the offer was better than their best alternative. Objective standards, as described by Fisher, Ury, and Patton (2011) refer to comparisons a negotiator might use to justify the fairness of his offer. Objective standards are a distributive strategy because the intent is to influence the counterpart to make concessions. Objective standards have been studied indirectly by scholars who measure or code the use of influence in negotiations (e.g., Adair & Brett, 2005; Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar, & Kamdar, 2011; Weingart et al., 1990).

The most influential research on distributive strategy is a series of studies by Galinsky and colleagues (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Gunia, Swaab, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2013) on the anchoring effect of first offers used in bargaining strategy. Bargaining strategy follows the principle of start high/low depending on your role and concede only enough to avoid impasse. First offers, whether in a single or multiple issue negotiation, strongly influence the ultimate outcome, because the counterpart "anchors" on the opening offer. The underlying psychological reason for the first offer advantage is that counterparts insufficiently adjust for the strategic, self-interested positioning of the first offer.

3.2. Integrative strategy

Walton and McKersie (1965) described a single strategy for capturing the value that is potential in the differences in negotiators' interests and priorities. Pruitt (1981), in contrast, described three different integrative strategies for joint gains in negotiations, which he called explicit information exchange, implicit information exchange, and heuristic trial and error. Explicit information sharing consists of an exchange of questions and answers that generate insight (Thompson, 1991; Thompson & Hastie, 1990) about negotiators' interests (motives concerns Fisher et al., 2011) and priorities (value of options under consideration, Walton & McKersie, 1965). This set of strategic behaviors has been shown in study after study, in culture after culture, as the simplest route to joint gains (Brett, 2014).

The idea of using implicit information exchange and heuristic trial and error as integrative strategies has been much less studied than explicit information sharing. Pruitt (1981) noticed in a study in which limits were high and trust was low, that negotiators tended to ask the counterpart to make extremely large concessions on issues that were particularly high priority to the negotiator. Pruitt observed that negotiators' offers and arguments reveal information about their underlying interests and priorities. He suggested that implicit information exchange embedded in the nature of offers and influence attempts could substitute for explicit information sharing, although he did not report negotiators using offers and arguments in this way.

There are two problems with using what is basically distributive strategy to generate the insight necessary for joint gains.

One is that negotiators using this strategy are not motivated to seek the implicit information embedded in distributive strategy. The other is that inferring priorities and interests from information embedded in offers and influence attempts is second order information processing that may be difficult for those who view negotiation as a contest to be won. Negotiators have difficulty engaging in dispassionate, rational information processing when they are also highly emotionally engaged (Pinkley & Northcraft, 1994). Kong's meta-analysis shows a negative relationship between distributive strategy and value creation (Kong et al., 2014).

However, one set of studies contrasting intra-cultural Japanese and American negotiators clearly shows the Japanese using implicit information to generate accurate insight, and joint gains. In contrast, the Americans in this study were using explicit information sharing to generate accurate insight and joint gains (Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Adair, Weingart, & Brett, 2007; Brett & Okumura, 1998).

According to Pruitt (1981) negotiators engaged in heuristic trial and error start the negotiation by proposing multi-issue offers that satisfy their high aspirations. A concession to a lower level of aspiration is made only when the counterpart has rejected all the proposals that the negotiator could make at the higher level of aspiration. Implicit in Pruitt's description of heuristic trial and error is that the negotiator is making multiple offers of equivalent value before moving to a set of offers at a lower equivalent value, although these offers are not necessarily made simultaneously. When the negotiator's multi-issue offer is rejected by the counterpart, who is probably responding with his own multi-issue offer reflecting his aspirations, the first negotiator, instead of conceding, reconfigures her initial multi-issue offer to see if the counterpart would be interested in a slightly different configuration, but one that also fulfills the negotiator's aspirations.

Heuristic trial and error was a successful in generating joint gains in some studies in Pruitt's lab, although it did not generate insight. In subsequent research use of multi-issue offers has been shown to co-vary with the explicit information sharing (Olekalns, Smith, & Walsh, 1996; Olekalns & Smith, 1999; Liu & Wilson, 2011), although these studies do not reveal the timing of the use of multi-issue offers. Adair and Brett's (2005) multi-cultural research suggests that Western culture negotiators may begin their negotiations by exchanging questions and answers about interests and priorities and then in the second half of the negotiation start putting that information together in multi-issue offers. Using multi-issue offers to integrate information gathered using explicit information exchange was not what Pruitt seems to have had in mind when writing about heuristic trial and error. Instead, he was talking about opening with multi-issue offers and continuing to trade multi-issue offers back and forth until the negotiators reach agreement. Gunia and colleague's (2013) multi-cultural study of opening with a multi-issue offer reveals that the multi-issue offer anchored the distributive issue in the negotiation in the same way that single-issue opening offers do. Thus, it is quite possible that multi-issue offers, depending on when and how they are used in the negotiation, may influence individual and/or joint gains.

3.3. Reciprocity and partner effects

A key question in negotiation research is how negotiators with different interests and priorities and strategic orientations interact to reach an outcome that either captures the potential value or does not. The key mechanism appears to be reciprocity, a norm to respond in kind to another's social behavior (Gouldner, 1960). Putnam (1983) viewed negotiation as a series of reoccurring actions and reactions and pointed out that reciprocity had the effect of constraining interaction by reducing the probability of talking about integrative topics once distributive talk occurred and vice versa. Weingart et al. (1999) showed that a second order Markov chain (two prior behaviors are needed to predict the third behavior) fit both integrative and distributive negotiation behavior (see also Olekalns & Smith, 2003b; Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007).

Reciprocity is also the mechanism underlying mimicking effects in negotiation. Maddux, Mullen, and Galinsky (2008) in the first of a series of mimicking experiments instructed negotiators to mimic the mannerisms of the counterpart. Negotiators who mimicked their counterparts gained more insight, generated more trust, and created and claimed more value, though not at the expense of their counterparts (since they created the value they claimed) than negotiators who did not mimic their counterparts. In another set of on-line studies, Swaab, Maddux, and Sinaceur (2011) showed that negotiators who mimicked the language (use of emoticons, jargon, abbreviations) of the counterpart during the first but not the last 10 min of a 60 min negotiation claimed more value (also compared to the non-mimicking control condition). Furthermore, trust – a topic we turn to in a later section - mediated these effects.

Multilevel modeling and actor-partner interaction modeling allows even greater insight into how the counterpart's behaviors affect the focal negotiator's behaviors and outcomes. For example, Liu and Wilson (2011) found that both actor's and partner's goals predicted the actor's information sharing. Individual gains were predicted (1) positively by the partner's information sharing (showing that actors were taking advantage) and interestingly (2) negatively by both actor's and partner's influence attempts.

In addition to reciprocity, researchers have investigated structural or transformative sequences of strategy or breakpoints to try to understand processes by which negotiators can cut reciprocal chains of distributive behavior that can lead to impasses and or unclaimed value (Druckman, 1986; Olekalns & Smith, 2000; Putnam & Jones, 1982; Weingart et al., 1990). The major findings of this research are that spirals of distributive behaviors can be broken by (1) refusing to reciprocate and responding with an integrative behavior, (2) reciprocating the distributive behavior but also responding with an integrative behavior, (3) responding with a comment about the process (Brett, Shapiro, & Lytle, 1998; see also Olekalns & Smith, 2000), or when parties recognize that no progress is being made, and they essentially have nothing to lose in sharing information more candidly (Druckman, 1986). (See Druckman & Olekalns, 2013 for a recent review of the turning points literature and theory.)

4. Cognitive and motivational biases

Negotiators' cognitions and biases interfere with reaching agreements that reflect their interests and leverage differences in their priorities. The cognition and biases approach to negotiation research can be largely traced to a series of studies by Bazerman and Neale (1983, 1992). Using Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky's (1982) book, *Heuristics and Biases,* as a theoretical guide, Bazerman and Neale cleverly designed two-party negotiation experiments to test predictions of framing, anchoring, overconfidence and a number of other cognitive biases that previously had been documented at the individual level as interfering with decision making. For example, in their study on framing, negotiators who were instructed to "minimize their losses" made fewer concessions, reached fewer agreements, and perceived settlements to be less fair those who were told to "maximize their gains" (Bazerman, Magliozzi, & Neale, 1985). In short, the negotiators who were told

to minimize their losses adopted riskier bargaining strategies, preferring to hold out for a better, but more risky settlement.

Another early area of biases research was on anchoring. For example, Northcraft and Neale (1987) found that real estate agents' pricing decisions were anchored by list prices. Over-confidence accounted for negotiators' estimates that a neutral third party would favor their proposal and disputants' estimates that they had a greater than 50% chance of prevailing (Neale & Bazerman, 1983). The key conclusion from these studies is that the biases that Tversky and colleagues documented at the individual level also operate at the dyadic level in negotiation.

A key breakthrough occurred in the bias research when began to document biases unique to the process of negotiation. Most notable of these negotiation-specific biases is the fixed-pie perception. The fixed pie error is the faulty belief that the counterpart's priorities and interests are completely and directly opposed to one's own, when in fact, this is not necessarily true (Bazerman & Neale, 1983). Thompson and Hastie (1990) were the first to measure the fixed pie perception empirically, by asking negotiators to complete the counterpart's payoff schedule immediately following negotiation. They found that most negotiators did indeed hold the fixed pie perception. Two other negotiation biases are noteworthy: the incompatibility bias which is a dramatic extension of the fixed pie perception (Thompson & Hastie, 1990), and the reactive devaluation bias (Ross & Stillinger, 1991). The incompatibility bias is the faulty belief that another person has opposing preferences to one's own in interests, when in fact, the other person is actually in complete agreement (Thompson & Hrebec, 1996). Thompson and Hastie (1990) found that approximately 40% of negotiators fail to realize when their interests are perfectly compatible with others. Reactive devaluation is the tendency for negotiators to devalue or dislike proposals presented by counterparties when the same proposal presented by their own side or a neutral party would be deemed acceptable (see also Oskamp, 1965).

Another important development in this area was the identification of refinements and limiting conditions of the biases. Consider for example, Bottom's (1998) study of framing and his articulation of risk. The straightforward prediction is that gain-framed negotiators will be more likely to settle; and loss-framed negotiators more likely to impasse. Bottom, in contrast, found that negotiators with negative frames were more likely to reach integrative agreements than those with positive frames when integrative outcomes involved contractual risk, such as whether the counterpart would honor the terms of the agreement.

As the 1990s came to a close, researchers became less interested in documenting the next "bias" that may manifest itself at the negotiation table; three new areas of research emerged: priming and unconscious biases; motivational biases; and correcting biases and learning.

4.1. Unconscious biases and priming

In 1995, Greenwald and Benaji introduced the topic of "implicit social cognition" to uncover racial bias in judgment. They used a priming technique to activate concepts below a person's threshold of awareness, and found that doing so affected people's subsequent judgments and behaviors. In negotiation research, the priming technique was used to study independent versus interdependent orientations (Howard, Gardner, & Thompson, 2007), gender bias (Kray, Thompson, & Galinsky, 2001) and power (Magee, Galinksy, & Gruenfeld, 2007). These studies found that subtle primes not only dramatically affected negotiators' interests and priorities but also their use of strategy. For example, Kray et al. (2001) found that when gender stereotypes were made explicit, women were more likely to negotiate in an assertive fashion, make more aggressive opening offers, and ultimately claim more value than when gender stereotypes were implicit. They referred to this as "stereotype reactance" suggesting that when (negative) stereotypes are made explicit, women marshal their cognitive and behavioral skills to combat those limiting stereotypes.

4.2. Motivational biases

If early research on biases was focused on faulty cognition and insufficient information processing, later research focused on motivationally-driven biases. Egocentric biases explain why negotiators are likely to view themselves as entitled to more resources than the counterpart. For example, negotiators largely prefer equitable division of outcomes, but if outcomes must be unequal, they favor themselves (Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). Another motivational bias distinguished between empathy and perspective-taking. Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, and White (2008) hypothesized that negotiators would be well-served to engage in perspective-taking but not empathy to increase value in negotiations. Whereas perspective-taking and empathy may appear to be similar constructs, there exists a critical difference. Namely, people who are prompted to take the perspective of another, cognitively view the world from the other's point of view. Conversely, people who are prompted to empathize with another, emotionally feel what the other person is feeling. The critical difference, then, centers upon cognitively perceiving a situation from another's vantage point (outward focus on the environment or situation) versus an inward focus of feeling what the other person is feeling inside (inward focus on emotions). Thus, it was reasoned that negotiators who engaged in perspective taking might be better able to understand the outcome potential in the situation than those who were focused on understanding emotional states. Indeed, those who empathized did not create as much value as those who took the perspective of the counterpart. The evidence suggests that formulating accurate perceptions of the negotiation is best served by imagining how the counterpart is thinking, not how they are feeling.

4.3. Correcting biases and learning

There is also a large literature on correcting biases and otherwise improving the performance of negotiators. The learning literature focuses on the effects of experience and expertise. For example, Bazerman et al. (1985) hypothesized that the framing effect might correct itself as negotiators gained experience in a market. Similarly, Neale and Northcraft (1986) hypothesized that overconfidence might be best addressed through experience. A series of studies examined the impact of feedback on experience and found that providing negotiators with information about the counterpart's interests led to a reduction of the fixed-pie perception and greater joint gains (Thompson, 1990a, 1990b, 1992; Thompson & DeHarpport, 1994). Nadler, Thompson, and Van Boven (2003) compared the impact of four different types of training on negotiation performance. The least effective training method was didactic training (based upon lecture and instruction of key concepts); the most effective methods were watching experts and engaging in analogical reasoning in which negotiators analyze cases and scenarios that are high in structural similarity to the actual negotiation but are superficially dissimilar. According to structure mapping theory (Gentner, 1983), when people compare two or more structurally-similar examples and derive a common principle, this learning is not context bound and therefore is more portable and not likely to remain inert (Gentner, Loewenstein, & Thompson, 2003; Gentner, Loewenstein, Thompson, & Forbus, 2009; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Gentner, 1999; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Gentner, 2003; Thompson, Loewenstein, & Gentner, 2000). A key finding in these studies is that when negotiators read

examples but do not actively compare the examples and derive a common principle, they are less likely to use the strategy in a subsequent negotiation. Conversely, when negotiators read the same examples and actively compare them with the purpose of deriving a common principle, they are more likely to profitably apply that principle to a novel-appearing negotiation in the future.

5. Personality

Since Rubin and Brown's (1975) early conclusion that personality has little or no impact on negotiation behavior and outcomes (see also Bazerman, Curhan, Moore, & Valley, 2000; Thompson, 1990a), negotiation scholars nevertheless have continued to study personality (e.g., Barry & Friedman, 1998; Barry, Fulmer, & Van Kleef, 2004; DeRue, Conlon, Moon, & Willaby, 2009; Dimotakis, Conlon, & Ilies, 2012). A recent meta-analysis (Sharma, Bottom, & Elfenbein, 2013) concludes that a variety of individual differences including Big 5 personality constructs of openness to experience, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism but not conscientiousness, as well as emotional intelligence and cognitive ability affect the strategies negotiators use, individual and joint gains, and psychological outcomes; and that these effects are stronger in field than laboratory studies. For example, even though none of the Big 5 traits predict economic outcomes, extraversion and agreeableness predict greater subjective value for the self. Sharma and colleagues conclude that the early consensus that personality is not predictive of negotiation strategy or outcomes was based on limited data.

6. Motivation

Social motives are goals in social interaction. Messick and McClintock (1968) described three social motives that reflect the relative importance that people in socially interdependent interactions like negotiations place on their own versus joint gains: prosocial or cooperatively motivated negotiators – try to maximize outcomes for self and other; pro-self negotiators have individualistic motives – try to maximize for self; and pro-self negotiators with competitive motives – try to maximize the difference (positive direction) between self and other.

Pruitt and Rubin's (1986) dual-concern model, that plays off of Blake and Mouton's managerial grid (1964) and Deutsch's (1973) theory of cooperation and competition, identifies five negotiation strategies resulting from prosocial versus proself social motives: forcing – high concern for self, low concern for other; yielding - low concern for self, high concern for other; avoiding - low concern for self, low concern for other; problem solving – high concern for self, high concern for other; and compromising - moderate concern for self and other. This conceptualization of negotiation strategy has been operationalized by DeDreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, and Nauta (2001), although much of the research using this measure aggregates strategy to cooperative versus competitive strategic behavior (e.g., Beersma & DeDreu, 2002).

Social motives affect negotiators' use of distributive versus integrative strategy (DeDreu, Weingart, & Kwon, 2000; Deutsch, 1973). Prosocial negotiators tend to engage in more integrative strategy and achieve higher joint gains than proself negotiators (DeDreu et al., 2000; Olekalns & Smith, 1999, 2003a, 2003b). More recent research focuses on the implications for strategy and outcomes when members of negotiating dyads (Schei & Rognes, 2005) and groups (Weingart, Brett, Olekalns, & Smith, 2007) have different social motives. The results show that prosocial negotiators' behaviors are more sensitive to the context of other negotiators' behaviors than proself negotiators. Prosocials, for example, may introduce distributive strategy when they are surrounded by other prosocials, but they may also introduce integrative strategy when surrounded by other proselfs (Weingart et al., 2007). Proself negotiators, in contrast, generally use distributive strategy regardless of the motive of the counterpart (De Dreu et al., 2000). They can be counted on to claim value (Schei & Rognes, 2003; Schei & Rognes, 2005). In multiparty situations proself negotiators increase their use of integrative strategy only just enough over time to get an agreement (Weingart et al., 2007).

More recently DeDreu and colleagues have been studying yet another motive - epistemic motivation, the personal need for structure, on use of negotiation strategy and negotiation outcomes. In several studies they show that negotiators who have high epistemic motivation are more likely to reach higher joint gains, because they engage in integrative strategy asking more questions about interests and priorities that lead to joint gains compared to negotiators who are low in epistemic motivation (DeDreu, Beersma, Strobe, & Euwema, 2006; Ten Velden, Beersma, & DeDreu, 2010).

7. Emotions and moods

Whereas the behavioral study of negotiation is firmly grounded in economic theory that does not consider emotion and mood, emotion, mood and other psychological states have been a key focus of study. Carnevale and Isen (1986) introduced research on emotion in negotiation demonstrating that setting a positive tone at the negotiation table helps to build rapport and creative processes that help to avoid impasses. Forgas (1998), too, reported that positive mood affected negotiators' use of strategy.

Allred, Mallozzi, Matsui, and Raia (1997) began the investigation of the implications of negotiators' expressing anger. In studies of face-to-face negotiations, they found that when anger did not provide new information, but just reinforced old slights or prior reputations, negotiators who were angry with each other were less compassionate toward each other and generated lower joint gains than the negotiators who were not angry. (See Antos, De Melo, Gratch, & Grosz, 2011 for a similar conclusion.) Other research documents a plethora of negative effects of expressing anger or negative emotions in negotiations. For example, Wang, Northcraft, and Van Kleef (2012) found that communicating anger generated concessions but also covert retaliation. Friedman et al.'s (2004) study of eBay disputes found that the angrier the claimant, the angrier the respondent and the less likely the dispute was to settle. Liu (2009) found that anger caused the counterpart to use more positional statements but also exchange less information about priorities. Similarly, Kopelman, Rosette, and Thompson (2006) reported that negotiators who strategically displayed negative emotions were less likely to reach agreement, extract concessions, or incorporate a future business relationship into the agreement than were those who strategically displayed positive or neutral emotions.

The best known anger research in negotiation is a series of studies by Van Kleef, DeDreu, and Manstead (2004a, 2004b), Van Kleef, van Dijk, Steinel, Harnick, and van Beest (2008). These researchers' studies led to a blossoming of research on anger in negotiation and a model that predicts when anger and other negative emotions will lead to concession making and when they will not (Van Kleef, Anastasopoulou, & Nijstad, 2010). The model (EASI) Emotion as Social Information proposes that when anger provides information about the negotiator's own higher limits, anger motivates the counterparty to make concessions. Subsequent research has shown a similar effect on concessions when the anger conveys a threat (Sinaceur, Van Kleef, Neale, Adam, & Haag, 2011) or signals dominance (Belkin, Kurtzberg, & Naquin, 2013). The dominance study showed higher individual gains on the part of the angry negotiator.

However, recent research has shown that the EASI model's prediction depends very much on the structural characteristics of the

bargaining situation. For example, the effect is contingent on (1) the counterpart's expectation that low offers will be rejected; the counterpart having no opportunity to deceive the negotiator; (2) the negative consequences of rejecting the angry negotiator's anger are low (the counterpart has a good BATNA) (Van Dijk, van Kleef, Steinel, & van Beest, 2008; see also Van Kleef & Côté, 2007); (3) the counterpart's power (Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni, & Manstead, 2006); (4) the counterpart's culture-East Asians generally do not make concessions to angry negotiators (Adam & Shirako, 2013; Adam, Shirako, & Maddux, 2010); (5) the object of the negotiator's anger whether the counterpart herself or the counterpart's behavior (Lelieveld, Van Dijk, Van Beest, Steinel, & Van Kleef, 2011; Steinel, Van Kleef, & Harinck, 2008); (6) whether the counterpart views the anger as authentic (Tng & Au, 2014); and (7) whether the anger is expressed privately, not publically (Pietroni, Van Kleef, Steinel, & Rumiati, 2008); and the competitiveness of the negotiation - when the negotiation context is predominantly cooperative (negotiating a new business relationship) or predominantly competitive (negotiating the resolution of a dispute) expressing anger does not elicit larger concessions than no anger (Adam & Brett, 2015). It is important to keep in mind that almost all of this research on the EASI model and its contingencies has used the same computer mediated design.

8. Trust

Trust is the willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another person (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998). Negotiation research shows that trust in the counterpart facilitates information sharing (Butler, 1999; Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980; Kong et al., 2014; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975), insight (understanding other the other's priorities), and joint gains (Gunia, Brett, Nandkeolyar, & Kamdar, 2011; Olekalns & Smith, 2003a, 2003b, 2005). Trust affects negotiation strategy, interaction, and outcomes because the integrative strategy of asking and answering questions gives the counterpart an opportunity to take advantage (Butler, 1999). Asking invites vulnerability by revealing gaps in a negotiator's knowledge (Gunia et al., 2011). Answering creates vulnerability by revealing negotiators' priorities and interests (Kimmel, Pruitt, Magenau, Konar-Goldband, & Carnevale, 1980; Pruitt & Lewis, 1975). Trust mitigates these risks because it is grounded in the belief that shared information will be used to identify mutually-beneficial opportunities (Kimmel et al., 1980).

Low trust causes negotiators to fall back on the distributive strategies of making offers and engaging in influence attempts (Gunia et al., 2011; Kong et al., 2014). Offers may be exaggerated, but offers do not require trust in order to be believed. Influence attempts, too, do not make negotiators vulnerable to exploitation in the same way that sharing information about priorities and interests does.

9. Reputations and relationships

Reputations are socially constructed labels that provide representations which organize our perceptions of other people (Tinsley, O'Conner and Sullivan, 2002). The study of reputations includes not only how negotiators' reputations come about, but also how, once developed, reputations affect negotiators' use of strategy. One of the first studies of how negotiators develop reputations of their counterparts was grounded in attribution theory. Morris, Larrick, and Su (1999) reported that negotiators are more likely to make dispositional attributions and to develop negative impressions of their counterparts when the counterpart has a more attractive alternative than when the counterpart has a less attractive alternative. Counterparts who have attractive alternatives are more demanding and hold out for better offers. Their more aggressive behavior is not a reflection of their disposition, but rather, is influenced by the fact that they have better alternatives. However, negotiators discount their counterparts' alternatives, and instead, attribute their counterparts' behavior to their underlying dispositions. According to Morris et al. (1999), negotiators are too quick to attribute their counterparts' behaviors to enduring, personality characteristics, rather than to situational constraints.

Glick and Croson (2001) turned the focus from how negotiators develop reputations to how negotiators' behavior is influenced by the perceived reputations of others. They found that in a community, like a class, in which over time people negotiate with different members of the community, peoples' reputations affect how others interact with them. Specifically, people negotiate more competitively with a counterpart who has reputation of being a liar, but more cooperatively when negotiating with someone regarded as "tough". In a counter-intuitive fashion, people act more competitively with "cream puffs", because they are viewed as easy to exploit.

Tinsley et al. (2002) examined the effect of negotiator reputations on their use of strategy. Novices who interacted with experts who had distributive reputations evaluated their counterpart's' intentions more negatively and used more distributive and less integrative strategy, which ultimately reduced their joint gains. The relative experts had a bargaining advantage, but not when their distributive reputation was known. However, a different pattern of results emerged for integrative reputations: when negotiators were given information that their counterpart had an integrative reputation, negotiators opened up and freely shared information about their interests, needs, priorities and achieved economically better outcomes than negotiators in the control condition (Tinsley, Cambria, & Schneider, 2006).

The study of social networks in negotiation uses sociological theory to predict that people who are more socially networked are more likely to develop reputations in bargaining communities. For example, Anderson and Shirako (2008) found that people who were highly networked in management communities developed reputations more quickly than less highly networked people and that their networks were also more impervious to change.

The study of relationships began innocently with Fry, Firestone, and Williams' (1983) study comparing the joint gains when negotiators were friends versus strangers. This simple, straightforward study revealed that strangers were more likely to create joint gains than were friends. Never mind that the results were not statistically significant, the mere idea that strangers might outperform friends became an oft-cited conclusion.

Subsequent research has not really resolved whether, when, much less why there are differences in joint gains when negotiators are friends versus strangers. For example, Valley, Neale, and Mannix (1995) tested the hypothesis that friends who find themselves at the negotiation table adopt a more expansive focus and fashion tradeoffs that generate joint gains across negotiations, not merely within negotiations. In contrast, Kurtzberg and Medvec (1999) noted that people are downright uncomfortable negotiating with friends. Amanatullah, Morris, and Curhan (2008) suggested that people often suboptimize at the bargaining table due to unmitigated communion or the belief that they should be responsive to others' needs and not assert their own.

Curhan, Elfenbein, and Xu (2006) moved the focus to the non-economic values that accrue to people as the result of negotiation. Their SVI (subjective value inventory) assesses negotiators' feelings about instrumental outcomes, feelings about themselves, feelings about the process, and feelings about the relationship.

10. Gender

The study of social categories and negotiation is largely traceable to Ayres and Seligman's (1995) field study of gender and racial discrimination in negotiations. In their study, women and men (both black and white) followed an identical script when negotiating for a car. The dependent variable was the price offered by the salesperson. The finding was that men were offered better (lower) prices than women; and whites offered better (lower) prices than African-American women. Interestingly, a study in Peru found that although men and women followed the same script when negotiating a taxi fare, men faced higher initial prices, higher final prices, and more rejection than women (Castillo, Petrie, Torero, & Vesterlund, 2013). The authors reasoned that male drivers are more reluctant to capitulate to demanding male customers. The authors then attempted to distinguish taste-based discrimination (taxi drivers prefer to transport females) or statistical discrimination (males are seen as more demanding). In a follow-up study, customers sent a signal on valuation (referencing a competitive market) before negotiating and it effectively eliminated gender differences, which supports the statistical discrimination argument.

10.1. Stereotype threat

Next, research attention turned to how men versus women use strategy in negotiation. Using Steele's stereotype threat theory, Kray et al. (2001) hypothesized and found that women make less aggressive offers. Similarly, Small, Gelfand, Babcock, and Gettman (2007) found that women are less likely to initiate negotiations than men. And when it comes to negotiating compensation, women are more likely to avoid negotiation than are men (Bear, 2011).

Bowles, Babcock, and McGinn (2005) articulated two conditions that magnify gender differences: structural ambiguity and accountability. Using Mischel's (1977) construct of strong versus weak situations, Bowles et al. (2005) hypothesized and found that women are more likely to be disadvantaged in weak situations that are high in ambiguity than in strong, unambiguous situations. Indeed, they found that women in management fields that lacked peer salary information earned starting salaries that were dramatically lower than did their male peers; this difference disappeared in management fields that had clear information on comparable salaries. Bowles et al. (2005) also hypothesized, based on Tetlock's (1985) accountability theory, that women are more likely to level the playing field when they negotiate on behalf of others. They found that when women are made to feel accountable, they are more comfortable negotiating, more likely to express their interests, make more assertive offers, and hold out for a better set of terms. Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013) also found that a key factor in determining whether women will ask for what they want in negotiation is whether they are self-advocating or advocating for others. In self-advocacy contexts, women fear that assertiveness will result in backlash and so they are less assertive and obtain lower outcomes. However, when women are advocating for others (other advocacy), they are more assertive and attain better outcomes.

Nevertheless, women are generally less assertive in negotiation than men and a key factor according to Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013) is fear of backlash. Backlash refers to the negative social reaction toward women when they are seen as violating gender norms because they engage in counter-stereotypical behaviors. The authors report that when asking for more resources in a negotiation, women receive a harsher response than men, unless they have externally conferred social status. Amanatullah and Tinsley (2013) conclude that backlash is a key element in women's reluctance to negotiate, and that when they do negotiate, women adjust their own bargaining behavior to manage social impressions so as to avoid backlash.

11. Power: BATNA and status

Power is conceptualized in two distinct ways in negotiation. The economic view of power is based on the quality of a negotiator's alternative, which is called BATNA, an acronym for Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (Fisher et al., 2011). The social view of power is based on personal qualities of negotiators, such as status "the extent to which an individual or group is respected or admired by others" (Magee & Galinsky, 2008, p. 359). In interpersonal interactions, status leads to respect, deference, and obedience from others; at the same time, parties enjoying high status often are expected to take the responsibility for caring for others' welfare (cf. Magee & Galinsky, 2008).

BATNA has been found to have several effects on negotiators. For example, negotiators who focus on the BATNA of the counterparty are more effective in claiming resources (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001, 2002). Negotiators who know their own and the counterparty's BATNAs have higher aspirations (Wong, 2014). Negotiators with better BATNAs set higher goals (Pinkley, 1995; Wong, 2014), offer the counterparty less, but take more for themselves (De Dreu, 1995), and behave in a more agentic (versus relational) fashion in pursuit of their goals (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003). Negotiators with better BATNAS are more likely to use threats (Lawler, 1992), to use other people as means to pursue their own ends (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008), to obtain larger shares of the total payoffs (Komorita & Leung, 1985; Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994), to obtain what they request (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013), and are less likely to be influenced by their counterparts' emotions (Van Kleef et al., 2006).

Nevertheless, many BATNA effects are contingent upon contextual factors. With respect to individual gains, one study showed the effect of BATNA was positive only when the bargaining zone was narrow (Kim & Fragale, 2005). Another study showed that the effect of BATNA depended on the degree to which the information regarding BATNA was certain (Pinkley & Vandewalle, 1997). Yet another study showed that having a good BATNA only helped the good BATNA party when both parties knew their own and the counterpart's BATNA (Pinkley, 1995).

Power associated with status in negotiation is quite different from power associated with BATNA. Whereas negotiators' BATNAs are variable across time, sometimes even within a prolonged negotiation, negotiators' status – the esteem and respect conferred on them by others is much more stable. Studies of status differences in negotiation reveal a variety of interesting effects on strategy and outcomes. Some status studies investigate the theoretical premise that low status individuals defer to high status individuals; but high status individuals also have responsibility to help low status individuals (Magee & Galinsky, 2008). For example, Curhan and Pentland (2007) found that thin slice dynamics (i.e., the first five minutes of the dyad interactions) predicted the overall negotiation outcomes of a negotiation simulation up to 45 min later, but only for the high status recruiter, not the low status job candidate. Similarly, Parlamis and Ames (2010) found that venting anger to a high status offender led to less post-venting anger than when venting to an equal status offender. Eckel and Ball (1996) found high status proposers (who made proposals for dividing fixed-sum resources) were more generous especially when the respondent (who decided to accept or reject the proposals) was also was high status. Similarly, Blader and Chen (2012) found that high status parties treated others in more procedurally just ways, listening to their counterparts' concerns, considering their counterparts' wishes, opinions,

and needs than low status parties, but that this effect was limited to those high status parties who were also in the low power (BATNA) condition.

Other status studies propose that certain social categories (e.g., females, minorities) have low status (Fiske, 2010) and so are expected to be poor negotiators (Amanatullah & Tinsley, 2013; Hong & van der Wijst, 2013). For example, because men are perceived to be of higher status than women in a negotiation context, men are given the "right" to propose agreements and to have them viewed as coming from a competent source (Miles & Clenney, 2010).

12. Culture

Brett's (2000) original model focused on intercultural negotiations, proposing that culture is one factor affecting negotiators' interests and priorities and the strategies that they bring to the table. Defining culture as the characteristic values, beliefs and norms characteristic of a group, as well as the ideologies that underlie economic, political, and social structures that organize social interaction within the group, she proposed that there were systematic differences in the ways that people in different cultures use negotiation strategy and that negotiators' cultural environments also influence their interests and priorities.

Substantial research has established that use of negotiation strategy varies by national culture (Adair et al., 2004; Brett, 2014). National boundaries not only delimit economic, political, and social structures, they also delimit differences in values (e.g. Hofstede, 1984; Schwartz, 1999); beliefs (e.g., trust http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp), and norms (e.g., cultural tightness looseness Gelfand et al., 2011). On the other hand, there is not a lot of research that explains these patterns of cultural differences in negotiation strategy. One explanation is interpersonal trust (Gunia et al., 2011). Another is competitive versus cooperative goal orientations (Liu & Wilson, 2011), although Brett (2001) does not report major cultural differences in social motives. In a theoretical paper (Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Semnani-Azad, Brett, & Tinsley, 2013) propose that cultural differences in self- worth, confrontation style, and views of power and status as captured by the cultural framework of honor, face, dignity (Leung & Cohen, 2011) can help to explain national cultural differences in use of negotiation strategy. Their empirical paper shows Qatari (honor) and Chinese (face) negotiators relying heavily on distributive strategy, relative to U.S. (dignity) culture negotiators who in turn were relying more heavily than Chinese, and especially Qatari negotiators on integrative strategy (Aslani et al., 2016).

Cultural differences in negotiation strategy account for cultural differences in joint gains (e.g., Aslani et al., 2016; Gunia et al., 2011; Lügger, Geiger, Neun, & Backhaus, 2015). Negotiators in cultures where use of integrative strategy is normative tend to generate higher joint gains than negotiators in cultures where distributive strategy is normative. There is one exception. Japanese negotiators use distributive strategy to negotiate joint gains, much as Pruitt theorized about the potential use of implicit information sharing to glean information about interests and priorities (Adair, Okumura, & Brett, 2001; Adair, Weingart, & Brett, 2007).

Most of the research on culture and negotiation has been done in the context of comparative intra-cultural negotiations. These studies have been valuable in identifying systematic cultural differences in the use of negotiation strategy. Research is beginning to understand these differences, although there are many opportunities for further research probing into the explanations for cultural differences in strategy. What research on culture and negotiation has not done very well is provide insight into the dynamic processes by which inter-cultural negotiators adjust to each other's culturally normative use of negotiation strategy and thereby reach an agreement. What research there is suggests that converging to a common view of the issues in negotiation is more difficult in inter than intracultural negotiation and may be highly dependent on negotiators' epistemic and social motives (Liu, Friedman, Barry, Gelfand, & Zhang, 2012).

13. Conclusion

We've selectively examined empirical research on negotiation spanning five decades. As empirical research on negotiation proliferated in the 1970s and 1980s, it was heavily influenced by game theory and by social psychological theory. Research from both of these theoretical perspectives has made major contributions to our understanding of negotiation strategy and outcomes.

The early research on negotiator bias was significant for two key reasons. First, because it was grounded in game theory, it gained the attention of economists and behavioral decision theorists. Second, by showing systematic and reliable departures from normative theory, it led to a number of findings counter-intuitive to rational economic theory that created fertile ground for non-obvious hypothesis-testing and theory building.

The influence of social psychology on negotiation research also cannot be under-estimated. Pruitt's (1981) empirical research confirmed the relevance of negotiator's goals and motivations for their use of strategy and outcomes, laying the groundwork for the model predicting the effect of negotiation strategy on insight and outcomes that is the core of the social psychological approach. Evidence that the behaviors that constituted integrative and distributive strategy predicted joint gains was contributed by Weingart and her colleagues (Weingart et al., 1990). Evidence that insight, the understanding of the counterpart's priorities, is the proximal predictor of joint gains was contributed by Thompson and Hastie (1990). Evidence that social motives affect negotiators' use of strategy is summarized in a meta-analysis (DeDreu et al., 2000).

As the new millennium approached, the research expanded to study the implications of the social, political, and cultural contexts of negotiation. With regard to culture, early research was influenced by Hofstede's (1980) typology of individualism-collectivism crossed with hierarchy (see Brett & Crotty, 2008 for a review), but Hofstede's dimensions of cultural values did not work empirically as causal accounts of the effects of culture on negotiation strategy and outcomes leaving this area of research without theoretical explanations. This has changed recently with Aslani, Ramirez-Marin, Semnani-Azad, Brett, and Tinsley (2013) introduction of Leung and Cohen's (2011) tripartite face, honor, dignity model of culture to negotiation research. Studying negotiations in honor cultures has moved the focus from people in honor culture's e.g., honor cultures quick aggressive response to insults, documented in Nisbett's studies with Cohen (1996), to studies trying to understand cultural implications for negotiations in areas of the world – honor cultures in the Middle East, South Asia, and Latin America – that have not had much emphasis in either the research in cultural psychology or in negotiation (Aslani et al., 2016). Although there continues to be progress in the advancement of theory and knowledge from comparative intracultural negotiation studies, the research on intercultural negotiations continues to lag.

The early study of individual differences – personality and social motives - was largely abandoned as researchers became enamored with understanding the power of the situation to change the processes and outcomes of negotiation. For example, the study of gender and negotiation was often upstaged by powerful demonstrations of the situational effects of negotiation. Gender made a "comeback" in negotiation research when Bowles, Babcock, and

Lai (2007) showed that women are reluctant to advocate for themselves in negotiations because of backlash. Personality, too, may be making a comeback especially with the issues raised in the recent meta-analysis (Sharma et al., 2013).

The study of power in negotiation has been influenced by a number of theoretical perspectives. The economic or behavioral decision theory approach narrowed the meaning of power to that of the presence of multiple, attractive alternatives. In contrast, social psychologists conceptualized power in more relational ways, as influenced by status, gender, and context. As the wealth gap continues to grow in dignity cultures like the U.S. (that gap is already large in face and honor cultures), status has become a new societally important question to be addressed in future negotiation research.

There are glimpses in the negotiation research that point to how time effects negotiations Moore (2004), and how negotiations develop over time (Putnam, 1990). Most of this research addresses development over a single negotiation episode (e.g., Adair & Brett, 2005). But, globally important economic and political negotiations do not reach agreement in a single episode of face-to-face negotiating. There are opportunities for future research in addressing the dynamics of negotiating across episodes and there may be some creative ways to use technology to do this. For example, compared to Putnam (1990) who sat in and took notes on hours of a teacher-school board negotiations, technology is close to giving us efficient ways to track and so model negotiations occurring over time via phone, video, text message and email. Soon voice recognition software will be able to turn audio into text and already linguistic coding protocols, for example, the Linguistic Inventory Word Count (LIWC) (Pennebaker, 1993), can be customized to code for particular research questions. With these tools it should be possible to capture, code and analyze negotiations that extend over even relatively long periods of time. Computational modeling is another approach that might be fruitful in studying the evolution of negotiations (e.g., Nowak & Gelfand, 2016).

Although research on negotiation is mature, it is by no means dead. Research has made significant headway in understanding much about negotiators' motivation and their use of strategy, but difficult problems particularly concerning the dynamic interaction between and among negotiators continue to challenge researchers from many disciplines.

One of the most remarkable and significant aspects of negotiation research is that it has been influenced by and in turn has influenced at least four research disciplines: economics, social psychology, political science, and communication studies and countless students taking classes to try to improve their negotiation skills. Unlike many research topics, negotiation creates bridges among scholars of different disciplines and between scholars and practitioners.

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