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Internal Control in Accounting Research: A Review and Future Research Agenda

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1. INTRODUCTION

Research exploring the determinants and economic consequences of internal control (IC) quality has gained momentum in recent years. The purpose of our paper is to synthesize the accounting related literature on IC, identify areas of research on IC that are lacking, and discuss the implications of the review for policymakers. Our findings are also relevant for managers, investors, creditors and auditors. In order to do this, we extend prior reviews by focusing on US studies published from 2013 to 2016, and by reviewing studies conducted outside the US setting. In light of increasing global efforts to enhance IC, an updated literature review with an international perspective is warranted to inform the regulatory debate surrounding the
enactment of disclosure and attestation rules to enhance the transparency and quality of IC of financial reporting and their relevance to stakeholders.

Prior reviews on IC reporting subsequent to SOX sections 302 and 404 (hereafter, SOX 302 and SOX 404 respectively) are US dominated and focus on the literature up to 2012. Schneider, Gramling, Hermanson & Ye (2009) limit their review to US, large sample size studies during 2005 to mid-2009. Key insights are that weaker IC is associated with smaller, riskier, and more complex firms. Weaker IC is also associated with weaker board and audit committee independence and expertise, increased cost of finance, less accurate earnings forecasts and higher audit fees. They suggest further research on the association between IC quality and earnings quality and cost of equity given the mixed findings in reviewed studies.

Kinney, Martin & Shephardson (2013) reflect on SOX and the production of IC audits using evidence from public and limited non-public archival data, analytical studies, and numerous personal experiences of audit practitioners. They are interested in understanding how the requirement for IC audits has changed the production of audits. The paper is a commentary rather than a literature review and calls for greater transparency and analysis of how control audits are conducted, and consideration of alternative means to provide IC effectiveness information to investors.

Asare, Fitzgerald, Graham, Joe, Negangard & Wolfe (2013) focus primarily on literature examining auditors’ evaluation and reporting on IC using a framework considering auditor, client, task and environment attributes, and auditor-client interactions. In doing so they discuss empirical findings of US studies with their synthesis suggesting that auditors conduct more testing when clients have deficiencies in IC with this manifesting in higher audit fees and delays. Bedard and Graham (2014) discuss the cost-benefit aspects of management and auditor reporting on IC. They review a select number of pre-2013 studies investigating ineffective IC determinants (six studies), consequences (seven studies), and remediation (four studies). The review includes three non-US studies on consequences,
conducted in Canada, Netherlands and Japan. They conclude that IC issues are more likely in smaller, more complex and financially distressed firms, auditor affiliation and audit quality influence IC quality and reporting, and effective IC are associated with lower cost of capital. Coates and Srinivasan (2015) review a decade of post SOX US literature on IC from accounting, finance and law disciplines concluding that SOX has delivered financial reporting benefits, but research on its net social welfare contribution remains inconclusive.

Our paper extends those previous reviews thereby making a distinct and incremental contribution. First, it provides an update of IC research published during 2013-2016 using US data. Prior reviews focus on the ten-year period post-SOX adoption and there has been a substantial body of research subsequent to this period offering new insights on the value, importance, and efficacy of IC reporting. Second, our review extends the scope to non-US studies investigating IC quality including countries regulating IC disclosure as well as unregulated settings and both developed and developing economies. As noted by Bedard and Graham (2014), regulatory differences in countries can contribute insights on the benefits and costs of SOX. Third, this study synthesizes IC literature by focusing on consequences for a diverse set of stakeholders. Finally, this review goes beyond a classic literature review by critiquing the IC accounting literature and setting a future research agenda.

Our systematic search of various editorial sources yields 60 published US papers during 2013-2016 and 34 non-US or cross country papers in total.¹ Six, nine, 19, and 26 of the US papers have been published each year during 2013-2016, respectively. The international diversity of IC research is increasing with 26 of the 34 papers published during this four-year period, with seven of these focusing on China. This trend highlights the growth in the IC literature, since the passage of SOX and the adoption of similar regulations worldwide, such as

¹ Studies dealing with IC quality but unrelated to the scope of our review are not included such as Fan, Li & Raghunandan (2016). The number of reviewed studies listed in Table 1, 2 and 3 is higher than 94 papers given that papers by Haislip, Peters & Richardson (2016b) and Pevzner & Gaynor (2016) each appear twice in the tables as they investigate multiple aspects of IC quality.
in Japan and Korea, due to the availability of data in developed and developing economies and the continued attention of researchers on IC since previous reviews.

Our review of the 94 papers captures: (1) the theoretical underpinnings of IC research; (2) the main proxies and approaches used in accounting and auditing literature to measure IC quality; (3) a summary of the main empirical findings; and (4) some future research issues for IC accounting research. In addressing these points, we categorize studies into two streams – determinants and consequences of IC quality. The former focuses on board and board subcommittee characteristics, ownership structure, internal audit characteristics, other firm structural characteristics, external audit related-variables, national culture, and regulatory and market environments. The latter discusses the impact of IC quality on decisions of managers, creditors, investors, auditors, financial analysts, and other stakeholders. For each stream of literature, we discuss the theory underpinning the associations, present recent empirical evidence, and consider any relevant methodological issues.

Our review shows that the measurement of IC quality has evolved in the US setting from general aspects of IC to greater specificity including account-level, information technologies (IT) and tax-related IC aspects. Outside the US setting, researchers generally use survey approaches among internal or external auditors or an internal disclosure index to assess IC quality in the absence of a SOX-like regulation. Synthesis of the studies reveals that empirical results are mixed concerning the effect of ownership structure (e.g., family ownership) and certain board characteristics (CEO duality, gender representativeness) on IC quality, while they are generally supportive of a positive association between audit committee characteristics (financial expertise, activity) and IC quality. Finally, empirical studies provide evidence that IC quality affects decisions and behavior of creditors, investors, managers, financial analysts, auditors and other stakeholders, and that this remains a fertile research area outside of the US.
Our synthesis of the literature’s findings suggests that while there are some mixed findings in research on this issue, in general, reporting on IC quality is useful for stakeholders suggesting that SOX-driven IC disclosures are worthwhile. It appears to be the case that similar requirements will be useful in other settings, although the studies do not enable a conclusion to be drawn regarding the cost of this type of regulation relative to its benefits. We suggest areas where further research around the determinants and economic consequences of IC quality will help to ascertain the extent to which similar reforms should be made. Our review will be relevant to academics interested in IC accounting research, as well as to policymakers, investors, creditors, managers, auditors, financial analysts and other stakeholders.

This study is organized as follows: Section 2 summarizes the main findings of research questions related to the internal and external determinants of IC quality including board and board sub-committee characteristics, ownership structure, external audit, regulatory and market features, and national culture. The research on IC quality and its consequences for management decisions, executive compensation and turnover, equity and bond markets, and other stakeholders is synthesized in Section 3. Section 4 presents the limitations of IC accounting research. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper and provides future research perspectives.

2. DETERMINANTS OF IC QUALITY

Studies examining the determinants of IC quality investigate its internal and external determinants. Beyond firm characteristics (e.g., size, risk, growth, and complexity), these internal determinants include board and board sub-committee characteristics, ownership structure, internal audit characteristics, and other structural variables. External determinants include audit-related characteristics, financial analysts, national culture, and the regulatory and market environment.
2.1. Internal determinants

Our review identifies 23 studies investigating internal determinants of IC quality, of which 11 are US studies published during 2013-2016, 11 are non-US studies and one is a cross country study. The studies reviewed are listed in Table 1. The internal determinants investigated in the studies identified are board and board sub-committee characteristics (14 studies, see Table 1 Panel A), ownership structure (four studies, see Table 1 Panel B), internal audit (two studies, see Table 1 Panel C) and other firm structural characteristics (three studies, see Table 1 Panel D).

2.1.1. Board and board sub-committee characteristics

It is widely believed that the board of directors and audit committee play a key role in shaping the IC environment (Krishnan, 2005). Audit committees oversee a firm’s audit processes including IC activities by reviewing any material weaknesses and monitoring corrective actions. The board of directors assumes ultimate responsibility to provide incremental oversight over IC to improve its quality as part of their fiduciary duties (Goh, 2009).

CEO characteristics (e.g., duality, power, ownership) can also affect IC quality. For instance, a CEO that has sufficient power in his/her hands has a greater ability to influence the appointment of friendly external directors and passive inside directors (Thomas, 2004). Accordingly, a powerful CEO may compromise the board’s ability to monitor managerial decisions and then weaken IC and corporate monitoring systems to serve his/her own personal interests (Lin, Wang, Chiou, & Hwang, 2014).

In their review, Schneider et al. (2009) identify that US studies have documented that board independence and audit committee independence, expertise, and meeting frequency are associated with higher IC. Recent studies in the US setting, such as Balsam, Jiang, & Lu (2014), investigate the effect of board (size and independence) and audit committee (financial expertise and size) characteristics on IC quality, finding no significant associations. However, Chen,
Knechel, Marisetty, Truong, & Veeraraghavan (2016a) find that board independence is negatively associated with the disclosure of IC weaknesses, and this negative association is more prevailing under CEO duality. The conflicting results are likely attributable to differing time periods with the former study covering 2004-2005 and the latter 2004-2012. Consistent with earlier studies, audit committee expertise is associated with higher IC quality (Lisic, Neal, Zhang, & Zhang, 2016; Haislip, Peters, & Richardson, 2016b). Campbell, Li, Yu, & Zhang (2016) report that executive relationships (e.g., CEO/CFO joint tenure) imply higher IC quality. Also investigating CEO characteristics, Lin et al. (2014) document that CEO entrenchment and age are associated with lower IC quality. He (2015) explores the effect of CEO inside debt holdings on IC quality, as proxied by the disclosures of IC deficiencies under SOX 404, in the US setting. The finding of higher CEO inside debt holdings being associated with higher IC quality, implies that a CEO with large inside debt is concerned about the default risk of his/her firm. Accordingly, a CEO will exhibit a strong commitment towards high financial reporting quality through higher IC quality. With respect to the government sector, Rich & Zhang (2014) document that municipalities with audit committees are associated with fewer IC problems.

The literature has subsequently evolved to examine gender representation on boards and audit committees on IC quality. Parker, Dao, Huang, & Yan (2015) examine whether audit and board members’ gender influences IC quality. Findings show that a higher proportion of females on the audit committee is associated with lower IC quality, while a higher percentage of females on the board is associated with higher IC quality. Chen, Eshleman & Soileau (2016) also find that the percentage of female board representation is positively related to IC quality. The evidence thus far is insufficient to be conclusive, especially for board sub-committees.

Outside of the US, Hu, Yuan, & Xiao (2014) examine whether the proportion of independent directors on the board affects IC quality in China and find that the percentage of

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2 CEO entrenchment score is the principal component factor (PCF) analysis of the following four CEO characteristics variables (CEO shareholding, CEO duality, CEO compensation and CEO tenure).
independent directors is positively associated with IC quality. In Egypt, Khlif & Samaha (2016) find that audit committee activity is positively associated with IC quality and the association is more prevalent when a firm is audited by Big-4 auditor.

Michelon et al. (2015) also examine whether board and audit committee characteristics have an effect on IC disclosures in four European financial markets. With regard to board characteristics (board independence and CEO duality), findings show that only CEO duality exerts a negative effect on IC disclosures. With respect to audit committee characteristics (audit committee expertise, independent chair and expert chair), the results suggest that an independent chair on the audit committee has a negative effect on IC disclosures, while an expert chair has a positive effect. Also focusing on disclosures, Agyei-Mensah (2016) finds that board independence is positively associated with IC disclosures by firms in Ghana. Pursuant to SOX like regulation, Yazawa (2015) examine the effect of board and CEO characteristics on the disclosure of material IC weaknesses in Japanese firms. He documents that CEO tenure and board size have a significant negative effect on such disclosures, while board independence exerts a significant positive effect.

The association between IC quality and board characteristics has been researched widely. Consistent with prior research, recent research generally supports IC quality is positively associated with board composition that is consistent with good governance practices. The results of research on audit committees and IC is also consistent, and supports the view that positive aspects of audit committees (such as expertise or independence) are associated with higher IC quality. The literature on CEO characteristics is more mixed as is the emerging literature on the influence of female directors on IC quality.

2.1.2. Ownership structure

With regard to ownership structure, entrenchment and alignment effects are used to explain how ownership concentration influences IC quality (Weiss, 2014). The entrenchment effect
suggests that ownership concentration (block ownership or family ownership) incentivizes a reduction in the effectiveness of IC for the purpose of owners serving their own interests and decreasing the likelihood of their future accountability (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The alignment effect suggests that dominant shareholders prefer to preserve their reputation and thereby align their interests with those of stakeholders (Weiss, 2014). Such behavior is conducive to higher IC quality. The research question examined in studies of this issue is whether ownership structure is associated with IC quality.

Early literature on the effect of ownership concentration and managerial ownership on IC disclosures conducted in the Netherlands, find that these two ownership attributes have a significant negative effect on IC disclosures (Deumes & Knechel, 2008). More recently, Bardhan, Lin, & Wu (2015) and Weiss (2014) focus on the effect of family ownership on IC quality in the US and Israel, respectively. Weiss (2014) documents family ownership is significantly associated with higher IC quality, whereas Bardhan et al. (2015) provide evidence that family firms exhibit lower IC quality than non-family firms. In China, Ji, Lu, & Qu (2015) examine the effect of ownership structure (institutional ownership and ownership concentration), on IC quality as measured by the voluntary disclosure of material IC weaknesses. They document that ownership concentration has a negative effect on such disclosures. The evidence generally is that ownership concentration is associated with weaker IC quality, while the results for family ownership are mixed.

2.1.3. Internal auditors

The role of internal auditors in improving IC quality has also been researched. The internal audit department plays a crucial role in overseeing and detecting IC weaknesses and reporting them to top management in order for corrective actions to be taken in a timely manner. Accordingly, research has examined the question of whether the quality of internal auditing
impacts IC quality in the firm (Mazza & Azzali, 2015a). Prior studies use investment in the internal audit function as a proxy for IC quality (Wan-Hussin & Bamahos, 2013).

The following two papers investigating the internal audit function and its association with IC quality deal with Malaysian and Italian settings, respectively. Fadzil et al. (2005) examine the effect of internal audit quality on IC quality using a survey methodology. They document that internal audit department professional proficiency, objectivity and review significantly influence the monitoring aspect of the IC system. Similarly, Mazza & Azzali (2015a) examine the effect of internal audit quality on the severity and persistence of IC deficiencies in the Italian setting by surveying Italian internal auditors. They document that increased internal audit quality is associated with reduced severity and persistence of IC deficiencies and thus higher IC quality. Both studies in this area show evidence that better internal auditing is associated with better IC quality.

2.1.4. Other firm structural variables

Other variables examined include reverse mergers, employee-friendly policies and diversification. Mao and Ettredge (2016) investigate whether reverse mergers influence managers’ propensity to issue unfavorable SOX 302 reports for Chinese firms listed in US. They document that managers of Chinese reverse merger firms have greater propensity to issue adverse SOX 302 reports when material IC problems exist relative to other US listed firms including reverse merger and IPO firms from other countries as well as Chinese IPO firms. Further, in the absence of known IC deficiencies, Chinese reverse merger firms have an equal or greater propensity to issue an adverse report. Studying firms’ employee-friendly policies in the US setting, Guo et al. (2016) find that such policies reduce the propensity for employee-related material IC weaknesses. In Taiwan, Chen and Keung (2016) investigate the relationship between corporate diversification and IC quality and whether institutional ownership affects such an association. They find that corporate diversification is positively associated with lower
IC quality and such an association is more (less) prevailing when firms have higher transient (dedicated) institutional ownership.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

2.2. External determinants

Our review identifies 12 studies investigating external determinants of IC quality, of which eight are US studies published during 2013-2016, one is a non-US study, and three are cross country studies. The reviewed studies are listed in Table 2. The external determinants investigated in the reviewed studies are external audit (six studies, see Table 2 Panel A), financial analysts (one study, see Table 2 Panel B), national culture (two studies, see Table 2 Panel C) and the regulatory and market environment (three studies, see Table 2 Panel D).

2.2.1. Audit-related variables

External determinants of IC quality include those related to external auditor characteristics. For instance, increased auditor quality has been hypothesized to be positively associated with IC quality. In this regard, auditor client specific knowledge and IT auditor expertise allow auditors to conduct refined audit procedures and appropriate tests to identify risk zones. This can increase audit quality, which reduces the occurrence of IC weaknesses (Chen, Gul, Marisetty, Truong, & Veeraraghavan, 2016; Haislip et al., 2016b). Auditor type (Big-4 versus non-Big-4) can also affect IC quality since Big-4 auditors may enjoy more independence given their diversified client portfolio and thus exert more pressures on management to improve IC (Khlif & Samaha, 2016). For example, in the healthcare sector, Lopez, Rice & Smith (2013) find firms audited by Big-4 auditors have higher IC quality. The higher reputational capital and visibility of Big-4 auditors also incentivizes high quality audits. Finally, additional audit effort, as proxied by unexpected audit fees or unexpected audit delays, may signal the auditor’s discovery of material IC deficiencies implying extended audit procedures. There are thus numerous reasons why a positive association between external audit and IC quality is expected.
Chen et al. (2016b), studying the influence of auditor tenure and firms’ geographic proximity to auditors on IC quality for US firms, find that firms with long auditor tenure and in closer geographic proximity to auditors have higher IC quality and that longer auditor-client geographic distance is associated with lower IC quality but such a relationship is weakened by the length of auditor tenure. Albring et al. (2016) explore the effect of unexpected fees on IC quality, as proxied by the disclosure of IC weaknesses under SOX 404, and distinguish between firm-level and account-specific IC deficiencies. They document that unexpected audit fees are negatively associated with IC quality at firm level, but such an association becomes insignificant for account-specific IC level. Haislip et al. (2016b) test for the effect of IT auditor expertise on IC quality and document a positive association between both variables since the likelihood of firms’ reporting IT internal control weaknesses is negatively associated with a firm having an auditor with IT expertise. De Simone, Ege, & Stomberg (2015) consider the association between auditor-provided tax services, as measured by tax fees, and tax IC quality. They document that increased auditor-provided tax services decreases the probability of tax material weaknesses which translates in higher tax IC quality. The overall results generally support the association between higher quality auditing and IC quality. Higher IC quality is associated with proximity, tenure, IT expertise and fees for tax services. While unexpected audit fees are associated negatively or insignificantly with IC quality, that effect is likely to be due to lower IC quality leading to more audit work.

2.2.2. Financial analysts

Financial analysts play an important role as intermediaries between firms and investors (Hope, 2003). When financial analysts follow a firm and publish earnings estimates, this represents an additional external monitoring mechanism and can put more disciplinary constraints on a firm’s management to improve IC quality (Mao and Yu, 2015). In this regard, Mao and Yu (2015) examine the relationship between analysts’ cash flow forecast initiation and IC quality in the
US setting. They document that subsequent to analysts’ cash flow forecasts, firms report fewer IC weaknesses under SOX 404 implying that analysts’ following focuses managers on IC quality.

2.2.3. National culture

National culture, as identified by Hofstede (2001), with a specific focus on individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance traits, can also affect IC quality. Managers operating in countries characterized by high levels of individualism are more concerned with their own interests than shareholders’ wealth and stakeholders’ requirements, and they are more likely to use discretionary acts to serve their own interests. Managers operating in societies with high levels of power distance have more centralized decisions and they have greater influence on financial reporting choices (Kanagaretnam, Lobo, Ma, & Zhou, 2016). Finally, managers in countries with higher degrees of uncertainty avoidance are more risk averse and have more concerns about litigation costs. Accordingly, empirical literature dealing with this topic generally posits that high levels of individualism and power distance are positively associated with IC deficiencies, while high uncertainty avoidance levels reduce the likelihood of occurrence of IC deficiencies.

Using multi-country samples, cultural determinants of IC disclosures and quality have recently been researched. Hooghiemstra, Hermes, & Emanuels (2015) finds that individualism (uncertainty avoidance) has a positive (negative) effect on voluntary IC disclosures. Kanagaretnam et al. (2016) find individualism and power distance are positively related to lower IC quality, while uncertainty avoidance is negatively related to the same variable. These results, albeit limited, are consistent with the predictions.

2.2.4. Regulatory and market factors

From an institutional perspective, a high level of regulation places pressure on firms to comply with rules and guidelines in order to survive (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Sarens and
Christopher (2010) suggest that the compliance with institutional norms and requirements may result in a variety of rewards including increased financial stability, legitimacy, social support, internal and external commitment, easy access to finance, and more attraction of personnel. More specifically, when corporate governance guidelines strongly emphasize IC and risk management, this will lead to higher IC quality (Sarens and Christopher, 2010).

Sarens and Christopher (2010) examine whether the reduced focus on IC within the Belgian corporate governance guidelines is associated with lower IC quality of Belgian firms, relative to Australian firms operating under corporate governance guidelines characterized by a stronger focus on IC. They document that the weaker focus of the Belgian corporate governance guidelines on IC is associated with lower IC quality in Belgian firms relative to Australian firms. This evidence suggests that regulatory attention on IC is positively associated with IC quality.

There are alternative possible explanations for the effect of market competition on IC quality. Intense market competition, through product market competition, can increase the likelihood of liquidation for a firm characterized by high product costs, as such a cost structure may reduce its sales in the market leading to lower profitability (Zhang and Chen, 2016). Since the implementation of quality IC requires financial resources, lower profitability will reduce the capability of a firm to improve its IC system (Ge and McVay, 2005). However, the intense competition may cause managers to reduce discretionary costs, improve inventory management and increase customers’ satisfaction through higher IC quality to confer competitive advantages.

In a US setting, Kim and Kim (2015) consider the effect of three proxies for product market competition (the industry concentration index (Herfindahl-Hirschman Index), largest four-firm concentration ratio, and an industry leader indicator) on IC quality. They show that companies operating in highly competitive markets are characterized by lower IC quality. By
contrast, Zhanga and Chen (2016), in a Chinese setting, show that intense product market competition is associated higher IC quality. When testing for the moderating effect of state ownership, they provide evidence that such an association remains significant only for non-state owned firms. Accordingly, the theoretical and empirical association between market product competition and IC quality, and factors mitigating the association, remains open to further research.

INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

3. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IC QUALITY

IC quality can affect decisions of financial statements users, both internal (e.g., managers) and external (e.g., creditors, investors, auditors, financial analysts and other stakeholders such as customers). This section reviews the effect of IC quality on stakeholders. We identify 61 economic consequence studies, of which 43 are US studies published during 2013-2016 and 18 are non-US studies. The reviewed studies are listed in Table 3. The economic consequence studies are categorized as: management decisions including earnings properties (26 studies, see Table 3 Panel A); management turnover and compensation (three studies, see Table 3 Panel B), debt markets (four studies, see Table 3 Panel C); equity markets (17 studies, see Table 3 Panel D), external audit (seven studies, see Table 3 Panel E), financial analysts (two studies, see Table 3 Panel F) and other stakeholders (two studies, see Table 3 Panel G).

3.1. IC quality and management decisions

IC quality can impact management behavior through the magnitude of discretionary accruals, earnings conservatism and the accuracy of management forecasts. With respect to discretionary accruals, the existence of material deficiencies in a firm’s IC system implies inadequate control over financial reporting which translates into significant risk of material intentional and/or unintentional anomalies in financial statements (AICPA, 1995; Doyle, Ge, & McVay, 2007a). This implies that IC quality impacts the magnitude of discretionary accruals (Chan, Farrell, &
Lee, 2008). Further, IC deficiencies may lead to a tardy recognition of impairment losses due to the lack of appropriate accounting policies and procedures or unqualified accounting staff to value a firm’s inventory, fixed assets and estimate the future cash flows of assets such as goodwill (Goh & Li, 2011). Impeding the timely recognition of losses leads to overvalued earnings and thus lower conservatism. Additionally, deficiencies in the IC system can imply that not all transactions are recorded in a timely manner leading to incomplete internal management reports and more uncertainty for management when estimating earnings and thus lowering earnings forecast accuracy (Feng, Li, & McVay, 2009).

This line of enquiry has continued in recent years with studies in US and non-US settings. It is an important line of enquiry to pursue given the previous mixed evidence on the consequences of IC quality on earning quality (Schneider et al. 2009). Jaggi, Mitra, & Hossain (2015) document that earnings quality for firms characterized by low IC quality audited by Big-4 industry specialists is higher than that of the firms with low IC quality audited by Big-4 non-specialists. Dowdell, Herda, & Notbohm (2014) investigate the association between IC disclosures in management’s and auditors’ reports and discretionary accruals. They document that management’s reports on IC improve financial reporting quality suggesting that such reports are beneficial even in the absence of attestation. Jarvinen & Myllymäki (2016) and Lenard, Petruska, & Bing (2016) investigate whether SOX 404 material weakness disclosures are associated with real earnings management practices. Their findings show that companies with low IC quality (reporting material IC weaknesses under SOX 404) engage in more manipulation of real activities (e.g. inventory overproduction) compared to companies with effective IC. Cho & Chung (2016) focus on the banking sector and examine how IC quality, proxied by IC weakness disclosures, may influence loan reserves and provisions. Their findings show that loan reserves and provisions are higher in years of IC deficiency disclosures relative to years without such disclosures.
Myllymäki (2014) documents that the likelihood of misstatements in financial information continues to be significantly higher for two years after the last material IC weaknesses reported under SOX 404 compared to firms that do not report such types of IC deficiencies. Consistent evidence is provided by Donelson, Ege, & McInnis (2016) showing lower IC quality increases the likelihood of future fraud revelations. Mitra, Jaggi, & Hossain (2015) examine the association between IC quality and accounting conservatism in the US. They find that firms with firm-level IC deficiencies significantly changed their conservative reporting practice from the pre- to the post-SOX period and firms with low IC quality have greater accounting conservatism in the post-SOX period relative to firms with effective IC.

Feng, Li, McVay, & Ashbaugh-Skaife (2015) examine the association between IC quality linked to inventories and firms’ inventory management and document that firms with inventory-related material weaknesses have lower inventory turnover ratios and report more inventory impairments compared to firms with effective IC. Cheng, Dhaliwal, & Zhang (2013), focusing on the investment behavior for a sample of firms characterized by low IC quality following their disclosure of IC deficiencies under SOX, find firms’ investment efficiency significantly improved after such disclosure. Similarly, Sun (2016) reports that firms with adverse SOX 404 opinions, indicating low IC quality, have lower investment than firms with clean SOX 404 reports. Following firm’s remediation from IC deficiencies, investment increases.

Bauer (2015) examines the link between tax IC quality and tax avoidance, as measured by the cash effective tax rate. He documents low tax IC quality is associated with higher cash effective tax rates. Similarly, Gallemore & Labro (2015) document that firms with higher IC quality have lower effective tax rates. Focusing on disclosure of IT internal control quality and 8-K filings, Holder, Lin, & Pinsker (2016) report that low IT internal control quality reduces firms’ 8-K filing compliance and reporting timeliness. Huang & Chang (2015) explore how
auditor-provided tax services affect the association between tax related IC and book-tax differences (permanent and temporary). Results show that firms characterized by lower tax IC quality experience larger permanent and temporary differences. Auditor-provided tax services mitigate the relationship between tax IC quality and permanent differences in the post-SOX period.

Research on the association between IC quality and managers’ actions in non-US settings has also expanded. Earlier research in Canada (Lu et al., 2011) and China (Li et al., 2012) find no association and a positive association between IC weaknesses and discretionary accruals, respectively. In the Netherlands, unaudited management statements of effective IC is associated with reduced discretionary accruals (Van de Poel & Vanstraelen, 2011). This research has been augmented with studies in Saudi Arabia, Germany, Korea, Malaysia and Japan with further studies in China. Using a Korean setting, Oh et al. (2014) examine how IC over financial reporting regulation affects discretionary accruals. Following the adoption of SOX in the US, Korean policymakers adopted a regulation stipulating that larger listed firms are subject to stricter IC over financial reporting (ICFR) rules than smaller listed or non-listed large firms since May 2005. Their preliminary evidence suggests, surprisingly, that the adoption of ICFR rules increased discretionary accruals. Nakashima & Ziebart (2015) examine whether Japanese-SOX equivalent (J-SOX) has an effect on earnings quality and earnings management for Japanese firms. They document an increase (no significant change) in accruals management and real earnings management for the period following J-SOX for firms disclosing (not disclosing) IC deficiencies. Brown, Pott, & Wompener (2014) examine the effect of IC regulation in Germany (Legislation on Control and Transparency of 1998) on earnings quality. They find that firms experience an increase in timely loss recognition and a decrease in earnings smoothing in the post-adoption period. Al-Thuneibat, Al-Rehaily, & Basodan (2016) examine the effect of compliance with IC legislation on corporate profitability in Saudi Arabia setting.
They document that only two components of the IC system, risk assessment and control of procedures, have a positive effect on corporate profitability, while control environment, information and communication and monitoring have non-significant effects on the same variable. Zhou et al. (2016) investigate the effect of IC quality on firm performance for different stages of a firm’s life cycle (introduction, growth, mature, shakeout and decline) in Chinese setting. They document a positive effect of IC quality on firm performance that varies over different life cycle stages and is more significant in maturity and shakeout stages. Finally, Zakaria, Nawawi, & Salin (2016) using a Malaysian case study concerning an oil and gas company, they find that lower IC quality leads to fraudulent practices.

Collectively, this recent stream of literature, in conjunction with that prior to 2013, suggests that IC quality influences management behavior and is generally consistent with better financial reporting (e.g., higher earning quality, reduced discretionary accruals, more accurate earnings forecasts, tax avoidance, more efficient inventory management). With regard to accounting conservatism, empirical evidence is mixed.

3.2. IC quality, management turnover and executive compensation

Lower IC quality can have an adverse effect on management status inside the firm through higher turnover (e.g., Johnstone, Li, & Rupley, 2011; Li et al., 2010) and reduced compensation (e.g., Hoitash, Hoitash, & Johnstone, 2012; Hsu & Liao, 2012). For instance, low IC quality can reduce earnings quality and its credibility among investors in the stock market and result in the replacement of top management or the reduction of executive compensation through lower bonuses based on the realized results.

Previous review papers (e.g., Bedard and Graham, 2014 and Schneider et al., 2009) suggest that US-empirical evidence documents that lower IC quality leads to higher turnover (e.g., Johnstone, Li, & Rupley, 2011) and reduced compensation (e.g., Hoitash, Hoitash, & Johnstone, 2012). Our review identifies more recent US studies examining these associations,
with nuances or moderating effects. Focusing on firms with and without IT-related internal control deficiencies, Haislip, Masli, Richardson & Sanchez (2016a) report that firms with lower IT-internal control quality experience higher CEO/CFO/Director turnover with remediation occurring timelier with the appointment of a new CFO with IT expertise. Haislip, Masli, Richardson, & Watson (2015) find that CFOs/CEOs losing their job due to lower IT-internal control quality are less likely to subsequently find an equivalent job relative to CEOs/CFOs who lose their job due to non-IT related IC problems. Extending previous studies on the association between IC quality and executives’ compensations, Paletta & Alimtimeti (2016) include all executives in their analysis and find that executives of firms with lower IC quality earn higher compensation relative to executives in firms with quality IC systems. Despite this one piece of recent evidence, the overall conclusion from research to date is that lower IC quality has adverse consequences for executives.

3.3. IC quality and debt markets

It has been suggested that low IC quality can also have an adverse effect on creditors’ lending decisions. Schneider & Church (2008) posit that adverse opinions on IC introduce concerns as to the reliability of financial data and increase the uncertainty associated with the loan applicant, thereby impacting the credit risk assessment. Costello & Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) suggest that low IC quality may affect loan pricing due to increased uncertainty regarding the firm’s creditworthiness implying higher agency costs of debt and loan monitoring costs reflected in a higher interest rate. Verrecchia (2001) posits that managers’ information advantage relative to lenders’ increases uncertainty and information asymmetry for lenders, which in turn, translates into an increased interest rate.

In their literature review, Schneider et al. (2009) conclude that US based empirical and experimental evidence supports the adverse effect of lower IC quality on the cost of debt. More recently, El-Mahdy & Park (2014) investigate the association between disclosure of IC
deficiencies and average annual bid-ask spread in the US secondary loan market. They document that low IC quality is positively associated with higher information asymmetry in this market. Tang, Tian, & Yan (2015) investigate the association between IC quality and derivatives pricing using credit default swaps. They find that lower IC quality implies higher credit default swap spread and that firm-level material IC problems are associated with higher credit default swap spreads than account-specific IC deficiencies. In the municipal bond market, Park, Matkin, & Marlowe (2016) find that low IC quality is associated with higher borrowing costs for municipal bonds with the association remaining stable before and after the financial crisis. Guidara, Achek, & Dammak (2016) focus on the cost of debt using a Tunisian setting and find that low IC quality, as proxied by auditor’s adverse opinion on IC system, increases the cost of debt and the association is stronger under high family ownership.

US studies dealing with creditors’ perceptions of IC quality, proxied by credit spreads, contractual debt terms and credit default swaps, generally support that IC quality plays an important role in estimating default risks for creditors. Low IC quality is associated with higher costs. Limited international evidence exists to generalize these findings beyond the US.

3.4. IC quality and equity markets
IC quality is also believed to affect investors’ perception of risk. For instance, when a firm’s IC system has weaknesses, the quality and the precision of its accounting signals are impaired (Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins, Kinney, & LaFond, 2009). Theoretical work by Easley & O’Hara (2004) suggests that poor information quality, mainly caused by material weaknesses in the IC system, has a non-diversifiable component that is priced by market participants, and more specifically, uninformed investors. Low IC quality may also lead to inadequate decisions by managers (e.g., investing in high risk projects during a poor performance period) which increases cash flow variability and failure probability (Ogneva, Raghunandan, &
This implies more uncertainty about a firm’s future cash flows and translates to a higher cost of equity capital.

In their literature review, Schneider et al. (2009) suggest that lower IC quality generally leads to higher cost of equity capital and negative stock price reactions. In a recent study, Gao & Jia (2015b) focus on the effect of IC quality on firms’ cost of raising equity capital, documenting that underwriters charge companies reporting IC deficiencies with higher risk premium. McNulty & Akhigbe (2016), in one of the few industry specific studies, report that banks characterized by low IC quality experience lower stock returns. Bolton, Lian, Rupley, & Zhao (2016) investigate the industry contagion effect for negative reactions to IC weakness disclosures. They report that firms with lower IC quality experience share price declines and peer industry firms experience similar declines. Dowdell, Kim, Klamm, & Watson (2013) test for the effect of IC quality on market liquidity as proxied by bid-ask spreads. They find that firms with lower IC quality, as proxied by the disclosures of IC deficiencies, have higher bid-ask spreads compared to those with effective IC systems. Also interested in information asymmetry in capital markets, Gupta, Sami, & Zhou (2016) show that subsequent to management’s reporting on IC, the information environment improves for U.S. firms through decreased bid-ask spread and price volatility, and increased trading volume. However, they do not report similar results subsequent to auditors’ reporting on a firm’s IC over financial reporting.

Hu, Qi, Tian, Yao, & Zeng (2013) explore how IC quality may affect the value relevance of earnings and book value. Using market model linking market value (dependent variable) to earning and book value (explanatory variables), they document that earnings and book values have a significant negative effect on market value under lower IC quality. Focusing on IT internal control quality, Kuhn, Ahuja, & Mueller (2013) find that firms with lower IC quality have lower market values. Li, Yu, Zhang, & Zheng (2016) investigate the effect of IC quality
on firm valuation as proxied by Tobin’s q. They provide evidence that firms with ineffective IC have 13 per cent lower valuation than firms with effective IC.

Ashbaugh-Skaife, Veenman, & Wangerin (2013) explore the effect of IC quality on the profitability of insider investors’ trading as proxied by the profitability of insider trades as the capital gain after purchases and the losses avoided by selling shares. They provide evidence that the profitability of such trading is significantly higher in firms with lower IC quality relative to those with effective IC. Investigating investment in target companies, Church & Schneider (2016) find that investment in target companies is lessened under lower IC quality.

More recent literature has focused on the effect of IC quality on aspects of cash holdings. Huang, Gue, & Zhang (2015) report that the value of cash improves for firms with lower IC quality suggesting that precautionary cash and cash equivalent holdings in the presence of deficiencies in IC is valued. In contrast, Gao & Jia (2015a) report that investors value liquid assets in firms with lower IC quality significantly less relative to firms with effective IC. Similarly, Qi, Li, Zhou, & Sun (2016) document that the marginal value of corporate cash holdings and the contribution of capital expenditures to shareholder value, proxied by excess return, are significantly less for firms with ineffective IC. Investigating the impact of IC quality on firms’ cash policies, Pevzner & Gaynor (2016) analysis suggests that ineffective IC increases a firm’s reliance on internal financing and the increased uncertainty about future uses of cash reduces the positive impact of higher relative cash balance on stock liquidity. Koester, Lim, & Vigeland (2015) test whether tax IC quality influences investors’ valuation of unrecognized tax benefits. They document that investors positively value unrecognized tax benefits and this association is less pronounced for firms characterized by lower tax IC quality.

Outside of the US, Nishizaki, Takano & Takeda (2014) utilize the introduction of J-SOX and find that firms with lower IC quality experience lower cumulative abnormal returns over the period of 2009-2010. Chen, Chang, Dong & Zhang (2016), using a self-constructed IC
quality index based on Chinese firms’ annual reports, find IC quality is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk.

In sum, investors’ perceptions of IC quality have been proxied using several measures including cost of equity capital, market reactions (e.g., cumulative abnormal returns), bid-ask spreads and value relevance of earnings and book value with limited investigation beyond the US. Findings remain mixed regarding the association between IC quality and the value of cash holdings. However, the evidence shows that firms characterized by ineffective IC systems are associated with lower cumulative abnormal returns and lower value relevance of earnings and book value. The evidence overall shows that IC quality has an impact on the decisions made by investors.

3.5. IC quality and auditors

IC quality is expected to impact the work of external auditors, indicated by audit fees and audit report lag. The detection of IC deficiencies heightens audit risk, necessitates more audit testing through corroborative approaches and increases audit scope and effort. Increased audit risk will be compensated by higher audit fees (Hogan & Wilkins, 2008), while increased audit effort will translate into longer audit delays (Khli & Samaha, 2014).

Reviews by Schneider et al. (2009), Asare et al. (2013) and Bedard and Graham (2014) focus on the effect of IC quality on auditors in a US setting. Results from reviewed studies generally show that lower IC quality is associated with longer audit delays, higher audit fees and increased likelihood of auditor change. Recent literature investigating IC quality and audit delays suggests that higher IC quality leads to shorter audit delays. Chen, Smith, Cao, & Xia (2014) focus on high Information Technology (IT) capable firms measuring IC effectiveness of both the overall IC and five components of IC – control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication and monitoring. They document that low IC quality has a significant positive effect on the percentage of increase of audit delays. Pizzini, Shu, &
Ziegenfuss (2015) investigate whether internal audit function quality, proxying for IC quality, affects audit delay for the pre-SOX 404 period. They document that audit delays are a decreasing function of IC quality. IC and audit delay studies have also been conducted in developing economies. Wan-Hussin & Bamahros (2013) document a negative association between the costs incurred for the internal audit function and audit delay. Similarly, Khlif & Samaha (2014) find a significant negative association between IC quality and external audit delays.

With respect to the literature relating IC quality and audit fees, Chen et al. (2014) analyze the association between IC quality and audit fees for high IT capable firms between 2004 and 2007 documenting that lower IC quality is associated with higher audit fees. Lee (2016) investigates the relation between IC deficiencies in initial public offering (IPO) audits and audit fees. He finds that firms with low IC quality for the pre-IPO period are likely to pay higher IPO audit fees, implying that auditors revise audit fees in response to higher IC risk. A non-US study investigating audit fees and IC quality using a survey instrument in Italy reports a negative association between IC quality and audit fees (Mazza & Azzali, 2015b).

With regard to auditor dismissal, Haislip et al. (2016b) test whether firms with revealed IT internal control deficiencies employ a strategy of disassociation with their current auditor. They document a positive association between firms reporting IT material weaknesses and subsequent auditor dismissals or switching. They further show firms hiring new audit firms with higher IT expertise have a greater likelihood of material weakness remediation within one year of reporting IC weaknesses.

Collectively, this literature supports the view that higher IC quality reduces audit delays and increases audit fees. Empirical evidence is limited outside of the US concerning the effect of IC quality on auditors’ opinions, resignations and dismissals.

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3.6. IC quality and financial analysts

IC quality could affect the decisions of financial analysts. Financial analysts strongly rely on firms’ financial information to shape their earnings forecasts (Clinton, Pinello, & Ashbaugh-Skaife, 2014; Xu & Tang, 2012). When forming their earnings estimates, financial analysts base their predictions on earnings-related information, disaggregated segmental information and information provided by management (Rogers & Grant, 1997). Low IC quality can compromise the reliability of financial information via the introduction of noise, due to the lack of appropriate oversight, or proper documentation increasing the likelihood of unintentional errors in the accounting cycle introducing a bias into earnings quality (Clinton et al., 2014). Accordingly, financial analysts will face more difficulties in estimating accurately future earnings implying lower analysts’ forecasts accuracy and greater analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion.

Arping & Sautner (2013) study the effect of disclosed information concerning IC quality on analyst earnings forecasts for a sample of European companies comprising firms that are cross-listed in the US and subject to SOX regulation and firms that are not cross-listed. They document cross-listed and non-cross-listed firms experience lower analyst earnings forecasts errors and dispersion with the decrease significantly larger for the former. Clinton et al. (2014) investigate the impact of IC quality reported under SOX 404 on analysts’ forecasts and coverage decisions. They provide evidence that low IC quality reduces analysts’ forecasts accuracy and analysts’ coverage.

Based on these two studies, financial analysts’ earnings forecasts are impacted by the quality of firms’ IC over financial reporting. Reducing information opacity by disclosing information related to the quality of the IC systems, increases forecast accuracy.
3.7. IC quality and other stakeholders

Employees in any firm have an explicit contract to receive compensation and rewards in line with the effort provided. If employees feel that are not treated fairly in their job, this will increase their motivation to commit fraud. In this regard, Rae and Subramaniam (2008) examine the moderating effect of IC quality on organizational justice and employee fraud in the Australian setting. Using a survey among 64 chief accountants, they document the positive association between organizational justice and the probability to commit fraud becomes negative and significant for the interaction variable between IC quality and organizational justice.

Customers represent an important stakeholder with whom firms have an implicit contract (Su, Zhao, & Zhou, 2014). Customers’ willingness to buy from firms is influenced by their perception of firms’ ability and incentive to fulfill implied commitments (Maksimovic & Titman, 1991). Since IC deficiencies can signal the possibility of future litigation risks, this can compromise the capability of a firm to meet its commitments causing customer concern about firms’ product quality and incentive to continue honoring implicit contracts (Su et al., 2014). Su et al. (2014) explore the possible effect of IC quality, as proxied by firms’ IC weakness disclosures under SOX 404, on customers’ perceptions of firms’ ability to meet implicit commitments to customers as proxied by sales growth. Their findings show that lower IC quality, following SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures, is associated with a decline in sales growth. Such a decline is more prevalent for firms with firm-level IC deficiency disclosures, with industrial customers, in the durable goods industries, with high research and development intensity, or without future IC weakness remediation.

INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
4. LIMITATIONS OF IC ACCOUNTING RESEARCH

Prior to SOX, IC quality was typically measured using survey methodology among auditors (e.g., Ashton, Willingham, & Elliott, 1987; Wright & Wright, 1996). Post-SOX, research on the determinants and economic consequences of IC characteristics in the US proliferated. SOX 302 requires management to issue a report assessing the effectiveness of a firm’s IC. Under SOX 404, external auditors must attest to management’s IC reporting and are responsible for issuing a report on the effectiveness of IC over financial reporting. A potential limitation of studies using SOX disclosure requirements is that some material weaknesses might not be detected and disclosed as managers’ and auditors’ incentives to identify and report IC deficiencies play an important role in whether or not existing problems are ultimately disclosed. Rice & Weber (2012) provide evidence that the majority of firms that later report misstatements (and their auditors) do not report existing IC weaknesses and instead report that controls are effective.

Studies often measure IC quality as a dichotomous variable with 1 being disclosure of IC deficiencies and 0 otherwise. According to Oh et al. (2014, p. 413) “this approach does not fully address the effect of the degree of regulation on accounting information quality, and yields only partial evidence of the benefits of having strong internal controls on accounting information quality”. Reducing IC quality to a dummy variable represents a reductionist approach (Chen, Eshleman & Soileau, 2016) and can omit firm’s policies in terms of: (1) communication and enforcement of integrity and ethical values; (2) the procedures used to analyze risks and how manage them; (3) actions undertaken to achieve entity's objectives; (4) information tools and systems used to communicate and gather information; and (5) supervisory activities conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of IC.

The use of disclosure indices (content analysis) to measure IC disclosure/quality suffers from limitations. It can be difficult to replicate as it is self-constructed and the researcher relies
on judgement during the coding process, which introduces potential bias (Hassan & Marston, 2010). In addition, self-constructed disclosure index studies dealing employ small sample sizes due to the labour-intensive data collection process (Hassan & Marston, 2010). Another potential limitation of applying such an approach is that the results are only valid if index items are appropriate since the type and number of items of information to be included in a self-constructed disclosure index is subject to judgment (Hassan, Romilly, Giorgionni, & Power, 2009).

Survey methodology has also been used in IC accounting research, especially in emerging economies where data on IC remains limited. For instance, Khlif & Samaha (2014) use a survey of auditors to assess the effectiveness and the quality of IC in Egypt based on a previously developed IC checklist. Mazza & Azzali (2015a) survey internal auditors in Italy finding that increased internal audit quality is associated with reduced severity and persistence of control deficiencies. Surveying internal auditors or external auditors (Mazza & Azzali, 2015a; Khlif & Samaha, 2014; Khlif & Samaha, 2016) is also subject to criticism. For instance, Bloomfield, Nelson, & Soltes (2016) state that responses resulting from the survey may be biased by the choice of samples as well as respondent self-selection to participate. They add that survey data can also be biased by how questions are asked, by respondents’ lack of self-insight concerning their own judgment processes, and by respondents’ desire for particular conclusions.

With respect to the sample selection process, a common methodology used in IC literature consists of the construction of matched samples (firms with low IC quality matched with a control sample including firms with effective IC). This can lead to incorrect inferences. Cram, Karan, & Stuart (2009) suggest that this may introduce a bias into the analysis since it is common for researchers to include all firms reporting IC weaknesses, while control sample (firms with effective IC) are selected using a much lower sampling rate which implies crudely
equal ‘case’ and ‘control’ samples obtained. Propensity-score matching has become more prevalent in this literature, but this issue remains a limitation that applies especially to earlier studies.

Studies dealing with IC quality generally control for endogeneity and self-selection bias. However, almost all studies conducted in emerging economies (e.g. Khelif & Samaha, 2016; Agyei-Mensah, 2016; Zhou, Chen, & Chen, 2016) do not control for endogeneity and do not use the Heckman-two-stage procedure to reduce the adverse effect of this statistical problem on estimating models’ parameters.

Cross-country IC studies can suffer from several limitations. For instance, these empirical enquiries use Hofstede’s cultural variables and other explanatory variables measured at the country level, while IC quality is a firm-level variable, and applying a country level measure at the firm level can bias the analysis. Further, Hofstede’s cultural dimensions have been widely criticized by accounting scholars (e.g., Baskerville, 2003). The criticisms include: (1) outdated data; (2) assumptions of ethnic homogeneity in one country; (3) the close connection of cultural dimensions with socio-economic data; and (4) the inapplicability of the cultural dimensions to all countries and cultures (Baskerville, 2003).

Finally, with the literature continuing to mature, findings of studies using a longer post SOX time window augment those using narrower time windows. Findings from studies using a period very close to SOX adoption (either SOX 302 or SOX 404 or both) or around such an event (e.g. Balsam et al., 2014; Dowdell et al., 2013; El-Mahdy and Park, 2014) can be influenced by managers and auditors unfamiliarity with the application of the new regulation. Accordingly, early evidence reported with respect to the economic consequences of IC reporting can be mitigated later as external auditors and management may gain more experience and confidence in the exercise of judgment when interpreting and applying the SOX regulation either in US or other settings that have adopted similar regulations (e.g. Japan, South Korea).
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH

We discuss the development of the empirical literature and provide suggestions for future research on IC quality and its influence on financial statement preparers and users. From a methodological perspective, our review suggests that the regulatory environment determines IC disclosures and thus the availability of reliable information to research this area. In the US, the enactment of SOX allows researchers to proxy for IC quality through the disclosure of IC deficiencies. Arguably, this is a robust and well-accepted indicator of IC quality and the availability of this measure has fostered research to better understand how IC affects stakeholders’ decision-making. Where other countries have adopted SOX-like regulation (e.g., Japan, South Korea) knowledge is also emerging on cross-country similarities and differences in the determinants and consequences of IC quality facilitating insights on how economic, political and social factors may be contributing to the differences. In settings where the disclosure of IC data is unregulated, researchers use content analysis to assess IC quality through the voluntary disclosures of IC information prepared either by management (e.g., financial statements) or auditors (audit report on the effectiveness of IC). Researchers also apply survey methodology among auditors or management in emerging economies where IC practices are less developed.

The documentation, synthesis and evaluation of the IC accounting research is timely with our review offering three main insights. First, findings are mixed concerning the association between board characteristics (e.g., CEO duality, gender), ownership structure (e.g., family ownership), and IC quality, while empirical evidence concerning the effect of audit committee characteristics (financial expertise, number of meetings) on IC quality supports a positive and significant association. Second, extant literature concerning the economic consequences of IC quality suggests that the latter can have a significant effect on the decisions and behavior of management, investors, creditors and auditors. Third, US studies are most
prevalent in this research domain. This is expected given the data availability pursuant to the introduction of legislation mandating disclosures about IC quality.

Our study contributes to the accounting and auditing literature in several ways. First, our review is informative for policymakers, managers and researchers. For policymakers, it highlights the advances in knowledge enabled by new regulated disclosures. Specifically, SOX disclosures have led to evidence-based assessments of the role of audit committees in improving IC quality. Disclosures under SOX have resulted in enhanced decision making due to reduced information opacity regarding the quality of financial reporting. This can inform policymakers outside the US, who may be considering or reassessing their approaches to requiring board and auditor oversight of IC systems to enhance the credibility of corporate reporting policy. For managers, our review suggests that lower IC quality increases audit delays, which in turn increase reporting lag and audit fees. Thus, improving IC can increase timely disclosure and reduce the audit costs. It is also relevant for investors, creditors and financial analysts through demonstrating the influence of IC on the cost of finance and earnings forecast accuracy. For researchers, this review represents a comprehensive compilation of the IC literature, identifying directions the IC literature has taken (e.g., gender influences on IC quality), and including suggestions for future research.

Future research on the determinants and effects of IC quality will further assist in understanding the cost-effectiveness of requiring management and auditor reporting on IC quality. There are numerous avenues to pursue. For instance, evidence on the effect of family ownership on IC practices remains mixed and further empirical investigations are needed in both developed and developing economies. Other ownership attributes including foreign, managerial, institutional and state ownerships and their effect on IC quality are also fruitful areas of enquiry. Hautz et al. (2013) and Khlif et al. (2016) suggest that ownership identity can influence preferences and priorities with respect to corporate risk, decision making and
reporting practices and this may have a direct impact on IC reporting. Political connections in corporate governance attributes (e.g., ownership, board of directors, CEO, CFO) should be also explored as a potential determinant of IC quality. Similarly, further empirical research on the economic consequences of IC quality on the cost of equity, dividend policy, cost of debt, earnings quality, accounting choices (fair value versus cost method) and auditors in developed and emerging economies is warranted to ascertain the importance of IC reporting for the investment community. It is also worthwhile to examine whether IC quality affects social and environmental disclosure policy and intellectual capital disclosures to assess the effect of IC environments on a wide range of stakeholders (e.g. employees, customers, labor unions and environmental organizations). Such research can inform the costs and benefits of IC disclosure requirements and shape the requirements. To assess IC quality, researchers can rely on auditors’ reports if there is a section devoted to the assessment of IC systems, construct an IC checklist, survey auditors or managers, or perform a content analysis of annual reports for IC disclosures.

Additionally, IC procedures may differ by industry (e.g., industrial, retail and banking and insurance sectors) and by sector (for-profit and not-for-profit) (Mazza & Azzali, 2015b). For example, Dechow & Dichev (2002) suggest that the industrial sector is characterized by a longer firm production cycle due to unfinished production activities, and the completion and sale of their products, which is not the case for banks where there is more emphasis on credit management. Therefore, a fruitful area for research is to examine the determinants and economic consequences of IC quality for these specific industries. This is particularly true for the financial services sector, which has experienced a serious crisis in the last decade implying more need for empirical enquiries to assess whether IC effectiveness affect market value. IC quality in the non-listed and not-for-profit sector is a relatively unexplored area and therefore a fruitful avenue to pursue (Petrovits et al., 2011). For instance, research is needed to examine how IC quality impact other aspects of such organizations’ operations, including earnings
management, cost of finance, and executive compensation. It is also worthwhile to explore the association between disclosure of IC quality in not-for-profits and donor support received and government grants beyond the US. Another research avenue is examining the effect of governance attributes on IC practices for governmental organizations and more specifically municipalities in European or Asian settings.

Finally, since IC quality may enhance overall corporate transparency, future research can explore the interaction that may exist between disclosure policy (voluntary disclosure, timely disclosure, earning quality) and IC quality in shaping cost of debt and cost of equity capital. In addition, for countries that have adopted IFRS, future empirical enquiries may focus on the effect of IC quality on IFRS compliance.

It should be noted that narrative reviews may generally suffer from weaknesses concerning generalizability of their results (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999). Accordingly, we recommend the consolidation of the evidences reported in this literature review by undertaking meta-analyses dealing with the determinants and economic consequences of IC quality when a sufficient number of studies using similar proxies in their empirical analyses is available.
REFERENCES

* indicates that the paper is an empirical study and summarized in the Tables.


Table 1: Internal Determinants of IC Quality (23 studies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Association(s) examined</th>
<th>Sample (Firm-years)</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IC quality measure</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>Effect of attribute on IC quality</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A: Board and Board Sub-Committees (14 studies)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>US Studies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Balsam et al. (2014)</td>
<td>Board and audit committee characteristics and IC weaknesses</td>
<td>4,086</td>
<td>2004-2005</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>The governance attributes examined are not significantly related to IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Not significant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lin et al. (2014)</td>
<td>CEO characteristics and IC weaknesses</td>
<td>4,374</td>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>CEO entrenchment and age are negatively associated with IC quality.</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>He (2015)</td>
<td>CEO inside debt holdings and IC quality.</td>
<td>5,216</td>
<td>2006-2011</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Large CEO inside debt holding is associated with higher IC quality.</td>
<td>Positive</td>
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<tr>
<td>Parker et al. (2015)</td>
<td>Female representation on audit committee and board of directors and disclosure of IC weaknesses</td>
<td>10,888</td>
<td>2007-2012</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>The proportion of females on the audit committee (board) is significant and positively (negatively) associated with the probability of reporting IC weakness</td>
<td>Positive and negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campbell et al. (2016)</td>
<td>Occupational community of top executives (CEO/CFO tenure) and IC quality</td>
<td>9,437</td>
<td>2006-2011</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Executive relationship (CEO/CFO joint tenure) is negatively associated with the likelihood of IC weakness</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen et al. (2016a)</td>
<td>Board independence and the likelihood of reporting IC weaknesses</td>
<td>11,226</td>
<td>2004-2012</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Board independence is negatively associated with the disclosure of IC weakness and this negative association is more prevailing under CEO duality</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen, Eshleman &amp; Soileau (2016)</td>
<td>Female representation on the board and IC weaknesses</td>
<td>4,267</td>
<td>2004-2013</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Firms with higher percentage of female representation on boards are less likely to have IC weaknesses</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lisic et al. (2016)</td>
<td>Whether CEO power affects the association between audit committee expertise and the occurrence of IC weakness</td>
<td>7,217</td>
<td>2004 -2010</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>When CEO power is low, audit committee expertise is negatively related to the incidence of IC weakness</td>
<td>Positive</td>
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<td><strong>Non-US Studies</strong></td>
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<td>Authors</td>
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<td>Effect of attribute on IC quality</td>
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<td>Hu et al. (2014)</td>
<td>Independent directors on the board and IC quality</td>
<td>6,764</td>
<td>2006-2010</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>The voluntary disclosure of auditors’ reports on IC</td>
<td>Independent directors on the board improves IC quality</td>
<td>Positive</td>
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<td>Yazawa (2015)</td>
<td>Board and CEO characteristics and the disclosure of material IC weakness</td>
<td>7,064</td>
<td>2009-2012</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>J-SOX Act IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>CEO tenure and board size (board independence) have (has) a significant negative (positive) effect on the disclosure of IC weaknesses</td>
<td>Negative and positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agyei-Mensah (2016)</td>
<td>Board independence, board size, institutional ownership and IC disclosure</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>Content analysis of IC reports</td>
<td>Only board independence has a significant positive effect on such type of disclosure</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khlif &amp; Samaha (2016)</td>
<td>Audit committee activity and IC quality and whether external auditor size affects such a relationship</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Survey among external auditors</td>
<td>Audit committee activity is positively associated with IC quality and such a relationship is more prevailing when firm is audited by Big-4 auditor</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michelon et al. (2015)</td>
<td>Board and audit committee characteristics and IC disclosure</td>
<td>867</td>
<td>2003-2008</td>
<td>Germany, France, Italy, UK</td>
<td>IC disclosure index</td>
<td>CEO duality exerts a negative effect on IC disclosure. Similarly, independent chair on the audit committee has a negative effect on IC disclosure, while expert chair has a positive effect</td>
<td>Negative and positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel B: Ownership Structure (4 studies)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Association(s) examined</th>
<th>Sample (Firm-years)</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IC quality measure</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>Effect of attribute on IC quality</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bardhan et al. (2015)</td>
<td>Family ownership and IC weaknesses</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Family firms exhibit more material IC weakness than non-family firms</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deumes &amp; Knechel (2008)</td>
<td>Ownership concentration, managerial ownership and IC disclosure</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>1997-1999</td>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>IC disclosure index</td>
<td>Ownership attributes have a significant negative effect on IC disclosure</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weiss (2014)</td>
<td>Family ownership on IC weakness</td>
<td>573</td>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>SOX 302 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Family ownership is significantly associated with fewer material IC weakness</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ji et al. (2015)</td>
<td>Ownership structure, board characteristics and audit committee expertise and the voluntary disclosure of IC weakness</td>
<td>2,754</td>
<td>2010-2011</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Content analysis of IC reports</td>
<td>Board size and ownership concentration have a negative effect on the voluntary disclosure of IC weakness, while audit committee expertise has a positive effect</td>
<td>Negative and positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel C: Internal Audit Quality (2 studies)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Association(s) examined</th>
<th>Sample (Firm-years)</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IC quality measure</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>Effect of attribute on IC quality</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fadzil et al. (2005)</td>
<td>Internal audit quality and IC quality</td>
<td>812</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>Survey among audit committee members</td>
<td>Internal audit department professional proficiency, objectivity and review significantly influence the monitoring aspect of the IC system</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Authors, Association(s) examined, Sample (Firm-years), Period, Country, IC quality measure, Main findings, Effect of attribute on IC quality

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Association(s) examined</th>
<th>Sample (Firm-years)</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IC quality measure</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>Effect of attribute on IC quality</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mazza &amp; Azzali (2015a)</td>
<td>Internal audit quality on the severity and persistence of IC deficiencies</td>
<td>4,284</td>
<td>2007-2012</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Survey among internal auditors</td>
<td>Increased internal audit quality is associated with reduced severity and persistence of controls deficiencies</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Panel D: Other Firm Structural Determinants (3 studies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US studies</th>
<th>Non US studies</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employee treatment policies and IC weakness</td>
<td>Corporate diversification, institutional ownership and IC quality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7,804</td>
<td>4,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>Taiwan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Regulatory IC weakness disclosures in prospectuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employee-friendly policies significantly reduce the propensity for employee-related IC weakness</td>
<td>Corporate diversification is positively associated with the likelihood of IC weaknesses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: External Determinants of IC Quality, 12 studies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Association(s) examined</th>
<th>Sample (Firm-years)</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IC quality measure</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>Effect of attribute on IC quality</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A: External Auditor (6 studies)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US Studies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Lopez et al. (2013)</td>
<td>Auditor size and IC weaknesses</td>
<td>1,180 audit reports</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>IC weakness disclosures in Circular A-133 audit reports in healthcare sector firms</td>
<td>Audits by Big-4 are less likely to disclose IC weaknesses relative to smaller audit firms</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De Simone et al. (2015)</td>
<td>Auditor provided tax services and IC quality</td>
<td>32,048</td>
<td>2004-2012</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 302 &amp; 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Firms purchasing tax non-audit services are significantly less likely to disclose a material IC weakness</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albring et al. (2016)</td>
<td>Unexpected fees and material IC weaknesses</td>
<td>11,529</td>
<td>2004-2012</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Unexpected fees are associated with company-level IC weakness</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen et al. (2016b)</td>
<td>Auditor’s tenure and geographic proximity to the client and IC weaknesses</td>
<td>24, 217</td>
<td>2004-2012</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Firms with long auditor tenure and in closer geographic proximity to auditors have lower incidence of IC weakness</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haislip et al. (2016b)</td>
<td>IT auditor expertise and IT IC weaknesses</td>
<td>20,407</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Audit IT expertise is negatively associated with both non-IT and IT material weaknesses in an ex ante reporting setting</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel B: Financial Analysts (1 study)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US Studies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mao &amp; Yu (2015)</td>
<td>Analysts’ cashflow forecast initiation and IC quality</td>
<td>1,646</td>
<td>2000-2010</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Providing cash flow forecasts reduces the probability of material IC weakness</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel C: National Culture (2 studies)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Cross Country Studies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Hooghiemstra et al. (2015)</td>
<td>Individualism and uncertainty avoidance and voluntary IC disclosure</td>
<td>4,370</td>
<td>2005-2007</td>
<td>29 countries</td>
<td>Content analysis of IC reports</td>
<td>Individualism (uncertainty avoidance) has a positive (negative) effect on IC disclosures</td>
<td>Positive and negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanagaretnam et al. (2016)</td>
<td>National culture (individualism, uncertainty avoidance, and power distance) and IC weakness</td>
<td>22,627</td>
<td>2000-2008</td>
<td>US-listed firms from 39 countries</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Individualism and power distance are positively related, while uncertainty avoidance is negatively related to IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Positive and negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel D: Regulatory and Market Factors (3 studies)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US Studies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
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<td>Sample (Firm-years)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Non US studies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Zhang &amp; Chen (2016)</td>
<td>Product market competition and IC quality and whether state ownership moderates this relationship</td>
<td>9,475</td>
<td>2007-2012</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Content analysis of annual reports (IC quality index)</td>
<td>Intense product market competition is associated with higher IC quality. This relationship remains stable only for firms with non-state ownership.</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cross Country Study</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Sarens and Christopher (2010)</td>
<td>The degree of focus of corporate governance guidelines on IC and IC quality</td>
<td>104 chief audit executives (31 from Australia and 101 Belgium)</td>
<td>2006</td>
<td>Australia and Belgium</td>
<td>Survey among chief audit executives</td>
<td>The weaker focus of the Belgian corporate governance guidelines on IC is associated with lower IC quality in Belgian firms than in Australian firms.</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Table 3: Economic Consequences of IC Quality (61 studies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Association(s) examined</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IC quality measure</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>Effect of increased IC quality on attribute</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel A: IC quality and Management Decisions (26 studies)</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>US Studies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dowdell et al. (2014)</td>
<td>Management IC reports and reporting quality proxied by discretionary accruals</td>
<td>2,339</td>
<td>2004-2010</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Management’s reports on IC quality improve financial reporting quality even in the absence of attestation</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Myllymäki (2014)</td>
<td>IC weakness and misstatements in financial information</td>
<td>5,249</td>
<td>2005-2008</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>IC weaknesses under SOX 404 are positively associated with misstatements in financial information</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bauer (2015)</td>
<td>Tax-related material IC weakness and firms’ corporate tax avoidance</td>
<td>6,696</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Tax IC weaknesses are positively and significantly associated with effective tax rate. After remediation, tax related IC weakness firms report higher levels of future tax avoidance.</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feng et al. (2015)</td>
<td>IC quality over inventory and firms’ inventory management</td>
<td>8,953</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Inventory-related material IC weaknesses lower inventory turnover ratios. In addition, firms with inventory-related material IC weaknesses are more likely to report inventory impairments relative to firms with effective IC over financial reporting.</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galemore &amp; Labro (2015)</td>
<td>IC effectiveness and tax avoidance</td>
<td>11,606</td>
<td>2004-2010</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Effective IC systems are negatively related to effective tax rates</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang &amp; Chang (2015)</td>
<td>Auditor-provided tax services and the association between tax related IC and book-tax differences</td>
<td>3,705</td>
<td>2005-2011</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 302 &amp; 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Firms reporting tax-related IC problems have larger permanent and temporary differences. Auditor-provided tax services mitigate only the positive association between tax-related IC weaknesses and permanent differences in the post-SOX period.</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaggi et al. (2015)</td>
<td>Whether industry-specialist audits moderate the association between IC weakness and earnings quality</td>
<td>7,172</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Earnings quality of IC weakness firms audited by Big 4 industry specialists is higher than those audited by Big 4 non-specialists</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cho &amp; Chung (2016)</td>
<td>IC weakness disclosures and loan reserves and provisions in banking sector</td>
<td>8,167</td>
<td>2002-2013</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 302 &amp; 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Loan reserves and provisions are higher in years of IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Henderson et al. (2016)</td>
<td>IC weakness and corporate fraud</td>
<td>14,093</td>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>There is strong positive association between material IC weakness and future fraud revelation</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holder et al. (2016)</td>
<td>Material information-technology IC weaknesses affect firm’s 8-K filing compliance and timeliness</td>
<td>118,808</td>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 302 &amp; 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>IC deficiencies reduce firm’s 8-K filing compliance and reporting timeliness</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jarvenen &amp; Myllymäki (2016)</td>
<td>Material IC weakness disclosures and real earnings management</td>
<td>23,409</td>
<td>2004-2012</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Firms with material IC weaknesses engage in more manipulation of real activities (e.g. inventory overproduction)</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lenard et al. (2016)</td>
<td>Material IC weakness disclosures and real earnings management</td>
<td>7,475</td>
<td>2004-2010</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Positive association between firms reporting IC weaknesses and real activities manipulation</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Panel B: IC Quality and Management Turnover and Compensation (3 studies)

**US Studies**

Haislip et al. (2015)  
IT related IC weakness, CEO/CFO termination and subsequent job opportunities  
404  
2004-2007  
US  
SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures  
Executives who lose their jobs due to an IT material weakness are less likely to find an equivalent job compared to executives dismissed for material IC weaknesses not related to IT  
Positive

**Non-US Studies**

La et al. (2011)  
IC weakness disclosures and discretionary accruals  
470  
2006  
Canada  
The number of IC weaknesses self-reported by the firm in its Management Discussion & Analysis section  
A positive and significant association between IC weakness disclosures and discretionary accruals  
Positive

Van de Poel & Vanstraalen (2011)  
Unaudited management statement of effective IC and IC disclosure score and discretionary accruals  
171  
2004-2005  
Netherlands  
Unaudited management statement of effective IC and IC disclosure score  
Only unaudited management statement of effective IC is negatively associated with discretionary accruals  
Positive

Ji et al. (2016)  
IC quality and firm performance for different stages of a firm’s life cycle (introduction, growth, mature, shake-out and decline)  
10,945  
2007-2012  
China  
Content analysis of annual reports, government documents, and press releases (IC quality index)  
The positive effect of IC quality on firm performance vary over different life cycle stages and such a positive effect more significant in maturity and shake-out stages  
Positive
Panel C: IC Quality and Debt Markets (4 studies)

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IC quality measure</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>Effect of increased IC quality on attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El-Mahdy &amp; Park (2014)</td>
<td>1,802</td>
<td>2002-2005</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 302 &amp; 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>IC deficiencies are positively associated with higher bid-ask spread in the US secondary loan market</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tang et al. (2015)</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Credit default swap is positively associated with IC material weaknesses</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Park et al. (2016)</td>
<td>9,618</td>
<td>2005-2012</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>IC data from the U.S. Census Single Audit Clearinghouse (content analysis of external auditor report)</td>
<td>Material IC Weaknesses are associated with higher borrowing costs for municipal bonds</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Panel D: IC Quality and Equity Markets (17 studies)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IC quality measure</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>Effect of increased IC quality on attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ashbaugh-Skaife, et al. (2013)</td>
<td>13,667</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>The profitability of insider trading is significantly higher in firms disclosing IC weakness relative to those with effective IC</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dowdell et al. (2013)</td>
<td>8,523</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 302 &amp; 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Firms reporting ineffective IC have higher bid-ask spreads compared to those with effective IC systems</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hu et al. (2013)</td>
<td>13,648</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>The interaction variables between IC weakness and earnings and book values have a significant negative effect on market value</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuhn et al. (2013)</td>
<td>278 and 164 matched pairs</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Firms reporting IT IC weaknesses have a lower ability to pay debts, earn lower profits and have lower mkt value</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao &amp; Jia (2015a)</td>
<td>7,495</td>
<td>2004-2008</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Investors value liquid assets in firms with IC weaknesses significantly less than in firms with no internal weaknesses</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gao &amp; Jia (2015b)</td>
<td>11,082</td>
<td>1996-2009</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 302 &amp; 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Underwriters charge a risk premium on IC weakness issuers, especially on those disclosing IC weaknesses in multiple consecutive years</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huang et al. (2015)</td>
<td>15,409</td>
<td>2004-2010</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Value of cash and cash equivalents increases for firms with IC weakness</td>
<td>Negative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koester et al. (2015)</td>
<td>5,745</td>
<td>2007-2012</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Tax-related material weakness in IC mitigates the positive association between unrecognized tax benefits and firm value</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Association(s) examined</td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>IC quality measure</td>
<td>Main findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Bolton et al. (2016)</td>
<td>Industry contingency effect for negative reactions to IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>49,092</td>
<td>2005-2014</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Firms reporting IC weaknesses experience share price decline and peer industry firms experience similar declines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church &amp; Schneider (2016)</td>
<td>Effect of IC disclosures (quarterly and annual) on individuals’ willingness to invest in a target company</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>Participants</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 302 &amp; 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Participants react negatively to the disclosure of a material weakness. They invest less in a target company when IC is ineffective rather than effective. Conversely, participants react positively to such disclosure accompanied by a clean (unqualified) audit opinion on IC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gupta et al. (2016)</td>
<td>IC weakness disclosures and information asymmetry in capital markets</td>
<td>3,262 (SOX 302)</td>
<td>First time adoption of SOX 302 and 404</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 302 &amp; 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Subsequent to management’s reporting on IC, the information environment improves for U.S. firms through decreased bid-ask spread and price volatility, and increased trading volume. Such results are not confirmed subsequent to the auditors’ reporting on a company’s IC over financial reporting.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Li et al. (2016)</td>
<td>IC weakness disclosures on firm valuation proxied by Tobin’s q</td>
<td>1,066</td>
<td>2004-2011</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Firms reporting IC material weakness have 13% lower valuation than firms with effective IC</td>
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<tr>
<td>McNulty &amp; Akhigbe (2016)</td>
<td>IC weakness and banks’ stock returns</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>Legal expenses as a proxy for IC weakness</td>
<td>IC weakness (proxied by legal expenses) are positively (negatively) associated with loan losses (stock returns)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pevzner &amp; Gaynor (2016)</td>
<td>IC weakness and firms greater savings of cash from internally generated cash flows and stock liquidity effects</td>
<td>10,214</td>
<td>2005-2010</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 302 &amp; 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>IC weaknesses are associated with stronger cash-to-cash flow sensitivities and with weaker impact of higher asset liquidity on stock liquidity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q et al. (2016)</td>
<td>IC weakness disclosures on value of corporate cash holdings and capital expenditures</td>
<td>12,317</td>
<td>2001-2010</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>IC weaknesses exacerbate agency conflicts</td>
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<tr>
<td>Non-US Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>Nishizaki et al. (2016)</td>
<td>Market reaction to the disclosure of IC weaknesses</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>2009-2010</td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>J-SOX IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Material IC weaknesses have a significant negative effect on cumulative abnormal returns</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chen, Chang, Dong &amp; Zhang (2016)</td>
<td>IC quality and future stock price crash risk</td>
<td>8,495</td>
<td>2007-2010</td>
<td>China</td>
<td>Content analysis of annual reports government documents, and press releases (IC quality index)</td>
<td>IC quality (control environment and monitoring) is negatively associated with future stock price crash risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Panel E: IC Quality and Auditors (7 studies)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>US Studies</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Chen et al. (2014)</td>
<td>IC weaknesses and audit delay and audit fees for high IT capability firms</td>
<td>6,381</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Material IC weaknesses have a significant positive effect on the percentage of increase of audit delays and audit fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pizzini et al. (2015)</td>
<td>IC quality and audit delays</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>2000-2004</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>A survey data from the Institute of Internal Auditors</td>
<td>Audit delays are a decreasing function of IC quality</td>
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<tr>
<td>Haslip et al. (2016b)</td>
<td>IT related IC weaknesses and auditor dismissal or switching</td>
<td>20,407</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IT related IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Material IT related IC weaknesses are positively associated with subsequent auditor dismissals or switching</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lee (2016)</td>
<td>IC deficiencies in initial public offering (IPO) audits and audit fees.</td>
<td>673</td>
<td>2005-2014</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 302 &amp; 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>Firms with IC deficiencies regarding pre-IPO financial reporting are likely to pay higher IPO audit fees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Authors</td>
<td>Association(s) examined</td>
<td>Sample</td>
<td>Period</td>
<td>Country</td>
<td>IC quality measure</td>
<td>Main findings</td>
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<tr>
<td>Wan-Husin &amp; Bamahros (2013)</td>
<td>IC quality and audit delays</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>2009</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>The investment in and the sourcing arrangement of internal audit function</td>
<td>IC quality is negatively related to audit delays in the Malaysian setting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khlif and Samaha (2014)</td>
<td>IC quality and audit delays</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>2007-2009</td>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>Survey methodology among auditors to assess IC quality</td>
<td>IC quality is negatively related to audit delays</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mazza &amp; Arzali (2013b)</td>
<td>IT internal control quality and audit fees</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>Survey methodology among corporate governance members</td>
<td>IT internal control quality is related to lower audit fees.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel F: IC Quality and Analysts (2 studies)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Association(s) examined</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IC quality measure</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>Effect of increased IC quality on attribute</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clinton et al. (2014)</td>
<td>Disclosures of IC weaknesses and analysts’ forecasts coverage decisions</td>
<td>5,272</td>
<td>2004-2009</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>IC weaknesses reduce analysts’ forecasts accuracy and analyst’s coverage</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arping &amp; Sautner (2013)</td>
<td>IC weaknesses and analysts’ forecast accuracy and dispersion</td>
<td>7,666</td>
<td>2001-2007</td>
<td>US foreign registrants from 15 European countries</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>EU cross-listed firms in US experience a significantly stronger decrease in both forecast error and forecast dispersion following SOX compared to non-cross listed EU firms</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Panel G: IC Quality and Other Stakeholders (2 studies)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Authors</th>
<th>Association(s) examined</th>
<th>Sample</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>IC quality measure</th>
<th>Main findings</th>
<th>Effect of increased IC quality on attribute</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Su et al. (2014)</td>
<td>IC weakness disclosures and sales growth (customers)</td>
<td>5,080</td>
<td>2004-2007</td>
<td>US</td>
<td>SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures</td>
<td>A significant decline in sales growth following SOX 404 IC weakness disclosures. Such a decline is more pronounced for firms with company-level IC weakness disclosures, with industrial customers, in the durable goods industries, with high research and development intensity, or without future IC weakness remediation.</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rae and Subramaniam (2008)</td>
<td>Whether IC quality moderates the relationship between organizational justice and employee fraud</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Survey methodology among chief accountants</td>
<td>The positive association between organizational justice and the probability to commit fraud becomes negative and significant for the interaction variable between IC quality and organizational justice.</td>
<td>Positive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>