Reproduction of ‘Typical’ gender roles in temporary organizations—No surprise for whom? The case of cooperative behaviors and their acknowledgement

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\textbf{A B S T R A C T}

Temporary organizations such as projects are known to differ in various respects from permanent ones and have been argued to be more gender-neutral. Inspired by gender research in permanent organizations, we show that (in)congruency between gender and project roles evokes similar mechanisms in both permanent and temporary systems. Using the example of cooperative behavior, operationalized as project citizenship behavior (PCB), we examine how temporary organizations reward such behaviour. A cross-sectional study was conducted, with 241 project managers and workers participating. The results of seven structural equation models reveal that though the enactment of PCB does not vary by gender, the relationship of PCB with its outcomes does: men and women were clearly rewarded differently depending on the gender congruency of their project roles.

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\section{1. Introduction}

Research into gender and organizations has shown up to now a persistence of gender inequality (e.g., Calás, Smircich, & Holvino, 2014). Studies for the most part have concentrated on permanent, or line, organizations. Might examining temporary organizations instead make a difference? Projects, the most prominent type of temporary organization (Turner & Müller, 2003), have unique features distinguishing them from permanent/line organizations, in particular temporality and certain termination; a team structure; and a complex, nonrepetitive task (Bakker, 2010; Lundin & Söderholm, 1995; Söderlund, 2011). Projects are embedded in a context of organizational and social structures and relationships as well as in a historic sequence of events (Engwall, 2003; Sydow, Linkvist, & DeFilippis, 2004). Because of their flatter structures, more decentralized decision making, and higher employee autonomy, projects have been argued to be more gender-neutral than permanent organizations and to offer more employment and promotion opportunities to women (e.g., Ferguson, 1984; Fondas, 1996; Savage & Witz, 1992). Thus, for research referring to temporary organizations it would be of no surprise if the mechanisms of gender role creation and enactment were somewhat different compared to permanent organizations—not least because of distinctive mechanisms of human information processing in the face of temporality (Bakker, Boros, Kenis, & Oerlemans, 2013). Yet still, gender oriented studies underline that men predominantly conduct and manage project-based work (e.g., Henderson, Stackman, & Koh, 2013; Legault & Chasserio, 2012; Ojiaho et al., 2014). Moreover, Henderson and Stackman (2010) note that women work both as project managers and team members twice as much as men on smaller projects with lower

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budgets. Against this background, for gender researchers a reproduction of typical gender roles and relations would be less surprising than a clear break with gender roles and hierarchical relations in temporary organizations. Thus, we are facing a tension between the research streams on temporary organizations on the one hand and gender-related research on the other. To explore this tension, it is necessary to focus more on informal processes and shape our view to the more subtle characteristics of temporary organizations. This will help to expose what is actually happening instead of what is supposed to happen (per prescriptive project management approaches). In particular, it is necessary to go beyond a differentiation between men and women (i.e., a reduction to the control and dummy variable ‘sex’), but to take in a consideration of typical gender segregations in terms of gendered project roles and their effects.

To dig more deeply into these relationships and potentially find opportunities to diminish gender inequalities, we focus in our study on cooperative behaviors and their impacts on potentially gendered reward structures. Thereby we do not only compare men and women and their assumed gender-(in-)congruent behaviors (e.g., Triana, 2011), but also men and women in gender (in-)congruent project roles.

Temporary organizations and in particular projects rely on diverse cooperative behaviors of individuals (project citizenship behavior [PCB]). These behaviors are performed voluntarily, in that they are beyond the scope of a work contract, and are supposed to accomplish complex and nonrepetitive tasks. At the same time, these behaviors may be inevitable, because tasks blur organizational boundaries and in an interorganizational setting, legal agreements are not specific enough to clearly allocate all duties to individual organizations (Autry, Skinner, & Lamb, 2008; Braun, Ferreira, & Sydow, 2013; Braun, Müller-Seitz, & Sydow, 2012). The research tradition on such cooperative efforts of individuals tracks back to the 1980s when the construct of organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) was introduced (Organ, 1988; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine, & Bachrach, 2000). Organ (1988) defines OCB as ‘individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization’. Previous studies prove that OCB not only enhances the effectiveness of organizations (Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006; Podsakoff, Ahearne, & MacKenzie, 1997), but also promotes social capital and the stability and quality of relationships, by, for instance, increasing liking and trust among coworkers (Bolino, Turnley, & Bloodgood, 2002). Corresponding studies on temporary organizations have shown that PCB may increase the effectiveness of this type of organization in analogous ways (Braun et al., 2013). OCB and PCB respectively enhance not only organizational and project outcomes, but also individual work and employment outcomes, for instance through performance evaluations and rewards (e.g., Allen & Rush, 2001; Kiker & Motowidlo, 1999; Podsakoff, Whiting, & Podsakoff, 2009).

Yet, as Bergeron, Shipp, Rosen, and Forst (2013) warn, the relation of OCB and individual career outcomes is not necessarily positive, but is determined by systemic features, such as performance evaluation based on organizational outcomes (which typically privileges task performance). What is more, hitherto research has rarely accounted for gender issues in the relationship of citizenship behaviors and their outcomes.

Hence, inspired by Kark and Waisel-Manor (2005), who ask what gender has got to do with organizational citizenship behavior, we examine the specific gendered employment outcomes of citizenship behavior in temporary organizations. Scholars have only rarely examined the gendered enactment of OCB (Kidder, 2002; Kidder & Mac Lean Parks, 2001; Kmc & Gorman, 2010) or OCB’s gendered impact on performance evaluations (Allen & Rush, 2001; Heilman & Chen, 2005), salary, and promotion (Allen, 2006).

In sum, examinations of the gendered enactment and outcomes of citizenship behavior as postulated by Kark and Waisel-Manor (2005) remain rare, and we are not aware of studies focusing on citizenship behavior in temporary organizations such as projects. Against this background, we ask about the gendered outcomes of PCB and in particular how they impact workplace (in) equality and diversity. More precisely, we examine the employment consequences of project citizenship behavior for men and women in both gender-congruent and gender-incongruent project roles (i.e., men in a project manager role entailing supervision duties and budget control; women in an administrative role lacking supervision duties and budget control; and vice versa). We derive hypotheses and utilize a quantitative survey design to test them.

The paper is structured as follows: first, we elaborate the theoretical background and derive hypotheses from research on OCB in temporary organizations (or PCB) and gender research on citizenship behaviors. Second, we outline our quantitative methodology, providing information about sample, data collection, measures, and methods of analysis. Third, we present the findings of our analyses. Fourth, we discuss our results against the backdrop of the previously introduced theoretical concepts of PCB and the research on gender issues. We point to theoretical implications, empirical limitations, and directions for future research.

2. Theoretical background

Projects are popular with managers since they are often more flexible than line organizations and have more predictable costs. They occur in various industries, including traditional ones such as construction or pharmaceuticals, creative industries such as theatre, film making, or advertising, and service industries such as consulting and IT services (Sydow et al., 2004). Projects differ from permanent organizations in terms of time (Lundin & Söderholm, 1995). Examining temporality is crucial to understanding this organizational form. Even though it seems that limited duration is often perceived as necessarily implying short duration, this does not need to be the case (Bakker, 2010). While a formal kick-off event often marks the starting point of a project, a deadline usually marks its end (Bakker, 2010). Nonetheless, there are cases in which termination is postponed or even abandoned completely (Müller-Seitz & Sydow, 2011); thus, the border between temporary and permanent can become fuzzy. This is also due to historicity of temporary organizations, i.e., the shade of past projects affects present and future organizing, thereby embedding the single occurrence into permanent structure (Engwall, 2003). What is more, the nature of temporality can lead to distinctive mechanisms of information processing that are quite different from permanent organizations. In particular, the time-limitation evokes more heuristic information processing as opposed to systematic information processing (Bakker et al., 2013). That means, in the face of temporality, individuals tend to grasp the information at hand (e.g., proven schemes, rules of thumb) instead working systematically (i.e., follow processes, analytical procedures etc.).

Second, projects rely on teams, or interdependent sets of collaborating people (Goodman & Goodman, 1976). Generally, project teams that are often characterized by high levels of interdisciplinarity, cut through organizational hierarchies and cross organizational boundaries (Bakker, 2010). Research on organizational behavior and project management literatures address, for example, how to motivate, communicate, and build commitment in team environments (Lundin & Söderholm, 1995).

Third, projects are defined by specific tasks. The task is usually the reason why a project exists (Lundin & Söderholm, 1995), and it dominates the becoming as well as the being of this organizational form. Generally, projects appear to be more important to their members than permanent organizations appear to be to their staff.
(Bakker, 2010; Katz, 1982). Project tasks can be rather complex and unique rather than simple and repetitive (Lundin & Söderholm, 1995). Thereby, project structures stretch across organizational departments and hierarchies and may even cross organizational boundaries, as does an interorganizational project (Midler, 1995).

Quite surprisingly, gender research has not paid much attention to temporary organizations yet, despite for a call for more critical research on projects, including a look at equality issues (Hodgson & Cicmil, 2008). Projects may distinctly differ from line organizations in regards to gender equality. In particular, projects cut through organizational hierarchies and sometimes also organizational boundaries. Thus, notions such as the ‘glass ceiling’ may not apply to projects (e.g., Fondas, 1996). Yet the few gender analyses of projects that exist point to a reproduction of the gender gap, be it via gendered biases in organizational culture (Cartwright & Gale, 1995; Gale & Cartwright, 1995), via gendered project management models and procedures (Buckle & Thomas, 2003; Henderson & Stackman, 2010; Lindgren & Packendorff, 2006; Thomas & Buckle-Henning, 2007), or via other mechanisms, such as unplanned and unpaid overtime, which disadvantage women (Chasserio & Legault, 2010; Legault & Chasserio, 2012).

In a recent gender-informed study on project management, Henderson et al. (2013) analyze women project managers’ advantages and disadvantages as well as their issue-selling behavior, thus coming close to our intent to analyze the gendered outcomes of citizenship behaviors. Henderson et al. (2013) find that using and developing networks, communicating, meeting challenges, and issue selling are important for women’s employment outcomes in project management roles. Yet still, networking behavior and subsequent resource acquisition might realize different outcomes for men and women, as the study of Jayawarna, Jones, & Marlow (2015) on entrepreneurial behavior shows. Consequently, we will ask if citizenship behaviors, enacted by men and women in either a gender-congruent or a gender-incongruent role (i.e., as either project member or manager), make a difference for employment outcomes.

2.1. OCB in projects

The concept of organizational citizenship behavior, introduced in 1983, has received increasing interest and gained increasing influence in the field of organizational behavior through today (Podsakoff et al., 2000; Braun et al., 2012). The concept’s managerial relevance and its potential effects on organizational functioning and performance account for this popularity (Organ et al., 2006). OCB is discretionary behavior that is not explicitly rewarded but is nevertheless useful for organizational functioning (Organ, 1988).

The vast majority of OCB studies refer to intraorganizational settings (Organ et al., 2006; Podsakoff et al., 2000). Yet there is empirical support for the prevalence of OCB in interorganizational projects (e.g., Autry et al., 2008; Braun et al., 2012). According to this stream of research, project citizenship behavior, PCB, consists of the following dimensions (cf. Braun et al., 2012, 2013):

Helping behavior is directed toward helping another individual face-to-face (Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983). This behavior solves or prevents problems among staff (e.g., Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; George & Brief, 1992; Smith et al., 1983) and it is crucial for bridging organizational boundaries in interorganizational projects (Braun et al., 2013).

Project loyalty entails supporting and defending objectives of a project—analogous to organizational loyalty that has been conceived as loyalty of an individual to an organization’s objective (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993). It also includes spreading goodwill, protecting organization and project, and defending them against various threats (Podsakoff et al., 2000).

Project compliance is the acceptance of rules and regulations as well as various project procedures and their internalization by individuals. Compliance is directed toward the well-being of an entire organization or project rather than toward the well-being of an individual (Smith et al., 1983). A ‘good citizen’ obeys rules even when nobody is watching (Podsakoff et al., 2000). For projects, this behavior is essential since this organizational form tends to be characterized by horizontal rather than hierarchical coordination (e.g., Bechky, 2006).

Individual initiative refers to task-related behaviors that extend beyond minimally expected performance to moments of creativity and innovation. Examples of individual initiative include an employee’s tackling additional tasks or motivating fellow employees to do the same (Podsakoff et al., 2000). On a project, a team member might proactively suggest improvements without being asked to.

Relationship maintenance refers to behaviors such as participating at industry conferences or project management venues, simply having lunch with former project co-workers, or calling previous colleagues to catch up. Relationship maintenance occurs outside operative day-to-day work and reflects individuals’ interest in the ‘big picture’, for instance the governance of a project. Thus, the focus of these behaviors is rather strategic.

Some of the above dimensions (in particular helping behavior and loyalty) are present in the vast majority of OCB studies, while others (such as initiative) are used less frequently. Furthermore, it should be noted that OCB dimensions have been re-conceptualized over and over and the application of different conceptualizations in empirical research is very common (e.g., Podsakoff et al., 2000). One distinction which is widely accepted distinguishes behaviors directed toward individuals (labeled ‘OCB-I’) from behaviors (‘OCB-O’) directed toward an organization as a whole (Organ, 1997). Correspondingly, in our empirical section we distinguish between PCB-I (comprising helping behavior and relationship maintenance) and PCB-O (comprising initiative, project compliance, and project loyalty), following the corresponding distinction proposed by Braun et al. (2012, 2013). There is a broad body of research on the antecedents of citizenship behavior, which include attitudinal and dispositional conditions as well as task, leadership and work context related antecedents (for an overview: Organ et al., 2006). The OCB construct reflects explicit individual and organizational expectations that may constitute an appropriate role behavior, which in turn, is influenced by external variables. For example, the existing literature suggests that transformational and transactional leadership styles are positively related to OCB (Nahum-Shani & Somech, 2011). Different individual characteristics may reflect different needs and interests and different leadership styles influence their tendency to develop OCB (Euwema, Wendt, & van Emmerik, 2007).

As for the outcomes of citizenship behavior, empirical analyses have shown that PCB may generate outcomes for temporary organizations and their members that are similar to the outcomes of OCB in line organizations. Just as OCB has been shown to impact organizational effectiveness (e.g., Organ et al., 2006; Podsakoff et al., 1997), PCB may enhance project effectiveness in terms of time, budget, and quality (Braun et al., 2013). With regard to individual outcomes for project members, PCB was shown to affect relationship quality (Braun et al., 2013), furthering related findings of OCB analyses (e.g., Bolino et al., 2002). Also, first indications of positive employment outcomes of PCB have emerged (Braun et al., 2013) analogous to OCBs’ impact on employment outcomes such as salary and career (Allen & Rush, 1998; Kiker & Motowidlo, 1999; Podsakoff et al., 2009), though these are not necessarily positive (Bergeron et al., 2013). In our analysis, we focus on these two categories of individual outcomes; we label PCB’s impact on the extent of closeness and trust in collaboration as ‘soft’ outcomes and
label PCB’s impact on collaboration requests and career progress as ‘hard’ outcomes.

Moreover, we focus on the question of how the congruence with gender roles and gendered job roles affects the relation of PCB and individual outcomes. As laid out in more detail below, according to gender role theory and findings of gender stereotype research, the PCB-I category tends to be associated with stereotypical female behavior (social, caring, emotional), while the PCB-O category is associated with stereotypical male behavior (responsible, leading) (Kidder, 2002; Kidder & Mac Lean Parks, 2001; Kmiec & Gorman, 2010; Rudman & Phelan, 2008). That is not to say that women and men will necessarily behave differently, but that how they behave is evaluated according to the behaviors’ congruence with the individuals’ gender role (Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Thus, men and women may be evaluated differently for their gendered enactments of citizenship behaviors (Allen, 2006; Allen & Rush, 2001) and also rewarded differently by ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ outcomes, even more so when their enactments of citizenship behaviors correspond to or contradict their equally gendered job role—built on historical occupational and organizational gender segregations with corresponding reward structures (Acker, 1990, 2006).

2.2. Gender and project citizenship behavior

As Kark and Waismel-Manor (2005) argue, the concept of citizenship behavior has a highly gendered nature, and its enactment holds different consequences for men and women, thus producing a gendered division of labor and inequality in organizations. The authors assume that it does so because of three related dynamics: (1) congruence and incongruence with gendered social expectations; (2) the sex segregation of occupations; and (3) the gendered structuring of OCB (Kark & Waismel-Manor, 2005: 903). Inspired by these authors, we examine such gendered dynamics in the context of temporary organizations, looking at gendered appearances of PCB and gendered outcomes for individuals working in projects.

We derived our hypotheses from the literature on gender and OCB. To begin with, the very enactment and perception of citizenship behaviors is gender-typed. According to gender role theory, behaviors directed toward the welfare and care of others (like helping behavior) or toward establishing and nurturing relationships (like relationship maintenance) correspond very much to stereotypes of femininity and the female gender role, whereas behaviors directed toward an organization (like initiative, compliance, and loyalty) relate much more to the male gender role, as they are associated with such stereotypical notions of masculinity, as assertiveness and conscientiousness (Kark & Waismel-Manor, 2005; Kidder & Mac Lean Parks, 2001; Kidder, 2002). It is important to note that we do not assume that women and men behave differently “by nature”. Rather, we claim that the (self-) perceptions of project members will differ according to gender stereotypes, corresponding status beliefs, and gendered cultural frames (Ridgeway, 2011). Consequently, we assume that women and men project members will perceive and evaluate PCB-I and PCB-O behaviors differently because of gendered expectations and ascriptions that coordinate gender relations in the workplace.

Firstly, the different natures of PCB-I and PCB-O imply they will be evaluated differently with regard to project success and consequently lead to different outcomes for individual project members. We assume female-typed PCB-I to be particularly related to soft outcomes (for instance, close and trustful cooperation) as such behaviors are directed toward relationships between project members and in that sense important for project realization and fulfillment. In accordance with Allen (2006), we assume that to achieve hard employment outcomes (for instance, bonuses or career steps) male-typed PCB-O is beneficial; organizational decision makers will appreciate behavior directed toward their organization and project success more highly and reward it more strongly. Following Kark and Waismel-Manor (2005), we additionally assume that corresponding perceptions and evaluations of PCB-I and PCB-O strongly vary by project members’ gender.

Women, and in particular their PCB-I, will be rewarded (preferentially by soft outcomes), as female-typed PCB-I only corresponds to the female gender role. In contrast, PCB-O displayed by women will be regarded as contradicting their gender role. Thus, they will not be rewarded in the same way as PCB-O displayed by men, and/or may even be punished. Therewith we relate to the work of Rudman and others on backlash effects, that is ‘social and economic reprisals for behaving counterstereotypically’ (Rudman & Phelan, 2008, p. 61), which have been demonstrated to exist for women managers in particular (e.g., Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012).

For men, the situation should be different, as shown by Allen (2006). Performing PCB-O and thus acting in congruence with their gender role will be expected and rewarded, particularly by hard employment outcomes such as bonuses or career steps. Also, trust and closeness in organizations might be enhanced if men show the legitimate citizenship behaviors that correspond to their gender role. Some studies even suggest that performing female-typed PCB-I such as helping may be of advantage for men, as such behavior may be recognized and evaluated positively when performed by men (Allen & Rush, 1998; Eagly, Makhijani, & Klonsky, 1992; Heilman & Chen, 2005). Yet, other gender role studies have reported on backlash effects for men (Rudman & Phelan, 2008; Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Rudman, 2010), suggesting that showing PCB-I might rather be loosely coupled with work outcomes for men or even be disadvantageous for them. Thus, regarding the relation of PCB with project members’ gender role, we propose

**Hypothesis 1.** Gender-role-congruent citizenship behavior will be positively associated with individual work outcomes.

**Hypothesis 1a.** The positive relationships between PCB-O and work outcomes for men are more pronounced than the positive relationships between PCB-I and work outcomes for women.

**Hypothesis 1b.** For men, PCB-O will particularly be associated with hard outcomes, while for women, PCB-I will be particularly associated with soft outcomes.

Moreover, the association of PCB to rewarding outcomes will not only vary by project members’ gender and the PCB’s congruence with specific gender roles, but will vary even more by project members’ gender and its congruence with (equally gendered) job roles. As Kark and Waismel-Manor (2005) argue with reference to Acker’s (1990) conception of the gendered organization, both the sex segregation of occupations and gendered hierarchical structures and status distributions add to the differential gendered impacts of citizenship behaviors. Women’s overrepresentation in helping and caring service jobs as well as in lower-status jobs with operative or assisting character advances the devaluing of their helping behavior, as it will be perceived as ‘natural’ to their job role and not as extra-role behavior. Also, structural barriers attached to their lower-status jobs (low access to organizational resources) may make it more difficult for women than for men to engage in citizenship behaviors—or to make them perceivable and salient. Thus, gender roles not only nurture cognitive mechanisms, individual decisions, and stereotypical expectations, but also build very much on status beliefs and gendered cultural frames that coordinate social
relations in the workplace and (re) produce hierarchical inequalities (Acker, 1990; 2006; Calás et al., 2014; Ridgeway, 2011).

We assume that these very dynamics also apply to temporary organizations such as projects. Even if temporary organizations have been argued to open employment opportunities for women (e.g., Fondas, 1996), women are still underrepresented in projects (Henderson et al., 2013; Legault & Chasserio, 2012; Ojako et al., 2014) and are typically engaged in smaller, less well financed projects than men (Henderson & Stackman, 2010). Yet still, unlike studies that point to projects as being male-typed organizations per se (Buck & Thomas, 2003; Cartwright & Gale, 1995; Gale & Cartwright, 1995; Lindgren & Packendorff, 2006; Thomas & Buckle-Henning, 2007), we do not assume temporary organizations such as projects to be generally male-typed. Instead, we expect attributions about project roles to be gendered and to have corresponding gendered impacts (Ridgeway, 2009). For instance, the function of project manager, with its supervision duties and budget control, appears – in accordance with gendered job segregation and ascription – as male-typed, and the supportive function of a project member, without supervision duties and budget control, appears female-typed.

Given these considerations, we go beyond a mere gender role analysis like that of Kidder and Mac Lean Parks (2001), who treat gender roles as different but equal (Calás et al., 2014; Kark & Waismel-Manor, 2005). We follow Kidder and Mac Lean Parks (2001) in their assumption that gendered ascriptions about citizenship behaviors, jobs, and job incumbents interact, yet we doubt that women and men in gender-congruent jobs will be rewarded equally for displaying citizenship behaviors. Particularly we question if gender-incongruent citizenship behaviors result in analogous outcomes (i.e., male-typed behaviors displayed by women in a congruent job role and female-typed behaviors displayed by men in a congruent job role). Instead we assume that these relationships will differ between men and women in both congruent and incongruent job roles because of power differentials and dynamics that tend to reproduce unequal gender relations (Kark & Waismel-Manor, 2005; Ridgeway, 2009, 2011).

According to related considerations, women in female-typed project roles should be rewarded for showing PCB-I (particularly by soft outcomes), yet they might go unrewarded or even get punished for displaying male-typed PCB-O, as PCB-O corresponds to neither their gender nor their job role. Men in gender-congruent job roles will particularly be rewarded for enacting male-typed PCB-O (more by hard than by soft outcomes), yet not for showing female-typed PCB-I. In contrast, perceptions and evaluations of PCBs will change for project members in gender-incongruent job roles. While women project managers will not be rewarded for female-typed PCB-I (i.e., for showing female-typed behaviors in a male-typed job role), it can be assumed that they will be rewarded when they display male-typed PCB-O (i.e., conforming to their job role and contradicting gender role ascriptions), though it is questionable if they yield more soft or hard outcomes. Instead, men project members in gender-incongruent roles (i.e., without supervision, budget control, etc.) might be rewarded for displaying PCB-I, yet it is questionable if they will be rewarded for displaying PCB-O, as these stereotypically male behaviors would contradict the gendered ascription about their job role and might therefore lack legitimacy (Kark & Waismel-Manor, 2005, p. 905; Martin, 1996). Thus, regarding the relation of PCB and gendered project roles we propose,

**Hypothesis 2a.** For women project members, PCB-I has a positive relationship to soft and hard outcomes only when they occupy gender-congruent project roles; when women occupy gender-incongruent project roles, PCB-O has a positive relationship to soft and hard outcomes.

**Hypothesis 2b.** For men project members in gender-congruent project roles, PCB-O has a positive relationship to soft and hard outcomes. This relation lessens or vanishes for men project members in gender-incongruent project roles; instead PCB-I has a positive relationship to soft and hard outcomes.

### 3. Methods

#### 3.1. Sample and data collection procedure

The survey that we composed for this study could be filled out online. The sample consists of a cross-sectional set of respondents who work on various projects (from classical construction projects to project-based IT implementation and event management projects). The study was supported by the German and Portuguese representations of the International Project Management Association (IPMA). The IPMA has currently more than 40,000 members (including approximately 7000 in Germany and 1000 in Portugal) in ~40 national associations promoting the project management profession and providing standards and guidelines for project management professionals. The survey was announced by the e-mail newsletters of IPMA Germany and Portugal, at practitioner conferences organized by the IPMA, and on official websites in both countries. In addition, IPMA groups on social networks such as Facebook and Xing were informed. The invitation to participate was not personalized; thus, a rate of return cannot be calculated very accurately. However, concerning the overall population (at the time of data collection), we have reached roughly 4% of the German and 13% of the Portuguese IPMA members. Moreover, we interviewed an international board member of IPMA, showing him the descriptive structure of our dataset, and he confirmed that the national samples for Germany and Portugal are a very good approximation of the member structure, except for a slight over-representation of the IT-sector at the expense of traditional manufacturing industries, as well as consulting services.

The sample consists of 241 respondents from Germany (48%) and Portugal (52%) who are regularly engaged in project-based work (an original group of 247 respondents was reduced by 6 owing to missing gender indications). The respondents are project managers (73%) and other project workers (27%). The average age is 40. Sixty-nine percent of the respondents are men, and 31% are women. Two-thirds of the respondents have over 6 years of project management experience. More than half of the respondents are in a managerial position with direct reports (64.7%) and budget control (56.8%). The duration of the projects ranges from several months to several years, averaging around 1.5 years. Almost half of the sample (47.4%) worked on technology and communication projects, and the remainder were engaged in various areas, such as research and development (14.2%), construction (13.4%), organizational change (9.7%), strategy (8.1%), and industry (3.6%).

#### 3.2. Measures

A 7-point Likert scale (1 = “I do not agree at all” to 7 = “I totally agree”) was applied for the items measuring citizenship behavior and outcomes. All questions focused on the latest fully completed project in which the respondent was involved.
The independent variables capture the five dimensions of PCB defined by Braun et al. (2012, 2013), whereby we aggregated, guided by previous research (Organ, 1997), helping behavior and relationship maintenance to PCB-I and initiative, loyalty, and compliance to PCB-O. Examples of items are: (1) helping behavior (e.g., “I help project staff when they have heavy workloads”), (2) project loyalty (e.g., “I defend the project when it is criticized from the outside”), (3) project-based compliance (e.g., “I follow strictly the rules and instructions that apply to the project”), (4) conform to all contractual obligations I have in the project with great care”, (4) individual initiative (e.g., “I make innovative suggestions to improve the project”), (5) relationship maintenance (e.g., “In the conflicts, I catch up with former external project workers”, “Occasionally, I contact selected external project employees of previous projects”). All of the dimensions present good psychometric evidence with construct validity and Cronbach alphas ranging between .90 and .96 for relationship maintenance. The scale also presents good construct composite reliability with values ranging from .70 to .76 (Braun et al., 2012, 2013). In order to avoid undesirable effects, essentially due to a reduced sample number of parameter ratios, we proceeded with item parceling strategies in SEM, as suggested by the literature (Hall, Snell, & Foust, 1999). Accordingly, we computed the mean score for each construct (with 3–5 the items belonging to each construct), reducing the number of free parameters and overcoming sample size demands.

Regarding the dependent variables, we focus on individual employment outcomes as laid out above divided into “soft” and “hard” outcomes. ‘Soft’ outcomes of PCB that impact relationship quality among project members are captured by the items ‘Because of this project ...’ (1) ‘I collaborate closer with particular project workers than I did before’, and (2) ‘I collaborate more trustfully with particular project workers than I did before’. ‘Hard’ outcomes of PCB that impact tenure and career progress are measured via the items ‘Because of this project ...’ (3) ‘I personally receive more collaboration-requests from project workers than I received before.’ and (4) ‘I made progress in my professional career’. Thus, we gathered subjective judgments about individual employment consequences.

### 3.3. Analysis

In the analysis, we considered a factorial distinction for PCB-I (including relationship maintenance and helping behavior) and PCB-O (including initiative, loyalty, and compliance). Regarding job roles, in line with the literature (e.g., Acke, 1990; Kark & Waisel-Manor, 2005; Ridgeway, 2009), we defined male congruence as the combination of male gender with supervision and budget control (i.e., male-typed work characteristics). Male incongruence was the combination of male gender and no supervision and no budget control. Female congruence was female gender, no supervision, and no budget control. Female incongruence was female gender combined with supervision duties and budget control. Finally, gender congruence comprises male and female congruence, whereas gender incongruence encompasses male and female incongruence. Fig. 1 displays the core relationships of PCB to work outcomes hypothesized both for women and men project members (H1) and for the different situations of female and male (in) congruence (H2).

To test our hypotheses, we used structural equation modeling (SEM) and analyzed the relationship between PCB-I and both soft and hard outcomes and that between PCB-O and soft and hard outcomes. We used AMOS to draw the relationship between the latent variables as laid out in Fig. 2. SEM with covariance matrices and maximum likelihood estimation was performed to test the hypothesized model. We studied the goodness of fit for the SEM presented in Fig. 2. Previously, we tested model validity and found evidence supporting the instrument’s convergent (Henseler, Ringle, & Sinkovics, 2009) and discriminant validity (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010). For the latent constructs, we found an average variance extracted (AVE) higher than 0.50, which was higher than the maximum shared variance and average shared variance. In our study, we combined the comparative fit index (CFI), the incremental fit index (NFI), and the root-mean-square error of approximation (RMSEA). As a rule of thumb, CFI and IFI indicators should be equal to or greater than .90 (Bollen, 1989). For RMSEA, the most reliable and popular goodness-of-fit indicator
values smaller than .08 are a reasonable result (Bollen, 1989).

### 4. Results

Table 1 presents the studied variables, for gender, work characteristics, PCB, and outcomes. In our results, loyalty ($M = 6.10$, $DP = 0.67$) and initiative ($M = 5.96$, $DP = 0.73$) were the PCB dimensions with the highest mean scores. As for the outcomes, the second one (trustful collaboration) presented the highest mean score ($M = 5.45$, $DP = 1.28$). Overall, we found moderate and low positive correlations between the PCB variables and the soft and hard outcomes. We also found a negative correlation between supervision and compliance ($r = -.16$, $p < .05$) and helping behavior ($r = -.18$, $p < .01$), respectively, meaning that employees with supervision responsibilities display lower levels of compliance and helping behavior. Most importantly, there is no correlation between gender and any other of the studied variables, meaning that the self-reported enactment of PCBs does not vary by gender.

Table 2 compiles the results of our structural equation modeling analysis. A first model comprising all participants indicated that the model fit the data well ($\chi^2 = 419.25$, $df = 21$; IFI = .964; CFI = .963; RMSEA = .064; see Table 2). This initial model shows a significant and positive correlation between PCB-I and soft outcomes ($\gamma = .45$, $p < .05$) yet no other significant correlations between PCBs and soft or hard outcomes. A split of the sample into men and women (M1a and M1b) still displays good model fit and shows that the relation of PCBs to soft and hard outcomes indeed strongly varies by gender. In the male sample, PCB-O is positively correlated with both soft and hard outcomes ($\gamma = .72$, $p < .01$, and $\gamma = .63$, $p < .01$, respectively), and PCB-I is not. Instead, in the female sample PCB-I shows significant correlations with both soft and hard outcomes ($\gamma = .44$ and $\gamma = .43$, both $p < .05$), and PCB-O does not. This pattern supports H1, as we find clear relationships between PCB-O and work outcomes only for men and between PCB-I and work outcomes only for women. Moreover, supporting H1a, we find that the relationship between PCB-O and work outcomes for men is more pronounced than is the relationship between PCB-I and work outcomes for women. Yet, H1b is not supported. For men, the positive relation of PCB-O to hard outcomes is weaker than that to soft outcomes; and for women, the positive relations of PCB-I to soft and hard outcomes are about the same strength. Both results contradict our H1b assumptions.

Then we tested the same model with different samples, considering the six possible situations of gendered job role congruence and incongruence. Models 2 and 3 (Table 2) reveal that gender (in) congruence again makes a difference. Whereas under gender congruence the (positive) correlation between PCB-O and hard outcomes is significant ($\gamma = .53$, $p < .05$), under gender incongruence there is a (significantly higher) positive correlation between PCB-O and soft outcomes ($\gamma = .63$, $p < .01$). Yet in these models PCB-I has no significant correlation to soft or hard outcomes. These results show that the assumptions of Kidder and Mac Lean Parks (2001) based on role theory alone do not hold; if so, project members in gender-congruent job roles should be rewarded for counter role behavior—women for PCB-O and men for

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**Table 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Gender</td>
<td>1.32</td>
<td>.47</td>
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<tr>
<td>2. Supervision</td>
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<td>.09</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Budget control</td>
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<td>.50</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.42**</td>
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<td>4. Relationship maintenance</td>
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<td>.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>5. Initiative</td>
<td>5.96</td>
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<td>.07</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.41**</td>
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<tr>
<td>6. Compliance</td>
<td>5.89</td>
<td>.64</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.07</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.40**</td>
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<tr>
<td>7. Loyalty</td>
<td>6.10</td>
<td>.67</td>
<td>.09</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.44**</td>
<td>.34**</td>
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<tr>
<td>8. Helping behavior</td>
<td>5.77</td>
<td>.89</td>
<td>.03</td>
<td>.18**</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.31**</td>
<td>.36**</td>
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<td>9. Close collaboration</td>
<td>5.00</td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.17**</td>
<td>.05</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.23**</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Trustful collaboration</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>1.18</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>.24</td>
<td>.11</td>
<td>.25**</td>
<td>.71**</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>11. Collaboration requests</td>
<td>4.76</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.14</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.28</td>
<td>.22**</td>
<td>.25</td>
<td>.55</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. Career progress</td>
<td>5.01</td>
<td>1.67</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.24**</td>
<td>.21**</td>
<td>.04</td>
<td>.10</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>.18</td>
<td>.42</td>
<td>.42**</td>
<td>.46**</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Gender: 1 = male, 2 = female; supervision: 1 = yes, 2 = no; budget control: 1 = yes, 2 = no. SD = standard deviation.*

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**Fig. 2.** Path diagram with the relationships between PCB and work outcomes.

Note: PCB-I = project citizenship behaviour – individual; PCB-O = project citizenship behaviour – organizational.
PCB-I. It would mean that no correlation should show up in our
gender congruence sample that comprises both men and women
in gender-congruent job roles.

Instead, a comparison of models 2 and 3 with models 4 to 7
impressively shows that the gender of project members
combined with job role congruence makes the decisive difference,
as hypothesized in H2. Model 4 (female congruence) and model 5
(female incongruence) thereby partially support Hypothesis 2a.
We find, as expected, in situations of female congruence (model 4)
a strong positive and significant correlation between PCB-I and soft
outcomes ($r = .77$, $p < .05$), which is higher and more pronounced
than the correlation on those variables in both the general sample
and the female sample. And for women project members in
gender-congruent project roles, a strongly negative relation of
PCB-O to soft outcomes ($r = -.64$, $p < .05$) is noteworthy. In
contrast, no significant correlation to hard outcomes can be found
for female job role congruence. This again contradicts the mere
role theory-driven assumption that women project members
would be rewarded for counter role behavior; instead it points to
a backlash effect for women project members. Regarding female
incongruence (model 5), PCB-O is positively correlated with soft
outcomes ($r = .64$, $p < .05$), again supporting H2a, yet there is no
significant correlation to hard outcomes.

Models 6 (male congruence) and 7 (male incongruence) reveal
results that partly support our predictions in Hypothesis 2b. For
men in gender-congruent project roles, PCB-I has no significant
relation to soft or hard outcomes. Instead, PCB-O displays a
positive correlation to hard outcomes ($r = .51$, $p < .05$) as well as
to soft outcomes ($r = .52$, $p < .05$). Yet, contrary to prediction, in
situations of male job role incongruence, PCB-O also displays a
positive correlation to hard outcomes ($r = .47$, $p < .05$) and an even
stronger one to soft outcomes ($r = .81$, $p < .01$). Instead, against our
assumptions, for men in gender-incongruent project roles PCB-I has
no correlation to soft outcomes.

In sum, our findings suggest that the achievement of soft and
hard outcomes is significantly related with PCB-O for males, while
it is significantly correlated with PCB-I for females. Our results also
show that the effect of PCB on work outcomes depends on the
typology of gender job role congruence and incongruence. For
example, for gender job role congruence, PCB-O has more influence
on hard outcomes, while PCB-O appears more correlated with soft
outcomes in situations of gender job role incongruence. This
assumption was supported when we studied congruence
differentiation across gender job roles. Ultimately, our findings
show that female job role congruence reflects a significant positive
 correlation between PCB-I and soft outcomes, as well as a negative
significant correlation between PCB-O and soft outcomes. For male
project members in gender-congruent job roles, PCB-I was found to
have a significant correlation with soft and hard outcomes.

### 5. Discussion

The results of the study bear clear relevance for management
research on temporary organizations as well as for organizational
research on gender. The rise of temporary organizations over
recent decades has led to this organizational form’s increasingly
receiving attention from both practitioners and academics, not
least because of the fascination of the time dimension (Bakker et al.,
2013). The objective of the present study was to develop and
test how gender congruence affects the relationship between
coopérative behaviors (operationalized as PCB) and work out-
comes in the face of temporality. More specifically, the primary aim
was to analyze whether gender makes a difference in how
coopérative behaviors are perceived and valued and thus may lead
to different individual opportunities for men and women in
temporary organizations. Our results suggest – in line with
corresponding conceptual and empirical analyses of OCB (Allan,
2006; Kark & Waismel-Manor, 2005; Kidder & Mac Lean Parks,
2001) – that PCB indeed has gendered consequences.

Instead, the (self-reported) enactment of PCB does not vary by
gender. Regarding our results, the absence of correlations between
the types of PCB reported and gender show that men and women
project members engage to similar extents in female-typed PCB-I
and male-typed PCB-O—both in gender-role-congruent and
gender-role-incongruent ways. This finding in a way contradicts
one aspect of the relationships between gender roles and

---

**Table 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Situations</th>
<th>PCB-I → soft outcomes</th>
<th>PCB-I → hard outcomes</th>
<th>PCB-O → soft outcomes</th>
<th>PCB-O → hard outcomes</th>
<th>Fit indices</th>
<th>$\Delta \chi^2$ (congruence–incongruence)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>M1. General sample</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>.23</td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>$\chi^2 (21) = 41.925$; $\chi^2/df = 1.996^*$; IFI = .964; CFI = .963; RMSEA = .064</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n = 241)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M1a. Male sample</td>
<td>–.27</td>
<td>–.18</td>
<td>.72**</td>
<td>.63**</td>
<td>$\chi^2 (21) = 40.630$; $\chi^2/df = 1.935^*$; IFI = .957; CFI = .956; RMSEA = .075</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>(n = 165)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M1b. Female sample</td>
<td>.44</td>
<td>.43**</td>
<td>–.22</td>
<td>.08</td>
<td>$\chi^2 (21) = 23.556$; $\chi^2/df = 1.112^*$; IFI = .985; CFI = .984; RMSEA = .040</td>
<td>$\Delta \chi^2 = 17.074^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(n = 76)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M2. Gender congruence</td>
<td>.01</td>
<td>–.06</td>
<td>.34</td>
<td>.53</td>
<td>$\chi^2 (21) = 30.197$; $\chi^2/df = 1.438^*$; IFI = .968; CFI = .966; RMSEA = .067</td>
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<tr>
<td>(n = 100)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M3. Gender incongruence</td>
<td>–.04</td>
<td>.16</td>
<td>.63**</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>$\chi^2 (21) = 29.177$; $\chi^2/df = 1.326^*$; IFI = .942; CFI = .935; RMSEA = .088</td>
<td>$\Delta \chi^2 = 5.131^*$</td>
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<td>(n = 76)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M4. Female congruence</td>
<td>.77</td>
<td>.45</td>
<td>–.64</td>
<td>.19</td>
<td>$\chi^2 (21) = 24.046$; $\chi^2/df = 1.145^*$; IFI = .963; CFI = .955; RMSEA = .067</td>
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<tr>
<td>M5. Female incongruence</td>
<td>–.02</td>
<td>.12</td>
<td>.35</td>
<td>.26</td>
<td>$\chi^2 (21) = 23.311$; $\chi^2/df = 1.492^*$; IFI = .960; CFI = .958; RMSEA = .078</td>
<td>$\Delta \chi^2 = 4.435^*$</td>
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<tr>
<td>M6. Male congruence</td>
<td>–.14</td>
<td>–.08</td>
<td>.52</td>
<td>.51</td>
<td>$\chi^2 (21) = 26.896$; $\chi^2/df = 1.281^*$; IFI = .963; CFI = .959; RMSEA = .082</td>
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<tr>
<td>(n = 81)</td>
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<tr>
<td>M7. Male incongruence</td>
<td>–.16</td>
<td>–.03</td>
<td>.81**</td>
<td>.47</td>
<td>$\chi^2 (21) = 26.896$; $\chi^2/df = 1.281^*$; IFI = .963; CFI = .959; RMSEA = .082</td>
<td>–</td>
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<tr>
<td>(n = 43)</td>
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</table>

*Note: PCB-I = project citizenship behaviour-individual; PCB-O = project citizenship behaviour-organizational.
$p < .05$.
$p < .01$. 
et al., 2013). This utility – in the eye of the beholder, the job incumbent (here, project member) – seems to be primarily disassociated from gender role ascensions.

Yet, while the reported enactment of PCB does not vary by project members’ gender, the relationship of PCB and its outcomes does. Our analysis shows that men perceive themselves to be rewarded for displaying male-typed PCB-O, yet not for displaying female-typed PCB-I. Instead, women felt to be predominantly rewarded for displaying PCB-I, and to achieve hard employment outcomes for it to a lower extent than men for displaying PCB-O. These gendered outcomes appear as unfair given the result that gender does not have an impact on project performance (Ojako et al., 2014). But, this pattern of gendered outcomes of PCB corresponds very much to the propositions of Kark and Waismel-Manor (2005) as well as to the findings of Allen (2006) regarding OCB. And in our comparison of gender-congruent and gender-incongruent project roles we go still a step further and highlight some more aspects of such unequal employment consequences.

Most importantly, our results contradict Kidder and Mac Lean Parks’s view (2001) that both men and women in gender-congruent job roles perceive themselves to be rewarded for gender-incongruent behavior. Instead, in our sample, women project members displaying male-typed PCB-O rarely perceived themselves to be rewarded—only in situations of gender incongruence, and only by soft outcomes (in terms of better cooperation). They felt at times even penalized for displaying PCB-O (PCB-O had a negative correlation to soft outcomes in female-typed project roles, i.e., without supervision duties and budget control)—pointing to a backlash effect of counter role behavior that up to now has above all been shown for women managers (Rudman et al., 2012). Moreover, men in no case feel to be rewarded for displaying female-typed PCB-I—what yet should be the case according to Kidder and Mac Lean Parks (2001) at least for men in gender-congruent project roles (i.e., with supervision duties and budget control). The lack of correlations of PCB-I displayed by men to soft and hard outcomes (in all considered situations) can on the one hand be taken as an indicator for backlash effects against (modest) men as discussed by Moss-Racusin et al. (2010). Yet on the other hand, the strong correlations of PCB-O displayed by men to soft and hard outcomes (again in all considered situations) make it difficult to speak of a backlash effect against men; they instead show that men project members perceive themselves in any case—in both gender-congruent and -incongruent project roles—better off and more strongly rewarded than their women counterparts who display the same citizenship behaviors. In this regard, our results reinforce Kark and Waismel-Manor’s (2005) view that mere gender role assumptions should be refuted as they disregard gendered power differentials. Our results—in accordance with the distribution of male- and female-typed project roles to men and women in our sample (and not only there)—indeed support Kark and Waismel-Manor’s assumptions on the gendered effects of OCB as well as our assumption that in temporary organizations such as projects corresponding gendered effects of citizenship behaviors will show up.

In sum, we conclude that citizenship behaviors tend to reproduce the gendered division of labor and inequality between women and men not only in ‘permanent’ organizations, but also in temporary ones such as projects. This reproduction might be due to the interrelationships of temporary and permanent organizations and in particular to the embeddedness of the temporary in the more permanent. As for projects, our examples of temporary organization, we know that they cut through organizational hierarchies, that they are characterized by more informal and a-bureaucratic team structures, and that these features should make them fruitful ground for more diversity and equality in a work setting (as e.g., proposed by Ferguson, 1984; Fondas, 1996; Savage & Witz, 1992). Hence, our results should be surprising for the research in the domain of temporary organizations. At the same time, we know from the still scarce gender research on project management that this work domain is still heavily dominated by men (e.g., Legault & Chassserio, 2012), and that both working conditions and project management procedures (Buckle & Thomas, 2003; Chassserio & Legault, 2010; Henderson & Stackman, 2010; Legault & Chassserio, 2012; Lindgren & Packendorff, 2006; Thomas & Buckle-Henning, 2007) tend to reproduce norms of masculinity and to disadvantage women. The reason may be that projects are not decoupled from time and space but are rather a result of historicity (e.g., existing relationships between project members that have shaped over time), the statuses of project members in an encompassing life organization, and more (Engwall, 2003). Hence, given gender relations and gendered statutes in permanent organizations it should be of no surprise to gender research researchers that the stable gender inequality (Calás et al., 2014) is mirrored and reproduced in temporary organizations. Moreover, we know that limited time can change the mode of information processing, i.e. if time is limited, individuals tend to process information rather heuristically than systematically (Bakker et al., 2013). A typical heuristic is to hold onto stereotypes and proven roles such as typical gender images. In this sense it appears to be conclusive and again no surprise that stereotypical gender roles are reproduced in temporary organizations. As also Kuura, Blackhson and Lundin (2014) propose in their recent call to link project management and entrepreneurship literatures, such a view on the gendering of temporary organizations (in analogy to ‘gendered entrepreneurship’; see e.g., Jayawarna et al., 2015) will shed light into this important, yet unexplored research domain.

As to practical implications our study shows that in temporary organizations such as projects managers need to be sensitized to corresponding gender role reproductions (and the potential implications) as well as to the more positive potential of gender diversity. Above all given the finding that gender does not have an impact on project performance (Ojako et al., 2014), managers should be alert to appreciate and reward enactments of PCB-I and PCB-O likewise for women and men in their differential project roles. Also, managers should be alert to focus on gender diversity as early as the time of recruiting and staffing for projects. During the projects, they should consider rotating tasks to foster mutual understanding and a focus on team performance instead of individual performance. ‘Soft indicators’ such as PCB-I should be incorporated into performance measurement. Though direct project performance impacts might not be measurable, these cooperative behaviors can be regarded as indispensable for a project’s success. Training and development should furthermore focus on sensitizing for gender stereotyping and avoiding its consequences.

This research is not without limitations. Our use of a cross-sectional correlational design limits the generalizability of our findings. Structural equation modeling is a useful technique in testing causal paths between variables; however, one must be cautious when establishing cause–effect inferences. Also, many of the studied concepts are intangibles and thus difficult to measure. Furthermore, all measures in the present study were self-reported and based on employees’ perceptions. To avoid common method bias, it would be helpful to have several sources of information and in particular objective data (Podsakoff et al., 2003). This applies particularly to the outcome measures. Unfortunately, such data was not available to our study. Even though this is an obvious restriction, it seems not only an issue for this study, but also a widespread limitation of OCB research (Organ et al., 2006). As this does not legitimize the bias, we tried to analyze it as much as possible. We chose the Harman one-factor test, a widely used technique (Podsakoff et al., 2003) with the central assumption that
if a major amount of common method variance occurs, a single factor emerges from an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) (Aulakh & Gencurt, 2000). Considering these methods, we loaded all variables into an EFA in a first phase (using principal component analysis and varimax rotation) and examined the nonrotated result to examine the number of factors that accounted for variance in the variables. Ten factors accounting for 67% of the variance emerged. The largest factor accounted for only 21%. The CFA showed that the one-factor model did not fit the data well; meaning that the general factor (the common method variance) did not explain the majority of the covariance among the measures (Iverson & Maguire, 2000). Although these results give us confidence regarding common method bias, this approach does not control the common method variance effects in a statistical sense (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 889). However, results suggested that common variance is not a major concern and thus should not affect the main conclusions of our study.

In addition, the sample used here is relatively small. Still, all models converged and fit indices are satisfactory, an indication that the data model can be adequately assessed with small samples. For example, Nevitt and Hancock (2004) found that fit statistics can even operate well with samples of fewer than 50, even with nonnormal data. Yet, some interesting aspects could not be treated because of the small sample size. For instance, the specific business context, which has been shown to matter for the gendering of managerial work in permanent organizations (Eriksson, Henttonen, & Meriläinen, 2008), could not be analyzed in detail. Though controlling for variables such as project size, project budget, and industry yielded no significant differences in our sample, we assume that this may well be different in a bigger sample composed along business context variables.

Lastly, our sample consisted of project workers from two different countries, Portugal and Germany. As both project management (Ferreira, Braun, & Sydow, 2013; Kuura et al., 2014) and gender relations are culturally bound (Kark & Waismel-Mantor, 2005; Ridgeway, 2009), one might expect a country effect on the studied relations. We tried to perform the same structural equation analyses described above with project members’ nationality added. However, some of the subsamples (e.g., Portuguese + female) were too small for an inductive analysis, so the respective models did not converge. Our analysis is based on the same dataset that we use in a prior study on cultural differences with respect to citizenship behaviors (Ferreira et al., 2013). Our findings in this study appear to be compatible, and at the least not contrary, to those of our previously published study on cultural differences. Furthermore, the smallness of some of our subsamples may account for the initial descriptive indications of culturally embedded differences in gender variables that our inductive statistical test failed to support. Taken together, these points give us confidence in the validity of our findings. Moreover, a previous multicultural study conducted with participants from 33 different countries showed no direct relationship between cultural variables (power distance and individualism) and group organizational citizenship behavior (Euwema et al., 2007). Despite the evidence, we still believe that future studies should expand the analysis to include a comparative view on the national and cultural context of gender relations in temporary organizations. Moreover, our study includes project members from different sectors which might have influenced the outcomes. Inductive analyses on sectoral differences did not lead to significant results (p > .05), and for those sectors with few respondents a subsequent analysis was not possible. Thus, future studies with larger samples within each sector might consider controlling the sector variable. For example, whether a sector is male- or female-typed (e.g., technological work vs. humanistic work), might affect the results.

Several other avenues could be pursued. In terms of replicating our results, further studies with different methods and samples should examine the domain of equality, diversity, and gender roles in temporary organizations. A deeper understanding of how gender roles are enacted in temporary organizations is needed, preferably one based on ethnographic case studies that scrutinize the practices and processes sustaining gender inequalities (e.g., Aaltio-Marjosola, 1994; Ackor, 2006; or Eriksson et al., 2008; on gendering processes in permanent organizations). Such studies can help reveal the reasons for male dominance and explore organizational conditions that may bring more women into employment in temporary organizations. Another important topic for further investigation is the interrelationship of the temporary and the permanent. More precisely, future studies may ask what mechanisms existing in line organizations reproduce behavioral patterns in temporary organizations and thus shed more light on the historicity of this organizational form.

References


